Casey v. State

• Decision Date: 24 October 1972
• Citation: 491 S.W.2d 90
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
• Parties: James CASEY, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error.

Page 90

491 S.W.2d 90

James CASEY, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Oct. 24, 1972.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Feb. 5, 1972.

Ferdinand Powell, Jr., Johnson City, for plaintiff in error.

David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Alex B. Shipley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Lewis W. May, Dist. Atty. Gen., Mountain City, for defendant in error.

OPINION

OLIVER, Judge.

Indigent and represented by court-appointed counsel, Casey was convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery without a deadly weapon in the Criminal Court of Washington County and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than three nor more than five years. He has brought his case to this Court by an appeal in the nature of a writ of error duly perfected.

The first two Assignments of Error relate to the defendant's plea in abatement to the indictment, complaining that the trial court erred (1) in overruling the plea in abatement, and (2) in denying his motion for a jury trial on the issues raised by his plea in abatement and the District Attorney General's joinder of issue thereon.

Prior to the trial on the merits, the defendant filed a plea in abatement to the indictment charging that it was not found upon the knowledge of the Grand Jury, or any member thereof, but solely upon the testimony of one Tom Tipton, and that Tipton's testimony was entirely hearsay in that he neither saw nor observed nor had any personal knowledge of the commission of the offense, and the defendant never confessed or admitted any participation in or connection with the offense to Tipton or in his presence.

At a hearing upon the plea in abatement, it was stipulated that the indictment was not founded upon any knowledge of the Grand Jury or any member thereof and that Tipton was the only person who testified before the Grand Jury in connection with the indictment. Tipton, a Detective Captain of the Johnson City Police Department, was the only witness called and testified that he had no personal knowledge of the offense charged in the indictment, and that the defendant at no time made any statement or admission concerning the offense; that, following a complaint made to the police department by the clerk of the liquor store mentioned in the indictment, he went to the defendant's home and arrested him; and that when he was placed in a line-up at police headquarters the clerk identified him as being the assailant.

Thus, clearly since only a question of law was presented inasmuch as there was no dispute or controversy about the facts relied on in the plea in abatement to the indictment, there was no issue of fact which a jury could determine, and hence no jury was required.

The trial court correctly decided the legal issue involved. The law is settled that an indictment may not be abated because it is found on hearsay evidence, and the legality and sufficiency of evidence heard by the Grand Jury is not subject to review by this Court. Parton v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr.App. 626, 455 S.W.2d 645; State v. Marks, Tenn.Cr.App., 464 S.W.2d 326; Burton v. State, 214 Tenn. 9, 377 S.W.2d 900; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397.

Finally, the defendant complains by his last Assignment of Error that the trial court failed to define 'assault' in his instructions to the jury. The real basis of this contention is that by finding him guilty of 'assault with intent to commit robbery without the use of a deadly weapon' the jury found that the 'chrome-plated revolver' described by the victim and in the indictment as being the weapon the defendant used in the attempted robbery, and which his mother found and turned over to the police after his arrest, was only a blank cartridge pistol and was not a deadly weapon.

According to the liquor store clerk, when the defendant pointed the gun at him and demanded his money he closed the cash register and told the defendant he had his hand on the alarm and that the best thing for him to do was to get out of the store, and that the defendant then snapped the gun and it did not fire and he then fled with the statement, 'You were lucky this time. I'll be back and get you the next time.' The yellow shirt with cigars in the pocket which the clerk said the defendant was wearing in the liquor store was found in his home when he was arrested there some two or three hours later. The defendant denied being in the liquor store, and attempted to establish an alibi. He identified the chrome-plated revolver and said that it belonged to a nephew and he had it at his home for repair.

He does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant and sustain the verdict of the jury, except indirectly in connection with his final Assignment that the court erred in failing to define the elements of assault in the charge to the jury.

Casey further insists, however, in essential substance, that use of a blank cartridge pistol, which was incapable of discharging a projectile against or into the alleged victim, completely negatived any 'assault.' Thus, he reasons that, without any definition or instruction from the trial judge as to what constitutes an assault in law, the jury labored in the dark without any knowledge or understanding of the crucial legal point in the case and that their verdict was void for that reason.

It must be remembered that the defendant was indicted and convicted for an Assault upon the liquor store clerk. Thus, although the indictment charged that this particular assault was made with the intent to rob the clerk, the fact remains that the substantive offense of which the defendant was indicted and convicted was an Assault, the words 'with intent to commit robbery' being merely descriptive of the felonious nature and purpose.

Obviously, then, it becomes very important to consider the constituent elements of an assault, and the failure of the trial judge to define and explain those prerequisite elements to the jury.

In Richels v. State, 33 Tenn. 606, the Supreme Court of this State defined assault as follows:

'An assault is an attempt or offer to do a personal violence to another. It is an inchoate violence, with the present means of carrying the intent into effect. 2 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 82. The intention to do harm is of the essence of the offence, and this intention is to be ascertained by the jury from the circumstances.

'As a matter of law, then, it is not true that to point a pistol at another is of itself an assault, as charged by his honor. It may or may not be according to the attending circumstances. These must be such as to satisfy a jury that there was an intent, coupled with an ability, to do harm, or that the other party had a right so to believe from the facts before him; otherwise, there is no danger of a breach of the peace.'

And the Court said in Bass v. State, 65 Tenn. 579, at 588:

'In view of many cases which have been adjudged, it is not inappropriately defined 'to be an attempt, with force or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force or violence, to do a corporal injury; and may consist of any act which shall convey, to the mind of the person set upon, a well grounded apprehension of personal violence:' 2 Waterman's A.C.P., 41.'

In Cowley v. State, 78 Tenn. 282, the Court made the following statements regarding assault:

'An assault, it is true, is an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, to do a corporal injury to another, the intent to do harm being essential: Richels v. State, 1 Sneed, 606; Bass v. State, 6 Baxt., 588 . . . And it is not necessary in a simple assault that there should be the specific purpose to do a particular injury, but general malevolence or recklessness will be sufficient: 1 Bish.Crim.Law, sec. 60; Tarver v. State, 43 Ala., 354; Regina v. Fretwell, 9 Cox.C.C., 471; Anderson v. State, 3 Head, 455.'

The essential substance of the foregoing expressions by our Supreme Court concerning the nature and elements of assault is adequately summed up in the statement from Corpus Juris Secundum quoted approvingly in Huffman v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738:

'. . . An assault is rather clearly defined in 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 60, at page 915, as:

'An assault may consist of any act tending to do corporal injury to another, accompanied with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using actual violence against the person."

While an intent to do bodily harm is essential to constitute an assault, the necessary intent to do so may be imputed to the accused where he acts illegally or with reckless and wanton disregard for the safety of others. That is, the intent to injure may be inferred from the circumstances surroundingthe act. 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 63, pp. 919-920.

According to the weight of authority, an actual ability to commit a battery is not essential in simple criminal assault, an apparent ability to do so being sufficient; that is, such apparent ability as to cause a person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear an injury. 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 64, p. 920.

There is nothing in this record to indicate that the liquor store clerk actually feared bodily harm or injury at the hands of the defendant. As noted, he merely closed the cash register and told the defendant his hand was on the alarm and the best thing for him was to get out of the store. But 'To constitute an assault at common law there need be no actual fear created, when physical force is actually put in motion, and the motion is such as to create a well founded apprehension of physical injury.' 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 66, p. 921.

Unquestionably, the average juror has no knowledge of the legal definition and constituent elements of an assault. Failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury on those matters, obviously left the jury to speculation and conjecture concerning the nature and...