Cassady v. Claiborne

• Decision Date: 15 November 1991
• Citation: 590 So.2d 339
• Parties: Lomax CASSADY, as a citizen taxpayer, incorporator of City of Evergreen, a municipal corporation v. John CLAIBORNE, as city councilman, agent, and trustee of City of Evergreen, a municipal corporation, and City of Evergreen, municipal corporation. 2900474.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 339

590 So.2d 339

Lomax CASSADY, as a citizen taxpayer, incorporator of City of Evergreen, a municipal corporation

v.

John CLAIBORNE, as city councilman, agent, and trustee of City of Evergreen, a municipal corporation, and City of Evergreen, municipal corporation.

2900474.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 15, 1991.

Margaret Stone, Mobile, for appellant.

David T. Hyde, Jr., Evergreen, for appellee.

ROBERT P. BRADLEY, Retired Appellate Judge.

This appeal arises from a complaint filed by Lomax Cassady, a taxpayer, in the District Court of Conecuh County.

The complaint was filed against the City of Evergreen, Alabama (City) and against Evergreen city councilman John Claiborne. The complaint alleged that Claiborne had unlawfully used municipal funds for travel expenses and had failed to account for these expenses or have them approved by the city council in a timely fashion as prescribed by statute. Cassady sought to recover for the City $500 in public funds, as well as court costs.

Claiborne filed a motion to dismiss Cassady's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Claiborne also challenged Cassady's standing to bring the suit against him.

Cassady subsequently amended his complaint twice to clarify his pleadings. Claiborne and the City then filed an amended motion to dismiss on the ground that the City had approved and ratified the payment of Claiborne's travel expenses. Thereafter, the district court entered an order finding that Claiborne had not properly itemized and presented his travel expenses to the city council as prescribed by statute, but that the City had ultimately ratified the expenses and cured Claiborne's error. The district court also implicitly found that Cassady did not have standing to bring the suit.

Cassady filed for a trial de novo of his claim in circuit court, and also filed a motion to enjoin the City from expending any municipal funds for the defense of Claiborne in the lawsuit filed by Cassady. The City then filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Cassady had failed to make a claim against the City in his pleadings. Cassady filed another amended complaint, but did not add any new claims against Claiborne or the City.

The matter was set for hearing on April 9, 1991. At that time, the court dismissed the City as a party-defendant. After taking evidence ore tenus, the circuit court entered judgment for Claiborne. This appeal ensued.

We begin by recognizing that the disbursal of municipal funds to a city councilman for traveling expenses is governed by Chapter 7, Article 1, Code 1975. Section 36-7-3 of this statute provides that no sum will be advanced to any city officer or employee for travel beyond the city unless the city council first adopts a resolution that states the purpose and object of the proposed traveling. Any city officer who is advanced funds by the city to defray travel is required to present an itemized statement of expenditures immediately upon his return, and these expenses must be approved in a regular meeting of the city council within thirty days of presentment to the treasurer. § 36-7-2, Code 1975. If there is failure to present and approve these itemized expenses, the officer or employee will be personally liable to the city for the sum advanced to him. § 36-7-4.

In this case, Claiborne was permitted by the Evergreen City Council to attend a National League of Cities Convention in Washington, D.C., on March 2 through March 7, 1990. Claiborne's hotel room and transportation costs were prepaid by the City, and Claiborne was given a $500 advance to pay for food, taxis, and other expenses while attending the convention. Upon his return from the trip, Claiborne did not immediately submit an itemized list of his expenses to the council treasurer.

Cassady instigated his lawsuit as a taxpayer suing on behalf of the City to recover the funds advanced to Claiborne, after Claiborne failed to get timely approval of these expenses. In its order the district court found that Cassady did not have standing to bring the lawsuit, then ruled against him on the merits of the case.

Cassady subsequently sought a trial de novo in the circuit court. In its order the circuit court found that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the city council failed to properly approve Claiborne's expenses. The court further held that the council substantially complied with state law by retroactively approving Claiborne's expenses. However, the circuit court also explicitly adopted the order of the district court in its entirety. In so doing, the circuit court adopted the finding that Cassady did not have standing to bring the suit. The circuit court thus held that Cassady did not have standing, but nevertheless ruled on the merits of the suit.

The United States Supreme Court has established that the question of standing turns upon whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Standing imparts justiciability to the issues raised and is the threshold issue of every federal case. Warth. Likewise, in cases brought in state court, the machinery of the court is not set into motion unless the plaintiff first alleges his right to bring suit to recover for a redressable injury. Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771 (Ala.1990). From these rules of law, it is axiomatic that a party who lacks standing cannot be granted relief upon his cause.

In this case, the circuit court denied relief to Cassady based on his lack of standing; thus, no justiciability was imparted to the substantive issues raised. Regardless of this, the trial court addressed these issues and based its judgment upon them. Review of this case thus presents us with a dilemma, i.e. whether to decide only the issue of standing or to decide both the issue of standing and the issue on the merits.

For reasons that are set out below, we hold that Cassady did have standing to bring his action. The trial court's holding on this issue is therefore due to be reversed. Nevertheless, we do not find that justice would be served by ordering a readjudication of the substantive issues in view of our holding on the issue of standing. The trial court has already been presented with the evidence on the merits of the case and judgment was rendered accordingly. The record of this adjudication is before us in full; thus, for purposes of judicial economy we will also review the court's judgment on the substantive issues raised. First, however, we must fully address the issue of Cassady's standing to bring suit in this case.

In most jurisdictions where an unlawful expenditure of money has been made by the officers of a municipal corporation and the...