Cassarello v. United States

• Decision Date: 01 January 1919
• Docket Number: 1137.
• Citation: 271 F. 486
• Parties: CASSARELLO v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

271 F. 486

CASSARELLO v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1137.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

December Term, 1919

A. A Vosburg, of Scranton, Pa., for plaintiff.

R. L Burnett, of Scranton, Pa., and Ed. H. Horton, of Washington D.C., for the United States.

WITMER District Judge.

Lorenzo Celetti, being in the military service of the United States under the name of Lawrence Seigle, on January 11, 1918, made application to the United States, under such assumed name for insurance in the sum of $10,000, designating as beneficiary 'step-brother (29 years old) Patsy Gillette, ' followed by a certificate of insurance issued through the Bureau of War Risk Insurance for the Treasury Department.

Lorenzo Celetti died, while in the military service of the United States, on October 29, 1918. Immediately thereafter a claim for insurance was made by Patrick Cilleto. A question as to the identity of the beneficiary with that of the claimant arose. It was, however, finally settled that Patsy Giletti, variously known as Patrick Cilletto, Patsy Giletti, or Patrick Chilant, whose name was Pasquale Ciletti, was a brother of the full blood of the insured soldier. The designated beneficiary, Pasquale Celetti, died during the month of April, 1919, before the matter of his identity had been adjusted. He left a will, naming Savino Cassarello as executor, which provided, inter alia, as follows:

'Third. I am beneficiary of $10,000 under the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, for the death of Lawrence Seigle, my brother, private of 303 Guard and Fire, Q.M.C.U.S.A. By this will I authorize and empower the said Savino Cassarello to collect same and remit as he receive the money by the War Department with the exchange to my wife in Italy, also to find out if my mother is still living and if my mother is living, then, I direct thereby the said executor to forward to my mother Filomena Siconolfi $15 per month with the exchange to be deducted from the installment which receive from the War Department, or instruct my wife to give my mother an adequate support of an equal amount.'

This action was brought against the United States by Savino Cassarello, executor of the estate of Pasquale Celetti, the beneficiary designated by Lawrence Seigle, for the purpose of recovering all the installments of war risk insurance accrued and unpaid, including both those installments accrued prior to the death of the beneficiary (Pasquale Celetti) and those accruing after the beneficiary's death; the contention being that the designated beneficiary took a vested interest in the insurance upon the death of the insured, and that he could by will dispose of and pass as his estate the accrued as well as the accruing installments or payments provided to be paid the beneficiary designated in the certificate of insurance.

As to the installments which had accured prior to the beneficiary's death, remaining unpaid at that time, there seems to be no serious dispute. When the installments became due and payable, they no doubt vested in the person having a right to receive them, and having become vested, they passed according to such beneficiary's will. The contest has to do altogether with the deferred payments or installments not yet payable when the beneficiary died.

The contract of insurance, if it may be called such, was made under and by virtue of an act of Congress approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 398, c. 105), which amended the act of September 2, 1914 (38 Stat. 711, c. 293; Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Secs. 514a-514j), by establishing in the Treasury Department a bureau to be known as the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and providing further:

'Sec. 1. * * * That there be in such bureau * * * a Division of Military and Naval Insurance in charge of a * * * Commissioner of Military and Naval insurance. * * *

'Sec. 13. That the director, subject to the general direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall administer, execute, and enforce the provisions of this act, and for that purpose have full power and authority to make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes, and shall decide all questions arising under the act, except as otherwise provided in sections five and four hundred and five. * * * '

40 Stat. c. 105, pp. 398, 399 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Secs. 514a, 514kk).

In pursuance of the authority granted, the Director of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance did make certain rules and regulations. To the admission of these rules and regulations, the plaintiff objected on the ground that they were not attached to the policy, as required by the Pennsylvania law (Pa. St. 1920, Sec. 12399). If we had under consideration the ordinary policy of insurance of an old line insurance company, this objection might be well taken; but a contract made in pursuance of a federal statute must be construed with reference to such statute, and cannot be controlled by the state laws or decisions. Watson v. Tarpley, 58 U.S. (18 How.) 517-521, 15 L.Ed. 509; Calhoun Mining Co. v. Ajax, 182 U.S. 499, 21 Sup.Ct. 885, 45 L.Ed. 1200; Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, vol. 2, p. 1314.

Furthermore, rules and regulations prescribed by a department of the government in pursuance of a statutory authority, have the force of law. U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 31 Sup.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563; United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 231, 34 Sup.Ct. 512, 58 L.Ed. 930; Covey v. United States (D.C.) 263 F. 768, 775. As was said in Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, at page 221, 14 Sup.Ct. 513, at page 517 (38 L.Ed. 415): ' * * * There was no necessity for a formal introduction in evidence of such rules and regulations. They are matters of which courts of the United States take judicial notice. Questions of a kindred nature have been frequently presented, and it may be laid down as a general rule, deducible from the cases, that wherever, by express language of any act of Congress, power is entrusted to either of the principal departments of government to prescribe rules and regulations for the transaction of business in which the public is interested, and in respect to which they have a right to participate, and by which they are to be controlled, the rules and regulations prescribed in pursuance of such authority become a mass of that body of public records of which the courts take judicial notice.'

Under section 882, Revised Statutes (Comp. St Sec. 1494), providing for the admission in evidence of copies of documents of this nature, the certified copy of the application for insurance of Lawrence Seigle was properly in evidence.

In arriving at a proper decision, this court may therefore turn for assistance, not only to the certificate of insurance, but also to the application for insurance, and the rules and regulations of the department, as well as the act itself, and, where the wording of the act is somewhat obscure, it may seek the legislative intent as expressed by the authors of the law, as a guide. In a very recent opinion of the Supreme Court (Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, etc., 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. . . ., rendered January 3, 1921), Justice Pitney said:

'By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well established that the debates in Congress expressive of the views and motives of individual members are not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-making body. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24; United States v. Union Pacific R.R.Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79; United States v. Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 318. But reports of committees of House or Senate stand upon a more solid footing, and may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute is obscure. Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495. And this has been extended to include explanatory statements in the nature of a supplemental report made by the committee member in charge of a bill in course of passage. Binns v. United States, supra; Penna. R.R.Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198, 199; United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281; United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318.'

The application for insurance contained the following clause:

'In case any beneficiary die or become disqualified after becoming entitled to an installment but before receiving all installments, the remaining installments are to be paid to such person or persons within the permitted class of beneficiaries as may be designated in my last will and testament, or in the absence of such will, as would under the laws of my place of residence be entitled to my personal property in case of intestacy.'

This application was made part of the contract of insurance in the certificate of insurance which so far as it had a bearing on this suit, contains the following:

'Subject to the payment of the premiums required, this insurance is granted under the authority of an act amending 'An act entitled 'An act to authorize the establishment of a Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department, ' approved September 2, 1914, and for other purposes,' approved October 6, 1917, and subject in all respects to the provisions of such Act, or any amendments thereto, and of all regulations thereunder, now in force or hereafter adopted, all of which, together with the application for this insurance, and the terms and conditions published under the authority of the act, shall constitute the contract. * * *

'Important Notice.

'The insured may change the beneficiary without the consent of such beneficiary. This insurance is not assignable and is not

...