Cassens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 May 1934 |
| Citation | 154 So. 522,114 Fla. 659 |
| Parties | CASSENS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, St. Lucie County; Elwyn Thomas, Judge.
Action by Rudolph Cassens against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. To review an adverse judgment, plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
COUNSEL D. C. Smith, of Fort Pierce, for plaintiff in error.
Shutts & Bowen, Joseph F. McPherson, and L. S. Bonsteel, all of Miami, for defendant in error.
The writ of error brings for review a judgment entered in favor of the defendant on demurrer to amend declaration sustained.
The amended declaration was based on the obligation contained in an insurance policy in the following language:
'Under the terms of the Group Policy mentioned on page One of this certificate, an Employee shall be considered totally and permanently disabled who furnishes due proof to the Company that, while insured thereunder and prior to his 60th birthday, he has become so disabled, as a result of bodily injury or disease, as to be prevented permanently from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit. Three months after receipt of such proof, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company will commence to pay to such employee, in lieu of the payment of the insurance under said policy at his death, equal monthly instalments, the number and amount of such instalments to depend upon the amount of insurance in force on the life of such Employee at such date, as shown in the following table:
Amount of Number of Amount of Each
Insurance Instalments Instalment
$1,000.00 20 $51.04
2,000.00 40 52.50
For amounts of insurance over $3,000.00, there will be sixty instalments of amounts in proportion to that for $3,000.00 of insurance. Such instalment payments will be made only during the continuance of such disability. In the event of the death of the Employee during the period of total and permanent disability any instalments remaining unpaid shall be commuted at three and one-half per centum and paid in one sum, or in instalments, to the designated Beneficiary. In the event of the recovery of the Employee from such disability before all instalments have been paid, payment of such instalments on account of such Employees shall cease.'
After setting forth the obligation undertaken by the insurer, the declaration alleges:
'That on September 15th, 1930, while said Rudolph F. Cassens was an employee of said Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation while said policy was in full force and effect, while said Rudolph F. Cassens was insured thereunder and prior to his 60th birthday, he became and was totally and permanently disabled as a result of bodily disease and was prevented from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit; that the disease which caused plaintiff's disability was an abscess of his right lung; that said state or condition of disability continued to exist uninterrupted from said last mentioned date (9-15-30) until June 15th, 1931, that said Rudolph F. Cassens furnished the said defendant with due notice and proof of such disability on or about November 6th, 1931; that said defendant received said notice and proof of loss covering said period of disability and retained same and advised the plaintiff that it refused to pay his claim thereunder because said proof of loss showed that his disability was neither total nor permanent and that said policy only provided for payment upon a total and permanent disability; that said defendant by and through its officer and/or agent advised plaintiff thru his attorney of record, that it would welcome additional proof of loss on the period of disability in question if the situation was different than was pictured to it and if the contention was that plaintiff actually became both totally and permanently disabled while his insurance was in force all of which will more fully appear from a copy of defendant' letter to plaintiff's attorney attached hereto and marked Exhibit 'B' and hereby made a part hereof; that upon receipt of said letter by said attorney, he, the said attorney, requested the defendant to send an exact copy of said proof of loss to him so that he could determine whether the proof of loss sent in by the plaintiff correctly showed plaintiff's condition during the time in question and that if it did not correctly show same so that a proof of loss correctly showing same could be sent in; that the defendant sent said attorney an exact copy of said proof of loss as requested; that the said copy showed and now shows a disability which comes within the terms of said policy; said proof of loss consisting of a statement by the plaintiff that he was wholly unable to do any work from September 15, 1930, to June 15, 1931, on account of said abscess in his right lung and that during said period of time he was confined to his home on account of said abscess, and of the statement of Dr. G. C. Hardie of Fort Pierce, Florida, a reputable doctor who treated said Plaintiff during said sickness.'
So we observe that the declaration alleged that the plaintiff was totally disabled from September 15, 1930, to June 15, 1931, and plaintiff alleges that this constituted a permanent disability under the terms of the policy. The construction of the clause contained in the policy and hereinabove quoted presents the only question for us to determine, and this question is whether a total disability for a period of nine months constitutes a total and permanent disability under the terms of the policy. The word 'permanent' is a common, ordinary word that is used in communications both oral and written, and has a well-recognized meaning. Webster's New International Dictionary, 1926 Edition, defines the word 'permanent' as follows: 'Continuing in the same state, or without any change that destroys form or character; remaining unaltered or unremoved; abiding; durable; fixed; stable; lasting; as a permanent impression.'
It is contended that the other phraseology used in this clause of the insurance contract is repugnant to the above definition of the word 'permanent.' We do not think so. As we construe this clause of the contract, it means that, if at the end of...
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