Casino v. Stonybrook [sic] Univ. Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2014
• Docket Number: 13-CV-6357 (SJF)(GRB)
• Parties: EILEEN CASINO, Plaintiff, v. STONYBROOK [sic] UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, WOODHAVEN NURSING HOME, and BRIAN CASSIDY, Law Guardian, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

EILEEN CASINO, Plaintiff, v. STONYBROOK [sic] UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,WOODHAVEN NURSING HOME, and BRIAN CASSIDY,Law Guardian, Defendants.

13-CV-6357 (SJF)(GRB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: January 27, 2014

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

On October 28, 2013, pro se plaintiff Eileen Casino ("plaintiff")¹ filed, inter alia, a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against defendants Stony Brook University Medical Center; Woodhaven Nursing Home ("Woodhaven"); and Brian Cassidy ("Cassidy"), law guardian, accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff's financial status, as set forth in her declaration in support of her application to proceed in forma pauperis, qualifies her to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fees, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), her application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. The First Casino Action

On September 11, 2013, plaintiff filed in this Court, inter alia, a complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against Cassidy and "Mr. Rohl, as owner/admin,"² among others, alleging violations of Mr. Casino's civil rights relating to his treatment and care in an unidentified nursing home and to court proceedings in which Cassidy acted as his law guardian, which was assigned docket number 13-cv-5095 ("the first action"). By Order dated November 8,2013, inter alia: (1) plaintiff's claims in the first action were sua sponte dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim for relief; and (2) Mr. Casino's claims in the first action were sua sponte dismissed without prejudice on the basis that plaintiff, who is not an attorney, could not assert pro se claims on his behalf.

II. The Instant Complaint³

On or about October 28, 2013, plaintiff filed the instant complaint ("the second action") alleging:

"(1) Unfair competition for family time with my husband (by this I mean they arrange to 'give care' by encroaching on visitation time rather than at other more reasonable scheduled time)[;] (2) Information about [Mr. Casino] which [he] [and] his family are reasonably entitled to receive from either 'proxy' or/and 'custodial agency' are not passed along to any of us family[;] (3) 'Law' 'guardian', 'nursing' 'home' owner/administrator, hospital, NY State Court are not always acting in best interestof [Mr.] Casino or his family or according to all our wishes as stated by us[;] (4) 'Nursing' 'home' owner/administrator and 'law' 'guardian' Brian Cassidy have withheld [Mr, Casino's] goods [and] money from [him] durring [sic] his latest stay at Stony Brook Hospital (which he has medical need of for comfort [and] relief [and] abatement of some of his 'symptoms') -> (most importantly his radio [and] cellphone)[;] (5) (Most of the time) respect of [patient's] rights, human rights [and] civil rights is put aside in best interest of 'custodial' person [or] entity most obvious to patient by custodial person creating 'scene' in front of patient in patient['s] room."

(Compl. at 1-3). Plaintiff does not allege any injury or specify any relief sought in the complaint. However, in a letter filed on January 22,2014, which the Court construes to be a supplement to the complaint, plaintiff seeks the following relief:

"an order to restrain all in control or in charge of 'giving care' of any kind from: (1) prematurely [and] deliberately causing an end of [Mr. Casino's] earthly life by comission [sic] or omission[;] (2) deliberately causing undue anguish by 'shabby etiquette' in delivery of alleged care which would so panic or depress [Mr. Casino] that he could be made sick by it. There is at least one specific [doctor] to speak of[;] (3) keep respect for [patient] right to practice religion [and] have visitors [and] unmolested [and] unharassed [sic] time with clergy daily [;] (4) staff [and] caregivers to show proper business etiquette toward respected clergy in [patient] rooms[;] [and] (5) restrain all from any criminal actions which would prevent appearance of myself on Feb[.] 7 at court[.]"

III. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Gunn v. Minton, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013); Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, — U.S. — 132 S.Ct. 740, 747, 181 L. Ed. 2d 881 (2012), and may not preside over cases absent subject matter jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2005) (holding that federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutorybasis); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994) (holding that federal courts "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute * * *.") Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L. Ed. 2d 619 (20121: see also Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824,184 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2013) ("Objections to a tribunal's jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy."'): Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) ("[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press. * * * Objections to subject-matter jurisdiction * * * may be raised at any time.") If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa. P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62-3 (2d Cir. 2009).

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

"A foundational premise of the federal system is that States, as sovereigns, are immune from suits for damages, save as they elect to waive that defense." Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333, 182 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2012). Absent consent, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court by private parties against a State or one of its agencies. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf &Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S. Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) ("Absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court." (quotations and citation omitted)); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) ("[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.") "Sovereign immunity principles enforce an important constitutional limitation on the power of the federal courts." Sossamon v. Texas, — U.S.— 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657, 179 L. Ed. 2d 700 (2011); see also Pennhurst State, 465 U.S. at 98, 104 S. Ct. 900 ("[T]he principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III[.]")

A State's consent to suit must be "unequivocally expressed," Pennhurst State, 465 U.S. at 99, 104 S. Ct. 900, and "may not be implied." Sossamon, — U.S.— 131 S. Ct. at 1658. "Generally, [courts] will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes [federal court] jurisdiction * * *, or else if the State makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to [federal court] jurisdiction * * *." College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondarv Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675-76, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 144 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1999) (quotations and citations omitted); see also In re Charter Oak Associates, 361 F.3d 760, 767 (2d Cir. 2004) (accord).

Although the Eleventh Amendment generally does not bar suits against state officials acting in their official capacity seeking prospective relief, i.e., to enjoin conduct that violates the federal Constitution, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1908); Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied by Convers v. Pistole, 133 S. Ct. 329, 184 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2012), that exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable to suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought. Puerto RicoAqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146, 113 S.Ct. 684: see also Pennhurst State, 465 U.S. at 100-01, 104 S. Ct. 900 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment's "jurisdictional bar applies [to claims against the State or one of its agencies or departments] regardless of the nature of the relief sought."); Palmer v. New York State Office of Court Administration, 526 Fed. Appx. 97, 99 (2d Cir. May 7, 2013) (summary order) (holding that the plaintiff was required to name a state official acting in his or her official capacity as a defendant "in order to attempt to avail herself of the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 * * *.")

Moreover, "[a]s an exception to this principle [of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity], Congress may abrogate the States' immunity from suit pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Coleman, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. at 1333; see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154, 158-59, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). "Congress must make its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Coleman, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct....