Cassidy v. Cassidy (In re Estate of Cassidy)

Decision Date16 November 2011
Docket NumberNo. SD 30025.,SD 30025.
Citation356 S.W.3d 339
PartiesIn re The ESTATE OF Charles Ray CASSIDY, DeceasedCarolyn A. Cassidy, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Stephanie M. Cassidy, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Ray Cassidy, Respondent–Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Transfer Denied Dec. 7, 2011.

Application for Transfer

Denied Jan. 31, 2012.

Patrick W. Keefe, Ellisville, MO, for Appellant.

Mathew G. Eilerts, III, Clayton, MO, for Respondent.

JEFFREY W. BATES, Judge.

This is an appeal brought by Stephanie Cassidy (Stephanie), in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of Ray Cassidy (Ray), from a judgment issued by the probate division of the Circuit Court of Crawford County, Missouri.1 The trial court entered a declaratory judgment determining that a written antenuptial agreement (Agreement) between Ray and his wife, Carolyn Cassidy (Carolyn), was void and could not be enforced by Stephanie against Carolyn in the estate proceedings. Because Stephanie failed to meet her burden of proving that the Agreement complied with the requirements of § 474.220, we affirm.2

I. Standard of Review

We presume the trial court's judgment is correct. Krepps v. Krepps, 234 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Mo.App.2007). As the party asserting error, Stephanie bears the burden of demonstrating that the judgment is incorrect. See id.; Elrod v. Elrod, 192 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Mo.App.2006). Appellate review of this court-tried case is governed by Rule 84.13(d) and the principles articulated in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the judgment and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.” Arndt v. Beardsley, 102 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Mo.App.2003). We defer to the trial court's determination of witness credibility and recognize that the court is free to accept or reject all, part or none of the testimony presented. Christian Health Care of Springfield West Park, Inc. v. Little, 145 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Mo.App.2004). In addition, this Court considers all fact issues upon which no specific findings were made to have been found in accordance with the result reached. Rule 73.01(c); Surrey Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Webb, 163 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Mo.App.2005). Our summary of the facts, which is set forth below, has been prepared in accordance with these principles.

II. Factual Background

Ray lived on a 570–acre farm that he owned in Cherryville, Missouri. Helen Franklyn (Franklyn) owned 85 acres of land that adjoined Ray's farm. When Franklyn bought her property in 1970, she paid $3,000 per acre for one 45–acre parcel of land and $2,500 per acre for one 40–acre parcel of land.

In June 1995, Ray executed his will. The will named his daughter, Stephanie, as his sole beneficiary and personal representative of his estate. Ray was single when he executed his will. He and Carolyn first met in October 1995. At that time, Carolyn was 55; Ray was 61. Carolyn lived in a house that she owned in Clark, Missouri. She had a high school education and worked as a secretary at the University of Missouri (MU).

Around May 30, 1996, Ray proposed to Carolyn. He also asked what she thought about a prenuptial agreement. Carolyn responded that she had never had one and did not know any attorneys. Ray suggested that they use his attorney to draft the Agreement. He told Carolyn that she did not need her own attorney. The wedding was scheduled to take place at 2:00 p.m. in Sedalia, Missouri, on June 28, 1996. Ray selected the date and place for the wedding. He would not allow Carolyn to tell her two sons or anyone at MU that she was getting married.

Ray had been represented on five other occasions by attorney J. Kent Robinson (Robinson). On June 8, 1996, Ray asked Robinson to prepare the Agreement. Ray supplied all of the information concerning the list of property, values and debts attached to the Agreement. No one at Robinson's office ever spoke to Carolyn, and she had no attorney of her own. In mid-June, Ray obtained the address of Carolyn's house in Clark from her and provided it to Robinson.

Robinson drafted the Agreement, which consisted of: (1) the five-page Agreement itself; (2) a Schedule A listing property, debts and income; and (3) an Exhibit A containing the legal description of several parcels of land in Crawford County.3 The Agreement stated that it was made pursuant to § 451.220.4 Section 3 of the Agreement stated, inter alia, that [e]ach of us waives and releases all rights, claims and interests he/she may acquire in the property now owned by the other which might have otherwise arisen by virtue of our marriage.” Section 11 stated:

Rights of surviving spouse—Each of us agrees to fully accept the provisions of any testamentary, inter vivos or beneficiary instrument made by the other. Neither shall have any obligation, contractual or otherwise, to make any other testamentary provision for the other. Except as herein stated, each of us waives and releases all rights, claims and interests of every kind, nature and description which may arise as a consequence of the death of the other including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) Each of us, pursuant to Section 474.120, releases and waives all rights of inheritance and any other statutory rights of a surviving spouse of a decedent who dies intestate.

(b) Each of us, pursuant to Section 474.220, releases and waives all rights under Section 474.160, to make an election as a surviving spouse to take against the will of the other.

(c) Each of us releases and waives all rights to claim any property of the estate of the other as exempt pursuant to Section 474.250, to claim a support allowance pursuant to Section 474.260 or to claim any portion of the estate of the other as a homestead allowance pursuant to Section 474.290.

In relevant part, Section 14 stated that [e]ach of us consulted with an independent attorney concerning the nature, terms and effect of this agreement. Our attorneys have advised of the rights and interests which normally arise as a consequence of a marriage and we are fully aware that many of those rights are being forever waived under this agreement.” Section 15(b) stated that [e]ach party has been given the opportunity to have the nature, terms and consequences of this Agreement reviewed for him/her by legal independent counsel of his/her choosing.” According to Schedule A, Carolyn had net assets of $22,000, and Ray had net assets of $321,398. This schedule, however, valued Ray's 570 acres of land in Cherryville at only $200,000, or an average of $350 per acre. If this property was worth as much as Franklyn's adjoining land, then Ray's real estate alone was worth between $1,425,000 and $1,710,000.

The preparation of the Agreement concluded at 3:22 p.m. on June 26, 1996. Either that day or the next, Ray picked up four copies of the Agreement from Robinson's office. It was Robinson's usual custom or practice to advise his clients not to execute a prenuptial agreement on the same day as the wedding. Robinson gave the following explanation for that advice:

Q. Well, and you said that's your usual custom or practice to advise clients not to sign the prenup on the date of the wedding. Why?

A. Because based upon Missouri case law, the courts always scrutinize whether or not there has been any undue influence or undue pressure placed upon a party to execute an agreement. So we will—we will advise clients that the party to whom they are to be married should have ample opportunity to review the agreement and have it reviewed independent—independently by counsel of their choosing before it's executed.

At around 8:00 a.m. on June 28, 1996, Ray and Carolyn were at her house in Clark when Ray handed Carolyn a copy of the Agreement. Carolyn was shocked, surprised and overwhelmed. This was the first time she had seen the Agreement, and the wedding was scheduled to take place in six hours. She had no idea Ray was going to present the Agreement to her that morning. She had no input in drafting it, and she did not have time to review it in detail. She had not seen Schedule A, which purported to list the parties' property and debts, until that morning when Ray handed her the Agreement. She provided none of the information in Schedule A concerning the value of her assets or the amount of her liabilities. Schedule A stated that Ray owned [r]eal estate located in Cherryville” with a stated value of $200,000. No address for this real estate was stated. A footnote stated that the legal description for this real estate was “attached as Exhibit 1.” She did not see an Exhibit 1 attached to the Agreement. In addition, the first page of Schedule A stated at the bottom that it was “Page 1 of 3.” There was another page stating at the bottom that it was “Page 2 of 3.” There was no “Page 3 of 3” attached to the Schedule A that she reviewed. It did not appear to Carolyn that she had been given a complete copy of Schedule A. She was not given any supporting documentation concerning the assets in Ray's column in Schedule A, and she did not have time before the wedding to investigate whether the list of assets and values was complete or correct. The section of the Agreement that was supposed to state the parties' respective annual incomes had not been filled out.5 Carolyn thought the Agreement would only apply if they got divorced. She did not understand that it also applied if one of them died. The Agreement contained a number of references to Missouri statutes. No one explained to Carolyn what these statutes meant. She did not understand what rights she was waiving as a surviving spouse by signing the Agreement. She did not know what it meant for a spouse to elect to take against a will.

As soon as Ray handed the Agreement to Carolyn, he said [c]ome on, we've got to hurry to Columbia and get this document signed so we can get...

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