Pratt v. Kendig

Decision Date16 May 1889
Citation128 Ill. 293,21 N.E. 495
PartiesPRATT et al. v. KENDIG et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to circuit court, Cook county; O. H. HORTON, Judge.

E. F. Allen and E. K. Smith, for plaintiffs in error.

H. S. Monroe, for defendants in error.

MAGRUDER, J.

The litigation of which the present suit is a remnant has been before this court three times, as will be seen by reference to the following cases: Stone v. Pratt, 25 Ill. 25;D'Wolf v. Pratt, 42 Ill. 198;Pratt v. Stone, 80 Ill. 440. As the respective titles of the parties to this proceeding are the same as those involved in the cases referred to, the facts as set forth in those cases, showing the manner in which such titles have been derived, will not be repeated here in detail. This is a bill filed on March 3, 1883, in the circuit court of Cook county, by John A. J. Kendig, Horatio Stone, Jr., and Elizabeth A. Stone, trustees, duly appointed in November, 1881, as successors to the original trustees named in the will of Horatio O. Stone, deceased, who died testate on July 20, 1877, against Emily H. Pratt, James Pratt, her husband, and E. K. Smith. It is not denied that the title which Stone had in his lifetime to the property in controversy has become vested in his trustees since his death. The object of the bill is to quiet the complainants' possession of certain lots in Stone's subdivision of the 15 acres described in the opinions in the foregoing cases; to remove a cloud upon the title of part of one of said lots; and to perpetually enjoin the prosecution of pending and threatened litigation affecting the rights of complainants in said property, and their possession of the same. The bill avers, and the proof shows, that complainants are in possession of all the lots, and that their title thereto his already been established by a number of suits to which the defendants herein, or their grantors or representatives, were parties. The bill was answered by Emily H. and James Pratt, and Smith. Emily H. Pratt filed a cross-bill, claiming to be the owner of the lots, and praying that she be decreed to be such owner; that she be put in possession of the same; and that the trustees be required to account for the proceeds of the sales of lots sold by Stone, and for rents collected by him. The said Emily announces her intention in her answer to take such legal steps as may be necessary to protect her rights in the premises. By the decree of the circuit court, which we are asked to review, it is decreed that the complainants, as such trustees, hold the title to the lots; that said cross-bill be dismissed; that the injunction be made perpetual; that the Pratts be perpetually enjoined from in any way taking possession of any part of the 15 acres owned by the grantees of Stone, or the houses thereon, or interfering with the rights of complainants therein; that the deed from Emily H. Pratt and husband to E. K. Smith of the south 25 feet of lot 16 in block 2 in said subdivision is null and void, and a cloud upon the title of complainants; and that Smith be perpetually enjoined from in any way interfering with their rights therein, etc. Where a complainant has already sufficiently established his right at law, and yet is in danger of being harassed by fresh attempts to interfere with such right, a court of equity will grant a perpetual injunction to quiet his possession, and protect him against the annoyance of future suits. Courts of law in some cases have not the power of putting an end to vexatious and oppressive litigation, and courts of equity will assume jurisdiction in order to do so. Although it must appear that the right has already been satisfactorily established at law before equity will interpose, ‘it is not material what number of trials have taken place,-whether two only, or more.’ 2 Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) § 859; 1 High, Inj. (2d Ed.) § 61; Eldridge v. Hill, 2 Johns. Ch. 281; Trustees v. Nicoll, 3 Johns. 566;Dedman v. Chiles, 3 T. B. Mon. 426;Woods v. Monroe, 17 Mich. 238; Eden, Inj. 356. We apprehend that it can make no difference whether the proceeding in which the right has been established is an action at law or a suit in chancery, if the latter is one of such a character as to authorize a court of equity to adjudicate upon the legal title. The common source of title under which the complainants and defendants claim is Amos Pratt. In D'Wolf v. Pratt, supra, where C. H. D'Wolf, Amos Pratt, Jeremiah Pratt, and Horatio O. Stone were all parties, it was the decision of this court that Amos Pratt should convey his title to the 15 acres to D'Wolf; and, in default of his doing so within a certain time, the master in chancery of the circuit court should so convey it. The master in chancery did make the conveyance to D'Wolf, and D'Wolf executed a deed to Stone. Appellees hold the D'Wolf title. October 7, 1853, Amos Pratt executed a quitclaim deed of said premises to Jeremiah Pratt. November 1, 1867, Jeremiah Pratt deeded the same to the appellant Emily H. Pratt. Appellants claim under the Jeremiah Pratt title. It was distinctly held in D'Wolf v. Pratt that the D'Wolf title was the better title; and that, as against it, the deed to Jeremiah Pratt was invalid. Here was one adjudication in which the right of Stone to this property was established as against the grantor of appellants. In Pratt v. Stone, supra, where Horatio O. Stone and the present appellants, James Pratt and Emily H. Pratt, were parties, it was again held that the title of Stone to this property was superior to the claims of said appellants thereto. Here was another adjudication in which the right of Stone was established against all the appellants, it being admitted that Smith holds by deed from Emily H. Pratt, as hereafter stated. It is also in proof that the appellant Emily H. Pratt conveyed one of the lots in the subdivision of the 15 acres to a non-resident by the name of Gallup, and that Gallup began and ejectment suit against Stone in the United States circuit court for the Northern district of Illinois, to recover the possession of said lot. This ejectment suit was designed to be a test case, for the purpose of settling the question of title between Stone and the Pratts. It resulted in a judgment by the federal court in favor of Stone, after an exhaustive trial by able counsel; and no appeal was ever taken from the judgment. Here was still another adjudication in which the right of Stone was established as against the claims of the present appellants.

In October, 1873, the appellant Emily H. Pratt, without the knowledge or consent of Stone or his agents, took possession of one of the lots in question by entering into and occupying the house located thereon. It is admitted that Stone brought suit against her to recover the possession of this house, and that he recovered judgment, and was restored to pssession through the process of the court. That the appellees are in danger of being vexed by further litigation as to a matter that has been so often passed upon, sufficiently appears from the facts disclosed in the record. In July, 1879, the appellant Mrs. Pratt took possession of another one of the lots in controversy, in the manner hereinafter explained. Upon being ejected, she began a suit of forcible entry and detainer against the trustees of the Stone estate, and also an action of trespass for damages. At least one of these suits is still pending. It has already been stated that,...

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11 cases
  • Shields v. Bush
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 20, 1901
    ... ... It is also true that, in a bill to remove a cloud from the title, a reconveyance from the defendant to the complainant should not be decreed. Pratt v. Kendig, 128 Ill. 293, 21 N. E. 495;Rucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 377.But it is well settled that, where a bill in chancery contains a general prayer ... ...
  • Casstevens v. Casstevens
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1907
    ...by A. T. Casstevens and his wife of the land by deed to the complainant. Rucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 377, 99 Am. Dec. 614;Pratt v. Kending, 128 Ill. 293, 21 N. E. 495;Clay v. Hammond, 199 Ill. 370, 65 N. E. 352,93 Am. St. Rep. 146. This bill is more in the nature of a bill for specific perfor......
  • Clay v. Hammond
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1902
    ...quieting the title, ‘without decreeing a reconveyance to the complainant.’ Rucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 378, 99 Am. Dec. 614;Pratt v. Kendig, 128 Ill. 293, 21 N. E. 495. Inasmuch, therefore, as in the case at bar the defendants are not and could not be required by the decree to make a conveyan......
  • Schultz v. Schultz
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 5, 1916
    ...holding under a deed which is decreed to be void and a cloud on the title. Bucker v. Dooley, 49 Ill. 377, 95 Am. Dec. 614;Pratt v. Kendig, 128 Ill. 293, 21 N. E. 495;Clay v. Hammond, 199 Ill. 370, 65 N. E. 352,93 Am. St. Rep. 146;Glos v. Woodard, 202 Ill. 480, 67 N. E. 3. The decree should ......
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