Casstevens v. Casstevens

• Decision Date: 19 June 1907
• Citation: 227 Ill. 547,81 N.E. 709
• Parties: CASSTEVENS v. CASSTEVENS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

227 Ill. 547

81 N.E. 709

CASSTEVENS

v.CASSTEVENS et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1907.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cumberland County; M. W. Thompson, Judge.

Suit by Amanda Casstevens against A. T. Casstevens and another. From a decree for complainant, defendant A. T. Casstevens appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill.Edward C. & James W. Craig, Jr. (Brewer & Brewer and Lyle Decius, of counsel), for appellant.

John S. Hall, for appellees.

Lewis Casstevens died in Cumberland county August 15, 1895, intestate, leaving a widow, Amanda Casstevens, and their two sons, A. T. (Thomas) Casstevens and Walter Casstevens; both being adults. He was seised at the time of his death of about 300 acres of farm lands, several town lots, and some personal property. Some time thereafter his widow and two sons entered into an agreement reading as follows: ‘We, the heirs of Lewis Casstevens, deceased, hereby agree to leave the division of the estate to three (3) disinterested persons to be selected by ourselves, and to peacefully abide their decision. The above selection must be made on or before Jan. 9, 1897. Amanda Casstevens. A. T. Casstevens. Walter Casstevens.’ This instrument was duly acknowledged by the mother and two sons before a notary public. The three persons selected are sometimes in the record called ‘arbitrators' and sometimes ‘commissioners.’ It appears they went upon the ground and decided that each of the sons should have as his separate share a fee-simple title to 100 acres of the farm land, and they also allotted to the widow 100 acres of the farm land, on which were located the house and buildings which at one time had been the old homestead. Each of the three took possession of the premises so allotted.

No question seems to be raised on this record as to the division of the personal property or town lots. The main question is whether the widow is entitled to her 100 acres in fee or merely for the term of her life. The widow resided in town at the time of the division, and did not then, and does not now, claim any interest of homestead in the farm property. A. T. Casstevens then was, and is now, married to India Casstevens, who was one of the defendants in the court below and is here an appellee. She did not sign the agreement for the division of the premises. Amanda Casstevens, the widow, filed her bill in the circuit court of Cumberland county October 13, 1906, to remove cloud on the title. The bill sets up substantially the above facts, and avers that appellant has no interest whatever in the land assigned to her, but that there is nothing of record in said county of Cumberland, nor is said complainant able to get anything of record, to show that said A. T. Casstevens does not still own, as one of the heirs of said Lewis Casstevens, an interest therein, and that the showing on the record that said A. T. Casstevens still has an interest in that 100 acres is a cloud upon her title, which she asks to have removed, and that said A. T. Casstevens and wife, who are made parties defendant, may be required to deed the same to complainant, and in default that the master in chancery make such deed. The defendants A. T. Casstevens and India Casstevens answered, admitting the facts as to the appointment of the three persons to divide the property, but claimed that the 100 acres set off to the widow was, according to the decision of the three arbitrators, or commissioners, to be taken by her only for her life. The court, by its decree entered December 4, 1906, found that all the material allegations of the bill were true, and that the record title of said A. T. Casstevens is a cloud upon the title of said Amanda Casstevens, and ordered that said A. T. Casstevens and his wife, within 30 days, or, upon their failure, the master, execute a deed as prayed, and that defendants be barred from all interest in said land. From this decree an appeal was taken by A. T. Casstevens to this court; Amanda and India Casstevens being named as appellees.

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts).

Counsel for appellant insist that, as appellee Amanda Casstevens has no legal title in fee to the lands in question, she could not maintain her suit to quiet title, particularly as against a person having the record title. ‘A bill to set aside a cloud on title is a proceeding in equity, and one who holds an equitable fee will be treated as the owner, and such equitable title will support the allegation of ownership of the title.’ Glos v. Goodrich, 175 Ill. 20, 51 N. E. 643; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Rem. § 730. If this proceeding be a bill to quiet title, then the decree should not have required, as it does, the conveyance by A. T. Casstevens and his wife of the land by deed to the complainant. Rucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 377, 99 Am. Dec. 614;Pratt v. Kending, 128 Ill. 293, 21 N. E. 495;Clay v. Hammond, 199 Ill. 370, 65 N. E. 352,93 Am. St. Rep. 146. This bill is more in the nature of a bill for specific performance than to remove a cloud on the title; but, in addition to praying for specific relief, it also contains a prayer for general relief. The rule is, in such cases, that although the prayer for specific relief prayed for may be denied by the decree, yet under the general prayer such relief should be granted as it may be found, under the allegations of the bill and the proof in support thereof, the complainant is entitled to. Gibbs v. Davies, 168 Ill. 205, 48 N. E. 120;Shields v. Bush, 189 Ill. 534, 59 N. E. 962,82 Am. St. Rep. 474. Hence, whether this be held to be a bill to quiet title or for specific performance, if the proof justifies it, the court, under the allegations in the bill and the general prayer for relief, should grant such relief as in equity the parties are entitled to.

The main point to be decided from the record is: What was the extent of the interest which the three persons chosen to divide the property decided should be given to the widow? Was it a fee, or merely a life interest? There is nothing in the record to establish any agreement between the parties subsequent to the finding of these three arbitrators or commissioners directing the partition of the premises. The decision of these three men, duly appointed, if not accompanied by such fraud or mistake as would render it voidable, would be binding upon the parties who signed the agreement as a common-law submission to arbitration. Eisenmeyer v. Sauter, 77 Ill. 515;Phelps v. Dolan, 75 Ill. 90;Smith v. Douglass, 16 Ill. 34; 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 540. The evidence as to what these arbitrators or commissioners actually decided in dividing the property is not clear. Two of the three are dead, and the surviving one, Newton Bassett, had moved out of the state and was not located until about the time of the trial. Appellant then made an affidavit for continuance to take the deposition of Bassett, and in the affidavit stated that the witness was residing in Oklahoma, and that he expected to prove, among other things, by Bassett, that he was one of the persons chosen to divide the premises, and that he and the other two commissioners, in pursuance of said article of agreement, went upon said land and assigned to said Amanda Casstevens, as and for her dower and homestead interest in said land, the land described in the bill of complaint; that she was not to be the owner of said land set off to her as a fee-simple estate. On this affidavit being presented the court held that it set up sufficient grounds for continuance, and thereupon counsel for the appellee Amanda Casstevens admitted that, if the said Bassett were present, he would testify as set forth in the affidavit. Such admission having been made, the trial proceeded.

It appears from the evidence that three deeds were made out by a notary public, one M. A. Ewing, who was one of the witnesses called by appellee Amanda Casstevens. He stated that these deeds were made out at the request of the two sons, and were...