Caseldine v. Johnson (In re Goldsworthy's Estate)

• Decision Date: 10 July 1941
• Docket Number: No. 4578.,4578.
• Citation: 115 P.2d 627,45 N.M. 406
• Parties: In re GOLDSWORTHY'S ESTATE. CASELDINEv.JOHNSON.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

45 N.M. 406

115 P.2d 627

In re GOLDSWORTHY'S ESTATE. CASELDINE

v.JOHNSON.

No. 4578.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 10, 1941.Rehearing Denied Aug. 18, 1941.

Appeal from District Court, Lea County; James B. McGhee, Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Nancy A. Goldsworthy, deceased, wherein Bessie Caseldine filed a claim to which Orville Ray Johnson, executor, filed written objections. From an adverse judgment, claimant appeals.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Under the “last antecedent doctrine”, relative and qualifying words, phrases, and clauses in a statute should be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and should not be construed as extending to or including others more remote.

Lake J. Frazier, of Roswell, for appellant.

Don G. McCormick, of Hobbs, for appellee.

BICKLEY, Justice.

Bessie caseldine, the appellant, a resident of Missouri, on September 12, 1939, filed her claim against the estate of Nancy A. Goldsworthy, deceased, pending in the District Court.

The claim consists of nine separate and distinct items as appears in the court's findings and conclusions quoted post. Items numbered 1 to 6 and number 8 are for personal services rendered by claimant to the deceased in Missouri during a period of time from July 1, 1917 to an unnamed date in July, 1930. Item No. 7 is for maintaining and caring for the grave of the husband of Mrs. Goldsworthy from 1923 to 1938 in the sum of $50. Item No. 9 is for money expended and advanced for Nancy A. Goldsworthy for postage from October, 1923 to May 31, 1938, amounting to $9.60.

The executor, the appellee, filed written objections to said claim and each and every item thereof as follows: “*** (1) that each and every item of the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations of the State of Missouri and also of the State of New Mexico; (2) that the claim was not corroborated by any promise in writing to pay the same by the deceased, and (3) that the said claim was wholly void and without force and effect, and was not a binding obligation of the Estate of the deceased, and should be denied.”

The case was tried by the court, without a jury. The claimant offered in evidence the testimony of five witnesses, all by depositions. No testimony was offered by the Executor in resistance to the claim.

The court took the case under advisement and on December 27, 1939, rendered its notice of decision as follows:

“After considerable wrestling with the briefs and authorities, I have reached the conclusion that as the indebtedness was not contracted in New Mexico and did not accrue herein, that it is barred by our Statute of Limitations except for the letter written by Mrs. Goldsworthy and attached to the deposition. Both of these questions were very close.

“An examination of the deposition does not disclose that any specific amount was agreed upon for board and nursing, so that the recovery thereon will have to be on quantum meruit. Additional proof will have to be offered as to the reasonableness of the claim. The claim for storage, caring for the grave, and postage will be disallowed on account of lack of corroboration. I will give the claimant an opportunity to take additional depositions on the reasonable value of the nursing services and board and room.”

The question of reasonableness of the claim was met by a stipulation of the parties to the effect that if the services were rendered as set out in Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, the demands therefor are reasonable. In view of the record, we conclude that Item No. 6 presented a claim reasonable in amount, being less than a dollar a month for the services alleged to have been rendered.

On March 20, 1940, the court filed a memorandum opinion in which it withdrew the former memorandum notice of decision heretofore quoted. In this second decision, the court's principal if not the sole reason for reversal of its former holding was that a letter written by Mrs. Goldsworthy to claimant in 1936, which concluded with the words: “I will pay you soon.”, did not, as the court had originally thought, serve to revive the indebtedness, the court saying: “There are many items in the claim and the letter is, in my opinion, too indefinite upon which to base a revival or written acknowledgment of the indebtedness.”

The same day the court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the material portions of which are as follows:

“1. That decedent was a resident of New Mexico for approximately three months prior to the time of her death and had never been a resident of this State at any other time.

“2. That the claims for board on the items barred by limitations in support thereof are indefinite and rather unsatisfactory, while the items within the six year period are intermingled with the old items and the unbarred part can not from the testimony be segregated.

“3. That the decedent was never a member of claimant's family.

“4. That the decedent was a resident of the State of Missouri at the time the services were performed by claimant, other than postage and storage charges incurred after decedent's removal from the State of Missouri in 1923. From 1923 until decedent's removal to New Mexico, a short time prior to her death, she was a resident of the State of California.

“5. That the letter attached to the depositions and received in evidence was written by decedent on June 29, 1936.

“6. That the executor has submitted no evidence to show that the claim as submitted by the claimant, is not the indebtedness mentioned by decedent in her said letter.

“7. That the claim herein consists of nine separate and distinct items as follows:

1. Nursing and boarding the said Nancy A. Goldsworthy from July 1, 1917 to January 1, 1918. 6 months at $40 per month $240.00 2. Boarding said Nancy A. Goldsworthy for the months of February, March, April, May and June 1918. 5 months at $30 per month 150.00 3. Boarding said Nancy A. Goldsworthy for the months of April, May, June, July and August 1919. 5 months at $30 a month 150.00 4. Boarding said Nancy A. Goldsworthy for the months of March, April, May and June 1920. 4 months at $30 a month 120.00 5. Boarding said Nancy A. Goldsworthy for the months of September, October, November and December 1921. 4 months at $30 a month 120.00 6. Storage and handling of trunks of the said Nancy A. Goldsworthy and storage and handling of other household goods for her for five years, 1918 to 1923 50.00 7. Maintaining, decorating and caring for her husband's grave and her lot from 1923 to 1938, inclusive, which required the claimant to drive a distance of 25 miles to perform said services 50.00 8. Boarding said Nancy A. Goldsworthy for two weeks in 1923 and for two days in July 1930 16.00 9. Money expended and advanced for the said Nancy A. Goldsworthy for postage to mail the Braymer Bee, a weekly newspaper of Braymer, Missouri, from October 1923 to May 31, 1938 9.60 $905.60

“8. That the only reference in the letter of June 29, 1936 is that part reading ‘will pay you soon.’

Conclusions of Law

“Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, I make the following conclusions of law:

“1. That all items set out and showing to have been incurred more than 6 years prior to the death of decedent are barred by limitation.

“2. That the letter of June 29, 1936 is so indefinite and vague as to the debt meant that it is insufficient to revive the indebtedness.

“3. That the items of indebtedness not barred on their face are not segregated and are so intermingled with the barred items that it is impossible to determine their amount.

“4. That the testimony offered in corroboration is vague and indefinite as to amounts, though if not barred might be sufficient, but there is no corroboration on the items not barred by limitations.” (Italics supplied)

We will decide the matter of corroboration first.

In the second memorandum the court said: “As to that part of items 7, 8, and 9 which are not barred, they are intermingled with barred items to such an extent that it is impossible from the deposition introduced in evidence or the claim to ascertain the amounts claimed to have accrued within the period not barred, and further there is no sufficient testimony corroborating these latter items.” (Italics supplied)

This indicates that the court did not specifically find that the item said to be barred were without corroboration. This also appears in the court's formal conclusion number 4 that if the claims were not barred the testimony offered in corroboration “might be sufficient”. Furthermore, we find the court made an order relative to the findings and conclusions requested by the parties in which it is recited that: “*** all requested findings of fact and conclusions of law of the parties in conflict with those made by the court be, and they are hereby denied, ***.”

Among plaintiff's requested findings of fact is the following: “That the claim of Bessie Caseldine has been corroborated by other material evidence.” It would be difficult to say that this requested finding was denied, because it is not in conflict with any finding the trial court made except as to Items 7 and 9, which the court specifically found to be uncorroborated.

On the other hand, the executor made no specific request for a finding of fact that the claim was not corroborated. However, the executor did request a conclusion of law as follows: “That the evidence of the Claimant regarding said alleged indebtedness is not corroborated by other material evidence in accordance with the Statutes of the State.”

It would have been inconsistent to have given this conclusion of law in view of what the court did find and conclude that as to Items 1 to 6 the evidence of corroboration “might be sufficient”. It is manifest from the record that the change of view of the court from allowance of certain items to disallowance thereof was due solely to a change of opinion relative to the application of the law of limitations without regard to...