Casey v. City of Los Angeles
| Decision Date | 02 August 1966 |
| Citation | 52 Cal.Rptr. 753,243 Cal.App.2d 789 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Theresa CASEY et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Board of Pension Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, Harold E. Levitt, John W. Givens, Leo J. Adelstein, M.D., Vincent M. Burke, and Arthur C. Eldred, as members thereof, Defendants and Appellants. Eva Lou BOWERS, Evelyn L. Dickey, Irene N. Haguewood, Felipa B. High, Della T. Kreis, Julia M. Morrison, Coral M. Rust, Christine Trimble, Maude Thomas, and Jessie M. Wollam, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Board of Pension Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, Harold E. Levitt, John W. Givens, Leo J. Adelstein, M.D., Vincent M. Burke, and Arthur C. Eldred, as members thereof, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 29851, 29852. |
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Weldon L. Weber, and John J. Tully, Jr., Asst. City Attys., for defendants and appellants.
Kenneth Sperry and John L. Kaesman, Long Beach, for plaintiffs and respondents.
In these two consolidated actions the plaintiffs, who are widows of policemen or firemen, seek a declaration with respect to pension benefits under the provisions of the charter of respondent City of Los Angeles. On a prior appeal (Atwell v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal.App.2d 336, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462--involving three actions, including the present two, Casey and Bowers), the judgments in the actions were affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions to the trial court to enter judgments in accordance with the opinion on appeal. Upon the retrial of the actions a question arose as to whether the court should receive evidence on the issue of estoppel,--the issue that defendants were estopped to assert affirmative defenses to the effect that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and by provisions of the charter regarding the time within which to file claims. The trial court determined that 'the law of the case' did not preclude the receiving of evidence on that issue. After receiving the evidence, the court found that defendants were estopped to assert said alleged defenses. Defendants appeal from the judgments.
Appellants (city and commissioners) contend that 'the law of the case' precluded the receiving of evidence on such issue of estoppel; and that the evidence received is insufficient to support the findings that defendants are estopped to assert said alleged defenses.
The plaintiffs are widows of firemen and policemen who had been pensioners under the charter provisions. In these actions, each plaintiff seeks a declaration that she is entitled to a fluctuating pension retroactive to the date of her husband's death. The Bowers action was commenced more than three years after the death of the husband of each plaintiff in that action. The Casey action was commenced within three years after the death of the husband of each plaintiff in that action. In both actions, each plaintiff had filed a claim with the city more than six months after her husband's death. (Three of them also filed claims 'shortly' after the deaths.)
The prior appeal (Atwell v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 201 Cal.App.2d 336, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462) was from judgments which were in favor of the plaintiffs in three consolidated actions (Atwell, 1 Casey, and Bowers). Those judgments were based, in substance, on determinations by the trial court, as follows: that a 1925 charter amendment was invalid insofar as it operated to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to fluctuating pensions; that the causes of action in Casey and Bowers were not barred by the provisions of sections 363 or 376 of the city charter, and the defendants were estopped to assert that the causes of action were barred by either of said charter sections; and that the causes of action in Bowers were not barred by the provisions of sections 312 or 338, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the defendants were estopped to assert that the causes of action are barred by either of said code sections.
On that appeal, it was stated (201 Cal.App.2d p. 338, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462) that the principal issue involved in the three actions was whether the 1925 charter amendment, regarding fluctuating pensions, was invalid as applied to the rights of a widow of a fireman or policeman who was appointed to his position prior to 1925. The court resolved that issue (pp. 339--340, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462) by holding that the said charter amendment was invalid for the reasons set forth in a companion case (Henry v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal.App.2d 299, 20 Cal.Rptr. 440--involving five actions). It was also stated on the prior appeal in the Atwell case (201 Cal.App.2d p. 340, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462) that the defendants (city and commissioners) contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to estop defendants from asserting that the said charter provisions and code sections were a bar to plaintiffs' pension claims. The opinion therein includes statements (p. 340, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462) to the effect that the claims provisions of the charter would operate so as to limit recovery of accrued pension payments, for each widow in the Casey case, retroactive only for a period not more than six months prior to the time when she filed her claim with the city; and the opinion includes statements (pp. 340--342, 20 Cal.Rptr. 462) to the effect that the limitation provisions of the code would bar the plaintiffs in the Bowers case from asserting their claims, because their action to establish their pension status was not commenced within three years from the death of their husbands; but the opinion makes no further express reference to the estoppel contention. (As previously stated, (1) the trial court (at the first trial) had found that defendants were estopped to assert that the claims were barred by provisions of the charter and the statute of limitations; and (2) the opinion on the prior appeal states that defendants contend on the appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support that finding.) The opinion on the prior appeal does refer to the Henry case (a companion case) in which it was held that the existence of such an estoppel is a question of fact (201 Cal.App.2d 299, 306, 20 Cal.Rptr. 440) and that such estoppel is not applicable to the five cases in the Henry case (201 Cal.App.2d, at p. 308, 20 Cal.Rptr. 440). The Henry opinion also states the elements necessary to establish such an estoppel (pp. 306--312, 20 Cal.Rptr. 440), and states the necessity of showing intentional conduct by the party to be estopped (as distinguished from showing only incorrect advice).
The opinion on the prior appeal (Atwell case) concludes with the following paragraph: 'The judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions to the trial court to enter judgment in accordance herewith. * * *' On the retrial, there was a pretrial conference at which a lengthy joint statement and lengthy separate statements were filed by the parties. The statements included detailed discussions of the Atwell and Henry cases and recited, in substance, that the issues remaining in dispute were: (1) whether the 'law of the case' in the Atwell opinion (as indicated by reference to the Henry opinion) precluded the presentation of evidence on the issue of estoppel by defendants to assert the charter provisions (§ 363 and § 376) and the code provisions (Code Civ.Proc., § 312 and § 338, subd. 1) as affirmative defenses barring the claims, and (2) whether subsequent 'intervening law' 3 relating to such estoppel precluded application of the law of the case (in Atwell and Henry) so as to prevent the presentation of evidence of estoppel.
When the case was called for trial the parties presented lengthy oral arguments with reference to the operation of the law of the case and the effect of intervening law thereon. At the conclusion of such argument, the judge stated in effect that since the Atwell opinion did not include any reference or direction relating to the issue of estoppel, and that since intervening law affected the statement of the law of estoppel as set forth in the Henry opinion, the court would permit plaintiffs to prevent evidence on that issue.
Appellants contend that 'the law of the case' pre...
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Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles
...provision. Inconsistent in some important respects with the foregoing resolution of the state of the law is Casey v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 789, 52 Cal.Rptr. 753. The parties agree that the situation presented in that case is identical in material respects with that in th......