Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 79896,79896
• Citation: 616 So.2d 446
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. S222 Andrew CASH, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSAL RIVET, INC., and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 446

616 So.2d 446

18 Fla. L. Week. S222

Andrew CASH, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSAL RIVET, INC., and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,

Respondents.

No. 79896.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 8, 1993.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1993.

Donald D. Gillis and Janet M. Greene of Underwood, Gillis & Karcher, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.

Kimberly A. Hill of Conroy, Simberg & Lewis, P.A., Hollywood, for respondents.

McDONALD, Justice.

We review Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So.2d 154, 158 (Fla.1992), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

WAS THE FIXATION STAPLE INSERTED INTO CLAIMANT'S SHOULDER A "PROSTHETIC DEVICE," AS THAT TERM IS USED IN SECTION 440.19(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)?

We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. We answer the question in the negative and approve the decision of the district court.

Andrew Cash suffered an on-the-job shoulder injury on February 24, 1986, while lifting a full bucket of rivets. In March 1986, the employer and carrier authorized Dr. Robert S. Ennis to perform an arthroscopic evaluation of Cash's shoulder. The examination revealed that Cash had a torn ligament in his shoulder, and Dr. Ennis performed a staple capsulorrhaphy. As a part of this procedure, Dr. Ennis inserted a long fixation staple to hold the ligament in its proper position until the normal healing process had occurred. According to Dr. Ennis' testimony, the staple is inserted through the ligament and into the bone of the anterior portion of the shoulder joint. Although the staple remains in place after the ligament has healed, it does not serve any function.

Cash received temporary total disability and temporary partial disability benefits until May 1986, at which time he returned to light duty work. When he began to experience renewed pain in his shoulder, he returned to Dr. Ennis on August 3, 1988. Dr. Ennis' associate, Dr. Dennis, examined Cash and determined that the staple appeared to be in its proper place and that the shoulder appeared normal. Dr. Dennis recommended medication and physical therapy, and Cash visited Dr. Ennis or one of his associates three additional times. On August 24, 1988, Cash filed a claim seeking further temporary total disability benefits and authorization for treatment. The employer and carrier denied the claim on the ground that, pursuant to subsection 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), the two-year statute of limitations had run. As an alternative argument, the employer and carrier claimed that if the staple was classified as a prosthesis under subsection 440.19(1)(b), the statute of limitations barred all claims except for medical assistance with the staple.

Subsection 440.19(1)(a) provides that "[t]he right to compensation for disability, rehabilitation, impairment, or wage loss ... shall be barred unless a claim therefor ... is filed ... within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment ... furnished by the employer." Subsection 440.19(1)(b) provides in pertinent part that

[a]ll rights for remedial attention ... shall be barred unless a claim therefor ... is filed ... within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or ... after the date of the last remedial attention ... furnished by the employer. However, no statute of limitations shall apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device to any part of the body.

(Emphasis added.)

In May 1991, the judge of compensation claims ruled that a staple was a "prosthetic device," within the meaning of that term as used in subsection 440.19(1)(b). ^* Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations did not apply to the right for remedial attention relating to the replacement or removal of the staple. The district court reversed the holding of the judge of compensation claims and concluded that the staple was not a prosthetic device. The court then certified the question at issue in this case.

The question of whether Cash should be awarded the compensation benefits he requested hinges on the definition of "prosthesis." Although chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1985), does not define "prosthesis" or "prosthetic device," the definitions of the terms in medical dictionaries are relatively consistent. Based on the collection of definitions found in medical reference books such as Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary (2d ed.) and Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary (27th ed.), the district court held that a "prosthetic device" referred to an "artificial substitute or replacement, whether external or implanted, for a missing or defective natural part of the body." 598 So.2d at 157. We also adopt this definition, but we add that a prosthetic device, as used in subsection 440.19(1)(b), requires a relatively permanent functional or cosmetic purpose.

Dr. Ennis described the staple inserted in Cash's shoulder as a "metal stitch." Unlike dentures, an artificial limb, or a hearing aid, the staple does not...