Casillas v. City of Fresno
| Decision Date | 13 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1042 AWI-SAB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | THE ESTATE OF CASIMERO CASILLAS, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF FRESNO, et al., Defendants |
ORDER ON PARTIES' MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Plaintiffs are proceeding to trial on four claims, each arising from the fatal shooting of Casimero Casillas by Officer Trevor Shipman in the fall of 2015. Plaintiffs have alleged a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as pendent state law claims of battery, wrongful death negligence, and an interference with rights under the California Bane Act.
Each party now presents one motion in limine. The Court finds:
Defendants have also requested permission to bring "physical evidence consisting of a metal pipe" through security for trial. Plaintiffs object to how the pipe is used at trial. The Court will allow for the pipe's presence at trial, but it may not be given to the jury, either during trial or during their deliberations.
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On September 7, 2015, members of the Fresno Police Department attempted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Casillas, but Casillas failed to yield. After a short vehicular pursuit, Casillas arrived at 5590 E. Saginaw, Fresno, California, parked his car, and ran inside. Officers set up a perimeter and dispatched K-9 units to search for Casillas; Officer Shipman was posted in an area between the main residence and garage (the "Breezeway"). At some point, officers and K-9 units moved toward a detached Apartment behind the main residence in search of Casillas. Casillas exited the Apartment carrying a pipe, which he held pointed at the ground. Casillas saw Officer Long to the east, walked slowly north, then saw Officer Wright to his left, and turned right into the Breezeway where Officer Shipman was stationed. The Parties dispute what happened next: Officer Shipman contends he gave Casillas a verbal warning, but Casillas charged at him with the pipe, so he had no choice but to use his gun. Plaintiffs contend that, based on the testimony of the other officers and witnesses on the scene, Officer Shipman shot Casillas almost immediately upon him entering the Breezeway. Plaintiffs argue Casillas's actions leading up to the encounter demonstrate an intent to flee, not attack, and Officer Shipman could have used his Taser to subdue Casillas. Officer Shipman fired three shots at Casillas, felling and ultimately killing him.
Plaintiffs (Casillas's wife and children) seek economic, non-economic, and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the California Bane Act, battery, and negligence. Defendants have denied all liability, contending Officer Shipman acted reasonably.
In the context of these four claims, the parties currently dispute the relevance and admissibility of two categories of facts: (I) Casillas's criminal and incarceration history, his drug use history, the results of his toxicology exam, and statements made by Casillas regarding death or suicide—information unknown to Officer Shipman at the time of the incident; and (II) "any testimony from Plaintiffs' designated expert William Harmening, who Plaintiffs argue is qualified to testify about the veracity of Officer Shipman's version of the shooting, and whose qualifications and methodologies Defendants challenge.
"A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a particular area." United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Motions in limine may be "made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). "Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials." Id. at 41 n.4; Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997); see also City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) ().
In Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the following "standards applicable to motions in limine":
Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. However, a motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. To exclude evidence on a motion in limine, the evidence must be inadmissible on all potential grounds. Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context. This is because although rulings on motions in limine may save time, costs, effort and preparation, a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.
735 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Goodman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 963 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1047 (D. Nev. 2013), rev'd in part on other grounds by 613 F. App'x 610 (9th Cir. 2015)); see also Tritchler v. Co. of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004)); Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002).
By resolving a motion in limine, potentially prejudicial evidence may be prevented from being presented to the jury, therefore avoiding the need for the trial judge to attempt to neutralize the taint of prejudicial evidence. See Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a court may change its ruling at trial "because testimony may bring facts to the district court's attention that it did not anticipate at the time of its initial ruling." United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42).
Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. "Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence[,] but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case." Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (quoting Advisory Committee Note for Fed. R. Evid. 401).
Additionally, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403
Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that Officer Shipman did not know Casillas prior to the day of the incident, and agree the Officer was unaware of Casillas's criminal and incarceration history, his history of drug use, the presence of methamphetamine in his system—as evidenced by the toxicology exam at autopsy, and his statements concerning death or suicide. Plaintiffs therefore argue these facts should be excluded as wholly irrelevant to the issue of Officer Shipman's use of force (under Fed. R. Evid. 402), as improper character evidence (under Fed. R. Evid. 404), or as unduly prejudicial to Casillas when weighed against their minimally-probative value (per Fed. R. Evid. 403).
Defendants counter that Casillas's criminal and incarceration history are relevant to the question of damages, both economic and non-economic, if only to counter Plaintiffs' expected testimony that Casillas was in "a loving and supporting relationship with them." Defendants further argue Casillas's toxicology report, criminal and incarceration history, and expressions of suicide are all admissible to show motive and intent on Casillas's part—that he charged Officer Shipman with a pipe either because he was under the influence of drugs at the time, he wanted toavoid returning to prison, or he otherwise intended commit "suicide by cop." Finally, Defendants argue these facts are admissible and relevant to officer-involved shootings especially where, as here, Plaintiffs dispute the circumstance facing the officer just prior to the shooting.
Based on the scope of Plaintiffs' remaining claims, the Court finds that these facts—Casillas's criminal and incarceration history, his prior drug usage, the results of his toxicology exam at autopsy, and his expressions of suicide—are not excludable.2
First, the Court is cognizant of the fact that phase one of this trial will not only require the jury to decide liability but also damages. See Joint Pretrial Statement, Doc. No. 34 at p. 15, ¶¶ 17-18 (). Plaintiffs seek economic damages as well as damages for "the loss of the comfort, familial relationship, society, attention, friendship, companionship, services, [and] support of the decedent." The above set of facts are relevant to the damages elements of Plaintiffs' claims. See N.W. v. City of Long Beach, 2016 WL 9021966, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2016) (...
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