Cason v. Leverette
| Decision Date | 24 December 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--59,73--59 |
| Citation | 502 S.W.2d 459,255 Ark. 841 |
| Parties | W. H. CASON and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland et al., Appellants, v. W. J. LEVERETTE, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Spears & Sloan, West Memphis, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, for appellants.
Sharpe & Long, Henry Wilkinson, Forrest City, Rubens & Rubens, West Memphis, for appellee.
This litigation arises out of the refusal of appellants R. H. White and Mary Rose White to vacate lands belonging to appellant and cross-appellee W. H. Cason after the expiration of a written lease.
The record shows that R. H. White and his wife Mary Rose White are substantial land owners in St. Francis County. In addition to farming the 1500 acres owned by them, they, for a number of years, have rented other land including Cason's 240 acres. Up until some seven years before this litigation, appellee W. J. Leverette had worked as a hired hand for the Whites and in that capacity had farmed the Cason land. The lease under which the Whites farmed the Cason land expired on December 30, 1970. During the spring of 1970, Cason and Leverette started negotiations which ultiamtely resulted in a two year written lease dated March 1, 1971. That the negotiations between Cason and Leverette had resulted in a contract between the two during 1970, is evidenced by a letter from Cason's counsel to White under date of December 23, 1970. Cason's unlawful detainer action against White resulted in judgment under date of April 29, 1971, against White for possession and for damages in the amount of $3,583.33. White promptly filed a notice of appeal and filed a supersedeas bond with appellant Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland as the corporate surety. The Whites continued in possession after the supersedeas was filed and made and harvested a bean and a rice crop from the land, but neglected to file the appeal from the unlawful detainer action in time for this Court to take jurisdiction. The White satisfied the $3,583.33 judgment, returned possession to Cason and offered a $7,000.00 check in full settlement of all liability.
This litigation was commenced when Cason brought action #7432 against the Whites and their supersedeas surety seeking double the rental value for the time from May through December. Leverette then brought an action (cause #7438) against Cason claiming damages by the way of lost profits upon his rental contract. The Whites and their supersedeas surety were vouched into this action by Cason. By agreement the two actions were consolidated for trial. The jury upon interrogatories found that Cason was liable to Leverette in the amount of $10,000.00 for his loss of profits and that the Whites were liable to Cason in the amount of $7,000.00. Upon motions by Cason the trial court set aside the $7,000 verdict in favor of Cason and granted a judgment N.O.V. in favor of Cason against the Whites and their supersedeas surety for the $10,000 Leverette verdict together with an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,000. For reversal the several points hereinafter discussed are raised.
POINT No. 1. The Whites and their supersedeas surety here contend that the first action is res judicata of the issues here involved and that the filing of cause No. 7432 by Cason amounts to the splitting of a cause of action. We do not agree. In the first place the issue of double damages was raised in the first action and thus the holding in Coley v. Westbrook, 208 Ark. 914, 188 S.W.2d 141 (1945), is not applicable. Furthermore, we held in Dover v. Henderson, 197 Ark. 971, 125 S.W.2d 798 (1939), that the liability of a principal and surety on a supersedeas bond in an unlawful detainer action for damages subsequent to the entry of the judgment for possession should be tested by an action at law on the bond.
POINT No. 2. The Whites contend that the court erred in not permitting them to introduce evidence to show that their refusal to vacate was not willful. They also complain that the court erred in instructing the jury that their holding over was willful. Their proffer of proof on this point concerned only evidence that was either presented or should have been presented in the first trial. The trial court properly held that these issues were concluded by the first trial.
POINT No. 3. The Whites say that Leverette's claim for loss of profits should have been dismissed because his proof on the issue was speculative and conjectural. We do not agree.
The record shows that Leverette was a man of little or no formal education. He was farming 240 acres of land only one quarter of a mile from the Cason land, and, for four of the years he had worked for White, he had farmed the Cason lands. Leverette testified that as he saw the two properties they were identical. On the 48.5 acres of rice that he farmed he made 5,090.44 bushels of rice for a total value of $13,498.07. On the 175 acres of bean land he made 4,621.33 bushels for a total value of $14,336.61. He testified that his total cost of making the two crops was $9,000. Without benefit of records he itemized from the witness stand $8,100 of the costs of making the crops on the lands he farmed. He then took his yield per acre and by multiplying that against the bean and rice allotments on the cason lands arrived at the total values he would have received had he been permitted to farm the Cason land. Leverette then arrived at what the expenses would have been in making the crop by determining his per acre cost of making the same crops on the lands he did farm. He also showed that he had acquired the necessary tractors and combines to farm the land before the trial of the first action. Not only White but each witness he called testified that Leverette was a good farmer. Leverette testified he would have made 104 bushels of rice per acre on the Cason land. The Whites admittedly harvested around a hundred bushels per acre.
Leverette testified without contradiction that there was no other land for rent at the time the supersedeas was executed. While there is other evidence on behalf of the Whites that would raise issues as to Leverette's credibility, we cannot say here that the evidence as to lost profits was so speculative or conjectural that a jury issue was not made. At least the evidence meets the standard laid down in Crow v. Russell, 226 Ark. 121, 289 S.W.2d 195 (1956).
Notwithstanding that the issue of Cason's liability for loss of profits by Leverette was submitted to the jury upon instructions submitted by White over Cason's objections, the Whites now apparently argue that such profits are not an element of damages for the breach of a lease. Cason also makes the same argument but concedes the issue is harmless or should be waived as to him if the judgment over against the Whites is sustained. Our cases on the issue have reached different results. In Thomas v. Croom, 102 Ark. 108, 143 S.W. 88 (1912), and Brown v. Bradford, 175 Ark. 823, 1 S.W.2d 14 (1927), we held that lost profits were not an element of damages. In Harmon v. Frye, 103 Ark. 584, 148 S.W. 269 (1912), Black v. Hogsett, 145 Ark. 178, 224 S.W. 439 (1920), and Crow v. Russell, 226 Ark. 121, 289 S.W.2d 195 (1956), we permitted the recovery of lost profits for breach of a lease agreement. Our cases in allowing or disallowing lost profits as an element of damages on a lease contract do not explain why a lease contract ought to be treated any differently from any other type of contract in which loss of prospective profits is allowed. See Williams v. Hildebrand, 220 Ark. 202, 247 S.W.2d 356 (1952). However, we need not decide here whether lost profits are a compensable element of damages for we have consistently held that a party who requests or acquiesces in an instruction submitting a particular issue to the jury is not in a position to thereafter complain, Farmers Co-op Ass'n Inc. v. Garrison, 248 Ark. 948, 454 S.W.2d 644 (1970). The record here demonstrates that during the trial neither White nor Fidelity raised the compensability of lost profits as an element of damages. On the other hand the record demonstrates that the issue was submitted to the jury upon an instruction requested by White and without objection on the part of Fidelity. Cason has waived the issue here by stipulation.
POINT No. 4. The Whites argue that Leverette is not entitled to recover damages for breach of his lease covenant, because he knew White was in possession when the lease was executed. We pointed out in Morrison v. Weinstein, 151 Ark. 255, 236 S.W. 585 (1921), that the possession or holding over of a prior tenant did not prevent a recovery by a tenant against a landlord upon a contractual covenant to give possession, for the liability grows out of the covenant.
POINT No. 5. The Whites here contend that the trial court erred in rendering judgment non obstante verdicto in favor of Leverette against White in the Leverette v. Cason case #7438.
In making this argument they contend only that the issue was a fact one for the jury. We do not agree. As pointed out in Garrott v. Kendal,212 Ark. 210, 205 S.W.2d 192 (1947), a landlord is acting within his rights to execute a lease to another tenant. One who, by his wrongful detention, causes the landlord to become liable to a tenant, such as Leverette, renders himself liable for the damages recovered of the landlord as a matter of law.
POINT No. 6. Neither do we find any merit in the White's contention that the trial court erred in setting aside the $7,000 damage verdict in favor of Cason. The proof showed that the Whites had...
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