Cassar v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission

• Decision Date: 03 October 1955
• Docket Number: No. 6-13,6-13
• Citation: 343 Mich. 380,72 N.W.2d 254
• Parties: Francis J. CASSAR et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The APPEAL BOARD OF The MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and The Michigan Employment Security Commission and Precision Manufacturing Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 254

72 N.W.2d 254

343 Mich. 380

Francis J. CASSAR et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The APPEAL BOARD OF The MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and The Michigan Employment Security Commission and Precision Manufacturing Company, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 6-13.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 3, 1955.

Zwerdling, Zwerdling, Keith & Livingston, Detroit, for plaintiffs and appellants.

A. D. Ruegsegger, Dyer, Angell & Meek, Detroit, for defendant and appellee Precision Mfg. Co.

Thomas M. Kavanagh, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General, Lansing, Arthur W. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Commission.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Chief Justice.

The facts in this matter are not in dispute. On October 24, 1952, and for some time prior to that date the Precision Manufacturing Company was engaged in business at West Branch, Michigan. It had in its employ approximately 40 men on the day shift. On said date one of the employees, Floyd Buckingham, was discharged for an alleged violation of the company rules. This occurred at 7 o'clock in the morning when Buckingham appeared for work. He was requested not to go out in the plant, but did so, advising his fellow workers that he had been 'framed.'

A foreman for the employer reminded the workmen that under the contract between the company and the union a discharged employee had the right to appeal. The suggestion was further made that the men go to work and that the prescribed grievance procedure should be followed in Buckingham's case. However, some of the men left with Buckingham, and when the manager entered the plant at 7:30 approximately 15 men were outside the building and 25 within. None of the latter was working. Thereupon the manager advised those within the sound of his voice that all who were not inside and ready to work at 8 o'clock would be discharged. Ten employees remained, and the rest of the men on the day shift failed to report for work at the time specified. Their discharges were later processed by the company. There being an insufficient number of workers to carry on operations, the ten who remained on the job were sent home at 9 a.m.

Following the occurrences above mentioned the plant remained closed until November 18, 1952. The plaintiffs in the present proceeding, eight in number, were among those who left the plant and refused to work on October 24th. On November 5th the company offered to reinstate all of the men except Buckingham and to arbitrate the dispute with him, but to employees declined the offer. In accordance with the contract between the union and the employer, above referred to, a claim of grievance was filed with the plant manager, in Buckingham's behalf, approximately 20 minutes after the discharge.

At some time subsequent to the events of October 24, 1952, the plaintiffs herein filed claims for employment benefits under the Michigan employment security act. ¹ The employment security commission considered such claims and determined in the first instance that the unemployment was due to a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute. Such determination was protested by the employer as to each plaintiff and subsequently, under date of December 12, 1952, the commission issued a further determination that the claimants were disqualified from October 24, 1952, through the duration of their unemployment, under the provisions of section 29(1)(a)(2) of the act, for misconduct connected with their work. This action was protested by plaintiffs, and on December 22, 1952, the commission issued a redetermination holding plaintiffs disqualified for benefits from October 24, 1952, through the duration of their unemployment, under the provisions of the statute above cited, for misconduct in connection with their work, and cancelling certain credits earned prior to October 24, 1952. On appeal to a referee of the commission the decision was affirmed. Similar action was taken by the appeal board, and the order of the latter board was sustained by the circuit court of Ingham county. The controversy now comes before this Court on appeal from the judgment entered in the circuit court.

The contract, above mentioned, between the Precision Manufacturing Company and the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO Local 56, hereinafter referred to as the union, provided that said union should be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the plant at West Branch. It outlined the procedure that should be observed in handling grievances, covered in detail the matter of seniority rights, and set forth rules designed to protect both employer and employees. Attached to the agreement was a statement of rules of conduct prescribed by the employer. In the article relating to grievance procedure it was specifically provided, in section 4, that:

'Section 4. The Union agrees that during the term of the Agreement it will not cause or permit or take part in any sit-down, slow-down, or other curtailment of work, strike or picket the Company's plant or premises until the grievance procedure provided herein has been completely exhausted. The Company agrees that it will not institute any lock out, move work, tools, jigs, fixtures, machinery or other equipment until the grievance procedure has been exhausted.'

That the dispute between the employer and Buckingham was subject to the grievance provisions of the contract is not open to question. It appears, however, that the plaintiffs in this case, and some of their fellow employees, were unwilling to abide by the terms of the agreement between the union, their sole bargaining agent, and the employer. It is a fair inference that their attitude was in part inspired by the statements made to them by Buckingham, who was at the time the president of the local union. It appears from the record that they refused to work because Buckingham had been discharged, and that they left the employer's plant 'to find out what was what.'

In enacting the statute granting unemployment benefits the legislature prescribed the terms and conditions under which such benefits might be received, providing that in certain instances they should be withhold or curtailed. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, the following provisions of section 29 of the employment security act, C.L.S.1952, § 421.29, Stat.Ann. 1953 Cum.Supp. § 17.531, indicate the legislative intent:

'(1) An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

'(a) For the duration of his unemployment in all cases where the individual has: (1) left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit, or (2) has been discharged for misconduct connected with his work or for intoxication while at work, or (3) has failed without good cause to apply for available suitable work when so directed by the employment office or the commission or to accept suitable work when offered him, or to return to his customary self-employment, if any, when so directed by the employment office or the commission. * * *

'(b) For any week with respect to which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute in the establishment in which he is or was last employed'.

The specific question presented to this Court on the appeal is whether, on the record before us, the plaintiffs' rights to the benefits claimed by them are subject to section 29(1)(a)(2), imposing a disqualification as to benefits for the duration of their unemployment, or to section 29(1)(b), limiting such disqualification to the weeks when there was a stoppage of work. Appellants contend that the latter provision governs and assert in support of their position that there was a 'labor dispute' that resulted in the cessation of operations in the employer's plant for the period above mentioned. No claim is made that plaintiffs did not violate the contract between the union and the employer, but it is insisted that there was on their part no 'misconduct' within the meaning of the statutory provision above quoted.

In considering the question it must be borne in mind that the burden of proving their eligibility to benefits rests on the plaintiffs. Phillips v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 323 Mich. 188, 35 N.W.2d 237; Clapp v. Appeal Board of Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 325 Mich. 212, 38 N.W.2d 325. It is likewise true, as pointed out in Intertown Corporation v. Appeal Board of Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 328 Mich. 363, 43 N.W.2d 888, that this Court is limited to a review of the circuit court judgment. In determining the issue presented to him on certiorari the circuit judge was subject to the provisions of section 38 of the employment security act, C.L.S.1952, § 421.38, Stat. Ann. 1953 Cum.Supp. § 17.540, which reads in part as follows:

'The findings of fact made by the appeal board acting within its powers if supported by the great weight of the evidence, shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but the circuit court of the county, in which the claimant resides or in which the employer's principal place of business in Michigan is located, if no claimant is a party to the case, or the circuit court for the county of Ingham shall have power to review questions of fact and law on the record made before the referee and the appeal board involved in any such final decision, but said court may reverse such decision of said appeal board upon a question of fact only if it finds that said decision of the appeal board is contrary to the great weight of the evidence'.

May it be said in the instant case that the conclusions of the employment security commission, the referee, and the appeal board, to the effect that the plaintiffs were properly discharged because of misconduct connected with their work were repugnant to the great weight of the evidence? In his findings of fact the referee who heard...