Casino v. Cassidy, 14-CV-00629 (SJF)(GRB)
Decision Date | 10 April 2014 |
Docket Number | 14-CV-00629 (SJF)(GRB) |
Parties | EILEEN CASINO and DONATO CASINO, Plaintiffs, v. BRIAN CASSIDY, STONYBROOK [sic] UNIV. HOSPITAL, WOODMERE NURSING HOME, ANY OTHER FUTURE AGENT OF ANY KIND, and NEW YORK STATE MENTAL HEALTH COURT, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
On January 22, 2014, pro se plaintiff Eileen Casino ("plaintiff")1 filed: (1) a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against defendants Brian Cassidy ("Cassidy"), Stony Brook University Hospital ("Stony Brook"), Woodmere Nursing Home ("Woodmere"), "any other future agent of any kind" and the New York State Mental Health Court ("the State Court"), seeking to assert claims on behalf of herself and Donato Casino ("Mr. Casino") concerning, inter alia, (a) the treatment and care of Mr. Casino at Stony Brook and Woodmere; and (b) court proceedings in which defendant Brian Cassidy ("Cassidy") acted as Mr. Casino's law guardian; and (2) an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff's financial status, as set forth in her declaration in support of her application to proceed in forma pauperis, qualifies her to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fees, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), herapplication to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On September 11, 2013, plaintiff filed in this Court, inter alia, a complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against Cassidy, "Mr. Rohl, as owner/admin,"2 "Suffolk County Employees of Court," "N.Y. State Court Employees," and a judge of the "N.Y. State M.H. Court," among others, alleging violations of Mr. Casino's civil rights relating to his treatment and care in an unidentified nursing home and to court proceedings in which Cassidy acted as his law guardian, which was assigned docket number 13-cv-5095 ("the first action"). By Order dated November 8, 2013, inter alia: (1) plaintiff's claims in the first action were sua sponte dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim for relief; and (2) Mr. Casino's claims in the first action were sua sponte dismissed without prejudice on the basis that plaintiff, who is not an attorney, could not assert pro se claims on his behalf.
On October 28, 2013, plaintiff filed, inter alia, another complaint in this court pursuant to Section 1983 against Stony Brook, Cassidy and Woodhaven Nursing Home alleging, inter alia, thatthe defendants therein were "not always acting in the best interest of [Mr.] Casino or his family or according to all our wishes" and "unfair competition for family time with my husband," (Compl. under docket number 13-cv-6357 at 1-2), which was assigned docket number 13-cv-6357 ("the second action"). By Order dated January 27, 2014 (the "January Order"), inter alia: (1) plaintiff's claims against Stony Brook were sua sponte dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Woodhaven and Cassidy were sua sponte dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for relief; and (3) any state law claims were dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
On or about January 22,2014, plaintiff filed the instant complaint alleging:
(Compl. ¶¶ III, IV). Plaintiff seeks: (1) an order directing defendants to "turn over all monies which should be rightfully returned to Dan's personal acct. at his address for pain [and] suffering over neglect [and] money ret'd which was paid for care not given on both occasions aforementioned," (Id. at ¶ V); (2) an "emergency restraining order to prevent any deliberat [sic] action or neglect leading to serious setback or espiacialy [sic] leading to death (i.e. neglect to get help or 'pulling plug') for any reason by anyone," (Id.); and (3) to hold Cassidy "responsible to sue in small claims for return of money from Medicaid [and] Medicare which was pd. for malpractice." (Id.)
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Gunn v. Minton, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013); Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 740, 747, 181 L. Ed. 2d 881 (2012), and may not preside over cases absent subject matter jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 162 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2005) ( ); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994) ( ) Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeitedand may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. — 132 S. Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed. 2d 619 (2012); see also Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, - U.S. - 133 S. Ct. 817, 824, 184 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2013) (). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006); Fracasse v. People's United Bank, — F.3d —, 2014 WL 1243811, at * 2 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2014); Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62-3 (2d Cir. 2009).
"A foundational premise of the federal system is that States, as sovereigns, are immune from suits for damages, save as they elect to waive that defense." Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333, 182 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2012). Absent consent, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court by private parties against a State or one of its agencies. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S. Ct. 684, 121 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1993) ; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) () "Sovereign immunity principles enforce an important constitutional limitation on the power of the federalcourts." Sossamon v. Texas, — U.S.—, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657, 179 L. Ed. 2d 700 (2011); see also Pennhurst State, 465 U.S. at 98, 104 S. Ct. 900 ()
A State's consent to suit must be "unequivocally expressed," Pennhurst State, 465 U.S. at 99, 104 S. Ct. 900, and "may not be implied." Sossamon, — U.S.—, 131 S. Ct. at 1658. "Generally, [courts] will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes [federal court] jurisdiction * * *, or else if the State makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to [federal court] jurisdiction* * *." College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-76, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 144 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1999) (quotations and citations omitted).
Although the Eleventh Amendment generally does not bar suits against state officials acting in their official capacity seeking prospective relief, i.e., to enjoin conduct that violates the federal Constitution, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1908); Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 2009). cert. denied by Conyers v. Pistole, 133 S. Ct. 329, 184 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2012), that exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable to suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146, 113 S.Ct. 684: see also Pennhurst State, 465 U.S. at 100-01, 104 S. Ct. 900 (...
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