Cass Cnty. v. City of Lee's Summit

• Decision Date: 30 November 2021
• Docket Number: WD 84333
• Parties: CASS COUNTY, Missouri, Respondent, v. CITY OF LEE'S SUMMIT, Missouri, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

638 S.W.3d 560

CASS COUNTY, Missouri, Respondent,

v.CITY OF LEE'S SUMMIT, Missouri, Appellant.

WD 84333

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: November 30, 2021

Jeffery T. McPherson, St. Louis, MO, and Tyson H. Ketchum and Kevin W. Prewitt, Kansas City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Zachary T. Cartwright, Kansas City, MO, and Brian W. Head, City Attorney, Lee's Summit, MO, Attorneys for Appellant.

Before Division Two: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Karen King Mitchell and Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judges

Karen King Mitchell, Judge

This case involves a dispute between the City of Lee's Summit, Missouri; Cass County, Missouri; and Raintree Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. (POA) over a bridge that is in disrepair. The bridge spans the top of Raintree Lake Dam and its spillway.¹ The dam created Raintree Lake, a private lake for the use of POA members only. County filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not own the bridge and is not responsible for its repair or replacement. County moved for summary judgment, which the court granted, and City appeals.

On appeal, City claims that the court erred in granting County's motion because (1) the ruling is based on a quitclaim deed that is void as against both public policy and the Missouri Constitution to the extent the deed conveyed the bridge, which is part of the dam, from County to City (Point I); and (2) there are genuine issues of material fact relating to offer and acceptance of the bridge (Point II). Finding no error, we affirm.

Background²

Before May 1976, Raintree Lake Development Corporation (Developer) constructed the spillway, bridge, and corresponding roadway, which is now known as Southwest Raintree Parkway.³ On May 4, 1976, Developer executed a Corporation Warranty Deed conveying to County the area where the spillway, bridge, and roadway are located. A portion of the area generally known as Raintree Lake lies in County and, sometime before May 16, 1977, City annexed that portion of the area into City; the annexation included the area where the bridge is located but excluded existing rights-of-way. County then executed and recorded a quitclaim deed, dated May 16, 1977, in favor of City. Pursuant to the quitclaim deed, County transferred all of its "rights, privileges and interest in the area previously described" to City with the intention that County would not "hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the aforesaid tracts or parcels of land or any part thereof." Thus, City obtained all of County's interest in the property covered by the deed.

Thereafter, City maintained and repaired the surface of the roadway and its shoulders. Beginning in 1995, City included the bridge in City's bridge maintenance program, inspecting the bridge and preparing or obtaining estimates for repairs to the bridge. Starting in 2002, City also funded maintenance on and repairs to the bridge itself with money from City's budget for bridge maintenance and repair, which is separate from City's road maintenance budget. And, around 2011, City constructed concrete flumes and an inlet and pipe for the bridge and spillway.

Currently, the bridge is in disrepair, and the parties disagree about which of them is responsible for repairing or replacing the bridge. On January 6, 2020, County filed a declaratory judgment action against City and the POA. In its petition, County asserted that, to the extent it ever owned the bridge, County conveyed the bridge to City by virtue of the quitclaim deed. County sought a declaration that the bridge is owned by City and/or the POA and that they bear responsibility for maintaining, repairing, and/or replacing the bridge.

The POA filed an answer that included a request for declaratory relief and counterclaims based on unjust enrichment and inverse condemnation.⁴ The POA asked the court to declare that (1) County or City owns the bridge; and (2) County, City, or both are responsible for maintaining, repairing, and/or replacing the bridge. City also filed an answer to County's petition. And both City and County denied the POA's claims.

Subsequently, City filed an amended answer, asserting,

The bridge and spillway are part of the Raintree Lake Dam, which was created and exists to provide a private lake for the benefit of the members of [the POA]. Mo. Const. art. VI, § 23, prohibits the grant of public money in aid of a private association or corporation. A determination that the City owns[ ] or has responsibility to repair or replace the bridge and spillway would violate that constitutional provision.

...

Any public money spent by the City to maintain, repair or replace the Bridge, Dam or its spillway would be in violation of that constitutional provision, except that related to maintenance of the right-of-way, as SW Raintree Parkway is a public road.

City further asserted that the POA owns, controls, and maintains the dam. City's amended answer also included a counterclaim against County for fraudulent conveyance and a cross-claim against the POA. As part of its counterclaim, City asked the court to enter an order setting aside or holding as void ab initio that part of the quitclaim deed purporting to convey any interest other than the designated rights-of-way.

For its cross-claim against the POA, City alleged that the POA, a private association, owns, controls, and maintains Raintree Lake, a private lake, for the benefit of its members. City also alleged that the POA owns, controls, and maintains the dam, which includes the spillway, and that the dam and spillway were constructed and exist to create and maintain Raintree Lake. The POA admitted these allegations, but denied City's claim that the bridge is part of the dam. City further alleged that it never accepted ownership of or responsibility for the bridge, spillway, or dam, except for the right-of-way crossing over the bridge; the POA denied these allegations. Finally, City alleged, and the POA denied, that ownership or control of the bridge by City would be tantamount to holding that City is required to spend public funds to aid a private association in violation of Mo. Const. article VI, § 23. And City requested the following relief:

if this Court finds that the City owns the Bridge, or any part of the Dam, including its spillway, or has responsibility to expend public money for maintenance, repair or replacement of any of those structures, then ... City prays that the Court also declare that Raintree Lake is open and available for use by all residents of the City.

On October 5, 2020, County moved for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory judgment and all counterclaims filed against County. According to County's motion, the uncontroverted material facts show "County conveyed any legal interest in the bridge ... to ... City ... through the May 16, 1977 quit claim deed [which] unambiguously conveyed all of ... County's interests (if any) in the Bridge [and] City has since exercised dominion and control over the Bridge for decades." The POA moved to join County's motion for summary judgment and asked the court to enter summary judgment in the POA's favor on all claims by and against it and to declare that the POA has no legal interest in the bridge and is not responsible for its maintenance or repair.

In its response to County's summary judgment motion, City admitted several facts, including the fact that the bridge is located in the area annexed by City as described in the quitclaim deed and that the deed conveyed rights-of-way in that area. City filed a statement of additional uncontroverted material facts⁵ and a legal memorandum opposing County's motion. In its legal memorandum, City reiterated its argument that Mo. Const. article VI, § 23, prohibits both County and City from owning the bridge because it is part of the dam that creates Raintree Lake, a private lake accessible to POA members only, and article VI, § 23, prohibits expenditures in aid of the POA, a private association.

On January 12, 2021, the court issued an order granting County's motion, concluding "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [County] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... on its claim for declaratory relief and on the counterclaims asserted against it." According to the court, it is uncontroverted that the area of Southwest Raintree Parkway, the spillway, and the bridge over which the Parkway runs are located within the area described in the quitclaim deed and that County conveyed that area as well as "[a]ll rights-of-ways, easements and other rights, privileges and interests in the area previously described" to City. Accordingly, the court concluded that County "is neither the owner of, nor responsible now or in the future for the maintenance or repair or replacement of Southwest Raintree Parkway or the Bridge and spillway over which Southwest Raintree Parkway runs and within the area more particularly described [in the quitclaim deed]." The court did not expressly address City's constitutional argument.

City filed a motion to amend the court's summary judgment order to designate it a final judgment for purposes of appeal. On February 11, 2021, the court issued a corrected order and judgment granting City's motion and finding "there is no just reason for delay, and this Judgment is certified as final for the purpose of appeal."

Jurisdiction

Before addressing the merits of City's points on appeal, we must first determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction in this case. McConnell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. , 606 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). "The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." Id. (quoting Wilson v. City of St. Louis , 600 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 2020) ). "Although many statutes govern ‘the right to appeal, the only statute even potentially applicable to the present case is section 512.020(5),’ which provides that ‘final judgments’ are appealable." Id. (quoting Wi...