Casey v. Proctor

• Decision Date: 20 June 1962
• Citation: 22 Cal.Rptr. 531
• Parties: William CASEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert Charles PROCTOR, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 25716.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 531

22 Cal.Rptr. 531

William CASEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert Charles PROCTOR, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 25716.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

June 20, 1962.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1962.

Hearing Granted Aug. 16, 1962.

Opinion vacated 28 Cal.Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579.

Harney, Drummond & Fitzwater, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Murchison, Cummings, Baker & Velpmen and Henry F. Walker, Los Angeles, for respondent.

SHINN, Presiding Justice.

The present action was instituted by William Casey against Robert Charles Proctor for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision of automobiles. On April 18, 1959, plaintiff, a Catholic Priest, operating his automobile, was stopped in traffic. His car was struck in the rear by one driven by defendant and was propelled into another car. Plaintiff was insured by Motors Insurance Corporation. Proctor's insurance was carried by Hardware Mutuals Insurance Company. Two days after the accident plaintiff took his car to a repair shop and made out a report of the accident in which he stated he had not been injured but that he expected to recover for the damages to his car. The car was repaired at a cost of $490. Motors Insurance sent receipted bills for the repairs to Hardware with a letter stating that Proctor was at fault in the accident. Hardware sent a check for the amount to Motors together with a release which it requested Motors to execute and to have executed by the persons in plaintiff's car. The release was executed by Motors and by plaintiff May 11, 1959, plaintiff's signature being witnessed by two friends. Apparently, plaintiff's insurance for collision damage was subject to a deduction of $100, which he evidently paid toward the repairs. He was reimbursed in this amount by Motors. The present action was brought March 16, 1960. It was alleged in the complaint that in the accident plaintiff received severe and serious injuries to his person, and damages were sought in the amount of $50,000. Proctor answered, denying negligence and asserting as a special defense the above mentioned release, a copy of which was attached to the answer. By a pretrial order based upon joint pretrial statements, the court directed that the special defense of the release should be tried first to a jury and that if the release should be held invalid further trial would be before a different jury. This issue was tried, the court directed the jury to find that the release was valid and binding, a verdict was returned as directed and judgment was entered for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

The ground of the appeal is that the release was executed under mistake of fact in that it was not known to plaintiff that he had sustained bodily injury, and it was his intention to effect a settlement of his claim for property damage and not for any bodily injury he may have suffered.

No claim was made by plaintiff upon defendant on account of personal injuries, and the demand of Motors Insurance upon Hardware Mutuals was for property (collision) damage for which plaintiff was insured by Motors.

Plaintiff was not contacted by defendant or his insurer. No representation was made to plaintiff by any one for the purpose of inducing him to execute the release. Plaintiff was competent to understand the release, and he executed it voluntarily. The release read in pertinent part: 'I/we, being of lawful age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge ROBERT C. PROCTOR of and from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown bodily injuries and property damage resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about the 18th day of APRIL 1959, at or near 9065 ROSECRANS, PARAMOUNT, CALIF. I/we hereby declare and represent that the injuries sustained are permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and in making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed that I/we rely wholly upon my/our own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and duration of said injuries. * * * It is understood and agreed that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, that the payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability, and that liability is expressly denied by the party or parties released.' Immediately above the signatures of Motors Insurance and plaintiff there appeared in bold type: 'CAUTION! READ BEFORE SIGNING.' Plaintiff had the release in his possession several days before he signed it. He did not testify that he failed to read the release, but that he could not say that he did read it; he 'probably' read the cautionary words that appeared above the signatures. He also testified that it was not his intention to release any claim that he might have for personal injuries. After the accident he suffered some pains in his neck and in July, upon consulation with physicians and as the result of X-rays taken, he learned that he may have suffered a broken vertebra in the accident. With respect to his condition resulting from the accident, he testified: 'I would say that for quite a few days after the accident I was completely shook up, to use an ordinary colloquialism. My nerves were completely shattered, but I controlled them as best I could.' Asked whether he read the papers every day from the time of the accident, he replied: 'With great difficulty. * * * Things involving deep thought were beyond me.' He testified that at an unspecified time he was called as a witness by the owner of the car into which his car was pushed and when then asked about his physical condition after the accident he replied: 'Well, I am all shaken up. Probably * * * I forgot exactly particularly how I said it--'Some muscles hurt' and 'I feel all aches.' My idea was there was nothing broken. * * * Well, to answer that question, your Honor, I explained that had I known--I knew I was sore and very sore and hurt, but I distinguish between fractures and strains and pulls of muscles. I knew very well that I was--I wouldn't use the word 'injured,' but I was hurt, which I felt that I could fight and get rid of as time went on with regard to these sore muscles, and so on.' He further testified that he had had difficulty with his neck from the time he was 18 or 19; during the five years previous to the accident he would have had trouble if he had played a game of Rugby; the pain was infrequent, a little more than once a month. Immediately following the accident and up until the date the release was signed, the neck pain differed substantially from what it had been before. 'Well, it differed in this sense: that it seemed to hurt me a little more especially trying to sleep, but it wasn't very much up to that.' He first consulted a doctor July 2, 1959; he had had X-rays of his neck before the accident and because of the pain in his neck he had consulted chiropractors.

There are several propositions that are well established.

One who knows he has been injured in an accident and executes a release which is induced by undue pressure exerted by the releasee, or by other conditions, which render his consent to the release involuntary, is not bound thereby. Relying upon this rule plaintiff cites the following cases: Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal.2d 469, 144 P.2d 349; Meyer v. Haas, 126 Cal. 560, 58 P. 1042; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Zimmer, 87 Cal.App.2d 524, 197 P.2d 363; Backus v. Sessions...