Keith v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 7,7
• Citation: 390 Mich. 458,213 N.W.2d 147
• Parties: John KEITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees. 390 Mich. 458, 213 N.W.2d 147
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 147

213 N.W.2d 147

John KEITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 7.

390 Mich. 458, 213 N.W.2d 147

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 18, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1974.

Stephen I. Schlossberg, John A. Fillion, Jordan Rossen, by Jordan Rossen, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant

Clifford L. Johnson, Detroit, for appellee Chrysler Corp.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen. of the State of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James H. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellee Michigan Employment Security Commission.

Before the Entire Bench.

SWAINSON, Justice.

John Keith was hired by Chrysler Corporation at its Detroit Tank Plant located in Warren, Michigan on April 22, 1968. When hired, Keith was 18 years of age and embarking upon his first full-time employment.

Plaintiff Keith was classified as a washer and degreaser and generally worked at that classification for the period prior to his layoff for lack of available work on April 25, 1969. After his layoff, Keith applied for unemployment compensation under the Michigan Employment Security Act. M.C.L.A. § 421.1 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.501 et seq. The issue before us concerns Keith's subsequent disqualification to receive benefits by the Michigan Employment Security Appeal Board.

The Appeal Board found that Keith failed to comply with the requirements of § 29(1)(d) of the Act by failing, without good cause, to report to his employer for an interview concerning available work at its Hamtramck Assembly Plant. The Court of Appeals (Levin, J., dissenting) upheld the Appeal Board in Keith v. Chrysler Corp., 41 Mich.App. 708, 200 N.W.2d 764 (1972), citing the case of Losada v. Chrysler Corp., 24 Mich.App. 656, 180 N.W.2d 844 (1970), leave den. 383 Mich. 827 (1970), as controlling. Although we do not adopt the reasoning of either the Appeal Board or the Court of Appeals, we find that the correct result was reached and we therefore affirm the denial of benefits to plaintiff Keith.

Little need be said at this point in time about the purpose of the unemployment security act. The act itself clearly states the Legislature's approach to the problem of unemployment.

'Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The legislature acting in the exercise of the police power of the state declares that the public policy of the state is as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern which requires action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family, to the detriment Under the act there is an obligation on the part of the employer and employee to take those steps considered necessary by the Legislature to help alleviate the burden of involuntary unemployment. Dwyer v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 321 Mich. 178, 188, 32 N.W.2d 434 (1948).

of the welfare of the people of this state. Social security requires protection against this hazard of our economic life. Employers should be encouraged to provide stable employment. The systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment by the setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of relief assistance, is for the public good, and the general welfare of the people of this state.' M.C.L.A. § 421.2; M.S.A. § 17.502.

One of these steps is found in § 29(1)(d). It places upon the unemployed individual the obligation to attend interviews concerning available suitable work. If the claimant fails to attend such an interview, he shall be 'disqualified for benefits' in all cases in which he:

'Being unemployed has failed without good cause to report to his former employer or employing unit within a reasonable time after notice from said employer or employing unit for an interview concerning available suitable work with said former employer or employing unit, * * *.' ¹

In determining the applicability of § 29(1)(d) to the facts of the present case, we must address ourselves to the poignant arguments advanced by counsel for plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he is not subject to sanction under § 29(1)(d) because he (a) was not given a reasonable time in which to report for an interview, (b) exhibited a good cause for not appearing at the interview, and (c) further, because defendants failed to prove that the work for which he was to report was suitable within the definition of § 29(6) of the act.

a. Reasonable Time.

At the time of his layoff Keith was orally referred to the Hamtramck Assembly Plant for an interview. One week latter, on May 2nd, a telegram was sent by Chrysler asking him to report to the Hamtramck Assembly Plant. ² Claimant did not appear for the interview after either request.

It is often very difficult to establish what is a reasonable time for the purposes of a given statute. However, in the present case, Chrysler did not file its Notice of Possible Disqualification until July 18, fully 2 1/2 months after the second notice to appear for an interview. Under the

facts of the instant case, it would be extremely tenuous for us to hold that 2 1/2 months is not a reasonable time in which to appear to an interview. We conclude then, that appellant Keith was provided a reasonable time to report to the Hamtramck Assembly Plant for an employment interview under § 29(1)(d) of the act.

b. Good Cause.

A large part of the argument in this case is addressed to the issue of the merits of Keith's refusal of the proffered assembly work at the Hamtramck Assembly Plant. The majority in the Court of Appeals relied on the Losada case which held no good cause present in a situation where an employee refused work in an adjoining plant. In dissent, Judge (now Justice) Levin expressed his inability to follow Losada and concluded that,

'* * * the term 'good cause' as used in the Employment Security Act means nothing more than good reason--a substantial reason--for refusing to accept the proffered employment, and that a cause personal to the employee can be good cause. I also conclude that on the facts of this case Keith had good cause to refuse the proffered employment.'

In our opinion, the debate on the validity of Losada and the presence of good cause for refusing assembly work at the Hamtramck Assembly Plant is not material to the facts of this case. The only 'good cause' we are concerned with here is Keith's good cause for failing to report for an interview. We do not review the validity of Losada nor do we decide if Keith could have exhibited good cause for refusing an assembly job if one had been offered. The facts of this case only justify an examination of the requirements of good cause under § 29(1)(d) for failing to appear for an interview.

Good cause under § 29(1)(d) has not been defined by the Legislature or the courts. In searching for a meaning, we look to what is reasonable in light of the purpose of the disputed section. The obvious purpose of § 29(1)(d) is to bring unemployed individuals and their former employers together to discuss the jobs then available. Section 29(1)(d) does not address itself to the acceptance or rejection of proffered employment; its scope is restricted to that preliminary step by which the employer can acquaint the unemployed individual with the existing employment possibilities.

To find a good cause refusal to attend an interview, the facts must warrant the conclusion that there were significant reasons for not attending. Depending upon the facts of the given case, some significant reasons might be an unreasonably distant place of interview, personal illness or emergency making attendance unduly burdensome, or a demonstrated lack of good faith on the part of the employer such as total disregard for the convenience of the claimant or a clearly unacceptable job as the basis for the employment interview.

Examining the facts of this case, we cannot find good cause for failing to attend an interview. The interview was to be held within a reasonable distance from Keith's residence, the time for the interview was flexible, and Keith has made no claim of his personal inability to attend.

The basis of his inaction was dislike for assembly work and his desire not to lose his status at the Tank Plant. We cannot find that in the case of a worker with slightly more than one year's seniority such dislikes and desires establish good cause for failure to merely attend an interview.

c. Suitable Work.

The Appeal Board found in its opinion that the interview was for work generally similar in character which would be suitable under the act. We cannot say that under Const.1963, art. 6, § 28 and § 38 of the Act that the decision of the Appeal Board must be reversed.

Section 29(6) does specifically enumerate factors of inquiry in determining whether or not work is suitable for an individual. There is, however, a difference in the level of inquiry demanded into suitable work under § 29(1)(d) and § 29(1)(e). When an individual has been offered a specific job and thereafter refuses to accept it, determining the suitability of the proffered employment under § 29(1)(e) should be a very careful and specific task, taking into account each factor of § 29(6) individually. The establishment of suitable work under § 29(1)(d), however, does not demand the specificity and in depth inquiry of § 29(1)(e). When a claimant refuses to attend an interview, and bases this refusal on the unsuitability of the work that would probably be offered to him, the employer need only demonstrate that the probable employment meets in a general manner the requirements of § 29(6). ³ Cf....