Langham v. Wampol

• Decision Date: 03 December 2004
• Citation: 902 So.2d 58
• Parties: Eric V. LANGHAM and Cynthia Langham, individually and on behalf of their minor son v. James WAMPOL.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

902 So.2d 58

Eric V. LANGHAM and Cynthia Langham, individually and on behalf of their minor son v. James WAMPOL.

2030322.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

December 3, 2004.

Mark N. Chambless and Michael A. Griggs of Chambless & Math, P.C., Montgomery, for appellants.

Submitted on appellants' brief only.

PER CURIAM.

Eric V. Langham and Cynthia Langham, individually and on behalf of their minor son, sued James Wampol, alleging malicious prosecution. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Wampol. The Langhams appeal. This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

An appellate court reviews a summary judgment by the same standard the trial court uses in determining whether to grant a summary-judgment motion. Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So.2d 45, 47 (Ala.1995); Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988). A summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The movant has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). If the moving party makes that prima facie showing, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who then has the burden of presenting substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Id. In determining whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, this Court must review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wayne J. Griffin Elec., Inc. v. Dunn Constr. Co., 622 So.2d 314 (Ala.1993). Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

On May 11, 2002, Wampol signed an "Alabama Uniform Incident/Offense Report" ("the incident report"). In the incident report, Wampol alleged that the Langhams' son and another juvenile offender had broken into Wampol's storage shed and had removed a pair of rubber boots from the shed and then left the boots outside. Wampol stated that during the break-in the electricity to the shed was turned off and certain items in the refrigerator that was located in the shed were ruined. A statement from a neighbor of Wampol's indicated that the neighbor had seen the two juveniles enter Wampol's backyard. The Langhams' son was prosecuted as a juvenile, and, according to the Langhams, a judgment was entered in their son's favor in the juvenile court.

In their complaint alleging malicious prosecution, the Langhams sought $10,000 in damages for unnecessary legal fees, mental anguish, and loss of reputation. The Langhams filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude their son's juvenile records from evidence. Wampol filed a motion to strike the Langhams' individual claims on the ground that the Langhams lacked standing to bring a complaint alleging malicious prosecution. Wampol also objected to the Langhams' motion in limine. Wampol notified the court of his intent to seek attorney fees pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the ALAA"). Subsequently, Wampol filed a motion for a summary judgment along with a copy of the incident report. In response to Wampol's summary-judgment motion, the Langhams and their son filed affidavits. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Wampol and made that judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Wampol then filed a motion for an award of attorney fees. The Langhams responded to the motion, arguing that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to award attorney fees. They also filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on Wampol's attorney-fee motion and entered an order awarding Wampol $2,500 in attorney fees.

Although it is clear that the Langhams have standing to bring a malicious-prosecution action on behalf of their minor son, there is a question whether they have standing to bring that claim in their individual capacities. "Standing, like jurisdiction, is necessary for any valid legal action." Doremus v. Business Council of Alabama Workers' Comp. Self-Insurers Fund, 686 So.2d 252, 253 (Ala.1996).

"The United States Supreme Court has established that the question of standing turns upon whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Standing imparts justiciability to the issues raised and is the threshold issue of every federal case. Warth. Likewise, in cases brought in state court, the machinery of the court is not set into motion unless the plaintiff first alleges his right to bring suit to recover for a redressable injury. Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771 (Ala.1990). From these rules of law, it is axiomatic that a party who lacks standing cannot be granted relief upon his cause."

Cassady v. Claiborne, 590 So.2d 339, 341 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). "`To say that a person has standing is to say that that person is a proper party to bring the action.'" Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., 881 So.2d 1013, 1019 (Ala.2003)(quoting Doremus, 686 So.2d at 253). "Standing ... turns on `whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right.'" State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1027 (Ala.1999)(quoting Romer v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566, 581 (Colo.1998)(Kourlis, J., dissenting))(emphasis omitted). The dispositive issue here is whether the Langhams, as individuals, have suffered an injury to a legally protected right.

The essence of the wrong committed in the malicious prosecution on a criminal charge is the institution of the prosecution maliciously and without probable cause, leading in due course to an arrest. Ladd v. Townsell, 38 Ala.App. 181, 79 So.2d 709 (1955). The Langhams lack standing to bring a suit for their individual claims of malicious prosecution because they were not the subject of the allegedly malicious prosecution. Although the Langhams may bring an action on behalf of their minor son, they have no cause of action in their own right. Alabama law does not provide to the parents of a maliciously prosecuted child an individual cause of action for malicious prosecution. In other words, Alabama law has not conferred standing upon the parents of a maliciously prosecuted child allowing them to recover damages in their own right. The courts of this state have not addressed this issue; however, other courts have addressed a parent's right to bring an individual action when their child has been maliciously prosecuted. See Downtown Grill, Inc. v. Connell, 721 So.2d 1113 (Miss.1998)(parents were not the proper parties to bring an action in their individual capacities alleging malicious prosecution of their child who was arrested for forgery); Rushing v. Bosse, 652 So.2d 869 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995)(grandparents who were not the subject of the judicial proceeding could not maintain a malicious-prosecution claim in their individual capacities); see also Lambert v. Garlo, 19 Ohio App.3d 295, 484 N.E.2d 260 (1985)(trial court properly dismissed the individual claims of parents and a brother of a person who was allegedly defamed because the publication did not concern them); Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F.Supp. 145 (N.D.Tex.1979)(parents could not maintain an individual action alleging libel, slander, or invasion of privacy against a television station where the parents were not identified in the news report that falsely reported that their son had had a homosexual relationship with his employer).¹

"`When a party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter jurisdiction.' State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Ala.1999). The absence of subject-matter jurisdiction renders void any judgment entered in the action. Sumlin Constr. Co., L.L.C. v. Taylor, 850 So.2d 303 (Ala.2002); Sustainable Forests, L.L.C. v. Alabama Power Co., 805 So.2d 681 (Ala.2001); Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642 So.2d 941 (Ala.1994); Luken v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., 580 So.2d 578 (Ala.1991). A void judgment will not support an appeal. Baldwin County v. Bay Minette, 854 So.2d 42 (Ala.2003); Kid's Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Human Resources, 843 So.2d 164 (Ala.2002)."

Moore v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 876 So.2d 443, 448 (Ala.2003). Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of Wampol and against the Langhams in their individual capacities is vacated and the appeal is dismissed in part.

We must now address whether Wampol was entitled to a summary judgment on the Langhams' claim asserted on behalf of their son. The Langhams argue that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Wampol because, they assert, Wampol "filed his summary-judgment motion with no supporting affidavits or other evidence attached." However, this contention is incorrect because Wampol did file an unauthenticated copy of the incident report from the Elmore County Sheriff's Department in support of his motion for a summary judgment.

The Langhams failed to move to strike or otherwise object to Wampol's attachment of the unauthenticated incident report to his motion for a summary judgment. The court can consider inadmissible evidence if the party against whom it is offered does not object to the evidence by moving to strike it. See Glenn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 534 So.2d 598 (Ala....