Cassidy v. Woodward
| Decision Date | 13 May 1889 |
| Citation | 42 N.W. 319,77 Iowa 354 |
| Parties | CASSIDY v. WOODWARD |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Decided January, 1889.
Appeal from Sioux District Court--HON. C. H. LEWIS, Judge.
THIS is an action in equity, and it involves the title and ownership of eighty acres of land in Sioux county. There was a trial upon the merits, and the plaintiff's petition was dismissed, and a decree entered quieting the title in the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED.
Rickel & Crocker and J. W. Bull, for appellant.
Argo & McDuffie and Struble, Rishel & Hart, for appellee.
I.
Both parties claim title to the land under one Gabriel T. Rock. The plaintiff's alleged title consists of a regular chain of conveyances from Rock through several intermediate grantors. The defendant's alleged title is based upon a sheriff's sale of the land upon an execution on a judgment against said Rock.
The first question necessary to be determined is an objection made by appellee to appellant's abstract. It is claimed that the statements in the abstract, showing that deeds of conveyance from Rock through the intermediate grantors down to the plaintiff were introduced in evidence, is not true and that the plaintiff has no standing in court, because she failed to show that she has even any pretended title. We have not thought it necessary to investigate the record in order to determine whether the said deeds were formally introduced in evidence, because, under the record as made by the pleadings and other evidence, it was not necessary that plaintiff should have offered said deeds in evidence. There was an abstract of title exhibited with the petition, which showed a line of conveyances from the government, through said Rock, down to the plaintiff. The defendant by her answer denied the averments of the petition, except as admitted. There were amendments made to the answer. In the several answers, and in oral evidence introduced on the trial to which there was no objection, it was either admitted or plainly shown that the plaintiff held by a regular chain of conveyances from Rock to her. All through the trial it appears to have been conceded that the conveyances were made as set out in the abstract of title attached to the petition. We do not feel called upon to more than state our conclusion upon this branch of the case. It is wholly unnecessary to set out the pleadings and evidence upon which the conclusion is based. The appeal cannot be dismissed and the case disposed of in this court on this objection.
II. It is claimed in the answer, and strenuously urged by counsel for appellee, that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest; that the real parties are the counsel in the case; and that they bought the land and took the title in the name of the plaintiff, who is a servant in the family of one of the counsel; and that the purchase of the land was a fraud and a conspiracy on the part of plaintiff's counsel; and that the claim made by plaintiff for the land is against public policy and good morals. It is true that the plaintiff's counsel purchased the land and paid for it and had the conveyance made to plaintiff, a servant in one of their families. There is no evidence that they discovered the alleged defect in the plaintiff's title. On the contrary it appears that Rock conveyed the land to one Marbourg, and he conveyed it to one Pitts, and Pitts conveyed it to the plaintiff. It is true, as claimed by the defendant, that actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, excepting in certain cases. Code, sec. 2543. The exceptions are set forth in section 2544, which is in these words: "An executor or administrator, a guardian, a trustee of an express trust, a party with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit of another, or party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the suit is prosecuted." It has uniformly been held by this court that, under this provision of the Code, the party holding the legal title to a cause of action, though he be a mere agent or trustee, with no beneficial interest therein, may sue thereon in his own name. Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa 481; Rice v. Savery, 22 Iowa 470; Pearson v. Cummings, 28 Iowa 344; Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa 232; Vimont v. Railway Co., 64 Iowa 513. The plaintiff stands in the place of Marbourg, who was the grantee of Rock, and of Pitts, her grantor; and the fact that she paid nothing for the conveyance, and that her counsel paid the consideration and had the conveyance made to her, even without her knowledge at the time, is no defense to the action.
III. We come now to the merits of the case. The defendant must fail in the action, unless she acquired the title to the land through the judgment against Rock, and the levy and sale thereunder. The facts with reference thereto are as follows: Rock was indebted to a partnership under the name of Hall & Woodward, upon two promissory notes payable at Le Mars, in Plymouth county. Action was commenced on these notes in the Plymouth circuit court, in the year 1874. It was averred in the petition that Rock, the defendant, had absconded, so that the ordinary process could not be served upon him. A writ of attachment was issued, directed to the sheriff of Sioux county, and service was made thereof by levying on the land in controversy and another tract of land. Service of notice of the action was made by publication in a newspaper. On the twelfth day of May, 1874, the said circuit court rendered a judgment against said Rock for the amount of the note, interest and costs. The judgment was by default and recited that the defendant therein "had received due and legal notice of the pendency of the action by publication." No reference is made to the attachment in the record entry. It was a personal judgment in the same form as would have been proper if the defendant in the action had been personally served...
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