Casey v. Standish
| Decision Date | 19 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 8349,8349 |
| Citation | 492 S.W.2d 629 |
| Parties | Dora H. CASEY, Appellant, v. William S. STANDISH, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Stokes, Carnahan & Fields, Richard L. Wilcox, Amarillo, for appellant.
Sanders, Scott, Saunders, Brian & Finney, Joseph M. Pritchard, Amarillo, for appellee.
This is a suit for injuries sustained as a result of an intersection collision. From a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff, William S. Standish, the defendant, Dora H. Casey, has perfected this appeal. Affirmed.
Appellee alleged that appellant had been negligent in that she had entered the intersection when the traffic light facing her was red and that she failed to maintain a proper lookout, both of which were a proximate cause of the collision and of appellee's injuries. Appellant by way of a counterclaim alleged that appellee had been guilty of negligence in that he had entered the intersection when the traffic signal light facing him was red and that appellee had failed to maintain a proper lookout, both of which were a proximate cause of appellant's injuries and of the collision.
Following a jury trial, the court submitted the case to the jury upon special issues. The jury found that neither party was, at the time immediately prior to the collision, traveling at an excessive rate of speed. It found that the appellant had entered the intersection when the traffic signal light facing her was red, and that she had failed to maintain a proper lookout which was a proximate cause of the collision. The jury also found in answer to Special Issue 5(a) that appellee had failed to maintain a proper lookout, and in answer to Special Issue 5(b) it found that such failure was a proximate cause of the collision.
After the verdict and answers of the jury were received and accepted by the court, the appellee filed his motion to disregard the jury's findings on Special Issues 5(a) and 5(b) in that such findings had no support in the evidence. Such motion was granted by the court and judgment was rendered for the appellee upon the remainder of the jury's findings. Appeal was duly perfected from that judgment.
Appellant has only one point of error on appeal, that being that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's finding as to Special Issues 5(a) and 5(b) and entering a judgment for the appellee on the remainder of the verdict.
'. . . the court may render judgment non obstante veredicto if a directed verdict would have been proper, and provided further that the court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any Special Issue Jury Finding that has no support in the evidence.' Rule 301, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
A directed verdict and a judgment non obstante veredicto may be rendered only where there is no evidence of probative force. When considering 'no evidence' points, the evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury findings of fact, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences which support the findings and rejecting the evidence and reasonable inferences which are contrary to the findings. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950).
After a careful reading of the statement of facts we have determined that there is no direct evidence to support the jury's findings that appellee failed to keep a proper lookout. The only direct evidence concerning appellee's lookout came from appellee himself. Appellee testified that he looked both directions and at the light prior to entering the intersection and did not see appellant's vehicle. Appellant urges that circumstantial evidence sustained the jury's holding of improper lookout upon the part of appellee. We have reviewed the record from that standpoint. Appellant contends that such a conclusion is justifiable in light of the respective speeds of the two vehicles, their location in the intersection at impact, and the fact that appellee's vehicle struck the left rear portion of appellant's vehicle.
The evidence most favorable to the appellant would indicate that she was traveling at a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour and that appellee was traveling at a speed of between 20 to 25 miles per hour....
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