Casillas v. Federal Exp. Corp.
| Decision Date | 02 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-3170 D/V.,00-3170 D/V. |
| Citation | 140 F.Supp.2d 875 |
| Parties | Mark A. CASILLAS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Brian O. Bowhan, Law Firm of Brian O. Bowhan, Aurora, CO, for Mark A. Casillas, plaintiffs.
Paul David Jones, Elaine K. Sanders, Federal Express Corporation, Legal Department, Memphis, TN, for Federal Express Corporation, defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT.
Defendant Federal Express Corp. ("FedEx") moves to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Mark Casillas's claims arising under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. ("ADEA"), the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA"), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. ("ERISA"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's unofficial policy of resetting to zero an employee's seniority status whenever that employee voluntarily transferred to a different division (1) violated anti-discrimination laws; (2) breached his union contract; and (3) contravened ERISA's benefit provisions. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons herein, the Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff is 45 years old and Latino. In 1989, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work in its Corporate Aviation Department, where Plaintiff shuttled senior executives on small planes. In August, 1992, Plaintiff voluntarily joined the Flight Department, a separate division, to fly cargo planes. In March 1993, Plaintiff voluntarily transferred back to Corporate Aviation. In September 1995, Plaintiff again voluntarily transferred to the Flight Department, where he remains at present.
Defendant's Employee Manual1 provides that seniority accrues from the date a pilot is employed and continues to accrue during the entire employment period. The manual also states that a pilot who voluntarily transfers to a non-flying position will lose seniority after one year. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant maintains an unofficial policy that conflicts with the official seniority plan, because it allegedly resets seniority to zero when a pilot voluntarily transfers from one flying division to another. On June 25, 2000 Plaintiff filed his EEOC charge, alleging that Defendant took adverse action against him on the basis of his age and race. On December 11, 2000 Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging that Defendant's unofficial seniority system discriminated against him on the basis of age and race, and violated the LMRA and ERISA.
A party may bring a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). This motion only tests whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988). Essentially, it allows the court to dismiss meritless cases which would otherwise waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery. See, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
The Supreme Court has held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27, 109 S.Ct. at 1832; Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir.1998). Thus, the standard to be applied when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is very liberal in favor of the party opposing the motion. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976). Even if the plaintiff's chances of success are remote or unlikely, a motion to dismiss should be denied.
To determine whether a motion to dismiss should be granted, the court must first examine the complaint. The complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The complaint must provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103; Westlake, 537 F.2d at 858. The complaint need not specify all the particularities of the claim, id., and if the complaint is merely vague or ambiguous, a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) for a more definite statement is the proper avenue rather than under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 5A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1356 (West 1990). The plaintiff, however, has an obligation to allege the essential material facts of the case. Scheid, 859 F.2d at 436-37. All facts taken as true in the complaint must be "well-pleaded." Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405. "Well-pleaded facts" refers to those facts which are legally capable of being proved. 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 426 (1951).
In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1983). Indeed, the facts as alleged by the plaintiff cannot be disbelieved by the court. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1832; Murphy v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997). Where there are conflicting interpretations of the facts, they must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (6th Cir.1991). However, legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences should not be accepted as true. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405-06.
1. Failure to exhaust administrative claims
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not restrict allegations in his complaint to those in his EEOC charge. Defendant accordingly contends that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In his EEOC charge and his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has discriminated against him on the basis of his age and race, but alleges different factual predicates to support these claims. In his EEOC charge, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant required him to sign an agreement that confined Plaintiff to a department for a longer period of time than a younger White employee who had less seniority with the company. In his complaint, however, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant maintains an unofficial seniority system that discriminates against him on the basis of his age and race.
A plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC before pursuing any grievance with the courts, whether the claim is brought under Title VII or the ADEA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland College Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463 (6th. Cir.1998). This procedure notifies potential defendants of the nature of the plaintiff's claims and provides them with the opportunity to settle claims before the EEOC rather than litigate them. Davis, 157 F.3d at 463. Conciliation serves an important purpose and is not to be easily circumvented. Vinson v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir.1986). Accordingly, if the plaintiff's complaint is not reasonably related to the EEOC charge, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter. Abeita v. Trans-America Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir.1998); Davis, 157 F.3d at 463.
Recognizing that a layperson frequently fills out the EEOC charge, however, the Sixth Circuit permits the plaintiff to allege claims in the complaint that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC charge. Davis, 157 F.3d at 463; EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232, 1235 (6th Cir.1980). Courts are apt to find that the complaint relates to the EEOC charge where the plaintiff had merely failed to recognize a procedural technicality, distinguish between seemingly identical legal theories, or articulate the exact wording required in a judicial pleading. McCall, 633 F.2d at 1235; Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 675 (6th Cir.1992); Davis, 157 F.3d at 463. In contrast, the plaintiff is expected to specify each event which he or she feels was a result of unlawful discrimination. Vinson, 806 F.2d at 688.
The plaintiff has two methods to show that his or her complaint could reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC charge. First, the plaintiff can show that the EEOC investigation of one charge revealed evidence of a different type of discrimination against the plaintiff. Davis, 157 F.3d at 463. In the present case, however, Plaintiff fails to show that the EEOC's investigation revealed evidence that Defendant allegedly maintained a discriminatory seniority system.
Second, where the alleged facts would prompt the EEOC to investigate an uncharged claim, the plaintiff may bring suit on that claim. Davis, 157 F.3d at 463; Farmer v. ARA Services Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1105 (6th Cir.1981). Courts can expect the EEOC to identify and investigate legal issues that flow from the plaintiff's factual allegations. McCall, 633 F.2d at 1236. For example, in Haithcock, the plaintiff failed to include legal language in his EEOC charge, such as the words "pattern and practice," that would trigger a continuing violation claim. The Sixth Circuit, however, found that the plaintiff's description of numerous and related discriminatory events over a period of time adequately notified the EEOC and the defendant that the plaintiff had pled a continuing violation claim. Haithcock, 958 F.2d 671, 676.
Similarly in Farmer, several female plaintiffs working as attendants filed...
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Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern.
..."bona fide" plans under § 623(f). In so arguing, plaintiffs rely solely upon a decision outside of this Circuit, Casillas v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 140 F.Supp.2d 875 (W.D.Tenn.2001), which held that a seniority system was not bona fide under § 623(f)(2)(A) because it was "adopted ... [and] operat......