Cass v. Parseghian

• Decision Date: 03 February 2023
• Docket Number: 22-P-415
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: STEPHEN F. CASS v. SCOTT PARSEGHIAN & others.[1]

STEPHEN F. CASS v. SCOTT PARSEGHIAN & others.^[1]

No. 22-P-415

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

February 3, 2023

Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Stephen F. Cass, served as athletic director of the town of Wayland (town) from July 2013 to June 2015. His tenure in that position became the subject of significant public controversy, especially as it related to the high school football program run by defendant Scott Parseghian. In May of 2015, Cass was informed that his contract would not be renewed. He alleges that his employment was terminated in retaliation for his efforts to address various improprieties in the football and other scholastic athletic programs.^[2] Based on these allegations Cass brought a series of actions in State and Federal courts.^[3]In 2021, Cass brought the action before us against eleven defendants: Parseghian, three other coaches, and seven other individuals (who appear to be either former student athletes or parents of former and current student athletes) who had become embroiled in the controversy. Representing himself, Cass alleged defamation and related tort and civil rights claims.^[4] In separate but closely parallel rulings, two Superior Court judges dismissed Cass's claims as barred by the applicable three-year statutes of limitations. See G. L. c. 260, §§ 2A, 4, 5B; Pagliuca v. Boston, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 820, 822 (1994). On Cass's appeal, we affirm.

It is uncontested that the alleged statements and actions on which Cass's claims rely all took place by the end of 2016. It is also uncontested that Cass did not file the current action until 2021. It thus follows that this action was untimely unless it can be saved through application of an exception to the statute of limitations. Flynn v. Associated Press, 401 Mass. 776, 780-782 (1988). Cass seeks to invoke the "so called discovery rule" to save his claims. Id. at 781, quoting White v. Peabody Constr. Co., 386 Mass. 121, 129 (1982). He bears the burden of demonstrating that application of the discovery rule renders his action timely. See Wolsfelt v. Gloucester Times, 98 Mass.App.Ct. 321, 324 (2020).

Cass argues that under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until February 28, 2018. It was on that date that he received a batch of documents through discovery in the Federal court action that he had brought against the town of Wayland and various other defendants. See note 3, supra. Only then, according to Cass, was he on notice of the particular statements and actions on which his current claims are based.^[5] Because he filed the current action less than three years thereafter, he argues it still was timely.

We are unpersuaded. The controversy over Cass's termination became extremely public during the summer of 2015.

For example, both the local press and the Boston Globe provided extensive news coverage. In addition, through letters to the editor, op-ed columns, and a petition circulating on the Internet, numerous people -- including some of the individual defendants here -- wrote to express their support for Parseghian and their opposition to Cass. It is readily apparent that during 2015, Cass had become aware not only of the swirling controversy surrounding his tenure but also of the fact that there appeared to be an organized campaign against him.^[6] For example, the complaint alleges that during the summer of 2015, defendant Clayton Jones approached him at a restaurant and said, "we're not done with you yet." It is therefore uncontested that more than three years prior to Cass's filing of his action, he had actual knowledge that individual defendants had made statements about him that he now alleges were defamatory or otherwise actionable.^[7] To be sure, we accept as true Cass's claim that until at least February 28, 2018, he was not aware of the full extent of the defendants' actions and statements, including the extent to which these efforts may have been organized by Parseghian or others. In addition, we accept as true that Cass may not have known prior to 2018 that some of the individual defendants had played a role in the controversy. But actual knowledge is not required to commence the running of the statute of limitations on his claims. Rather, even under the discovery rule, a cause of action begins to accrue once a party "learns, or reasonably should have learned, that he has been harmed by the defendant's conduct." Flynn, 401 Mass. at 781. Stated differently, the discovery rule "applies only to 'inherently unknowable' causes of action." Id., quoting White v. Peabody Constr. Co., 386 Mass. at 130 (discovery rule inapplicable to broadly disseminated publications). Accord Wolsfelt, 98 Mass.App.Ct. at 328 (discovery rule inapplicable to article and update published on newspaper website available through "search engine query"). Contrast Tryon v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 98 Mass.App.Ct. 673, 680-682 (2020) (where key facts were deliberately hidden from plaintiff, question for jury as to whether discovery rule applied).^[8] Cass has not demonstrated that his claims against the various defendants were inherently unknowable, even with respect to those defendants whose involvement he learned of only during or after February of 2018. This can be illustrated by example. Cass's first amended complaint relies in great part on statements that defendants made in e-mails that they sent to school officials. Cass describes these communications as "confidential" e-mails that he learned of only on or after February 28, 2018. Although the e-mails may have been unknown to him until then, they hardly were "confidential." Rather, the e-mails plainly constituted public records subject to disclosure under the public records act. As Cass acknowledged at oral argument, he did not file a public records request until after February 28, 2018.^[9] With considerable force, the defendants have raised numerous alternative grounds on which they assert we could affirm the judgment. These include, for example, arguments that, as a matter of law, the statements at issue are not defamatory. Given how we ru...