Castagnozzi v. Phx. Beverages, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | 13-CV-2618 (SLT)(JO) |
| Parties | Vincent CASTAGNOZZI, Plaintiff, v. PHOENIX BEVERAGES, INC., Windmill Distributing Company, L.P., Rodney Brayman, Phil Curcio, Ken Paterno, Angelo Srgo, and Peter Dydensborg, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Benjamin Natan Leftin, The Law Offices of Daniel Felber, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Eugene T. D'Ablemont, Taraneh Jean Marciano, Kelley, Drye & Warren LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Vincent Castagnozzi ("Plaintiff") brings this employment discrimination action against his former employer, Windmill Distributing Company L.P. d/b/a Phoenix Beverages, Inc. ("Phoenix"); Phoenix's Chief Executive Officer, Rodney Brayman; and four Phoenix employees (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq. ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107 ("NYCHRL"), by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability and terminating him in retaliation for complaining about disability discrimination. Defendants now move for summary judgment, principally arguing that Plaintiff does not suffer from a "disability" as defined by the ADA, has failed to identify a reasonable accommodation that would enable him to perform his job, and was terminated only because he refused to work on a weekend, not because of his complaints. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to all of the federal claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiff's State and City-law claims.
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are not in dispute or are drawn from Plaintiff's version of events. In February 1998, Plaintiff began working as an off-premises sales representative at Phoenix, one of New York City's largest beer distributors. (Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Defendants' 56.1 Statement") ¶ 3; Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Plaintiff's 56.1 Response"), p 1 & p. 5, ¶ A; Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Defendants' 56.1 Response"), p. 3, ¶ A). To perform the essential duties of that job, Plaintiff had to be able to lift, carry, and climb up and down stairs carrying cases weighing more than 25 pounds on a frequent basis. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 4; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1).
While driving his sales route on Wednesday, May 12, 2010, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 5; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 5, ¶ B; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 3,¶ B). Plaintiff' suffered an injury to his neck, causing him to take seven days of disability leave. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 5-6; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 5, ¶ B; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 3, ¶ B). Plaintiff returned to work on Monday, May 24, 2010, and worked for approximately three more weeks. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 7; Plaintiff's ¶¶ 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 5, ¶ C; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 3, ¶ C). However, in mid-June 2010, Plaintiff ceased working once again, alleging that his injury prevented him from continuing. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 8; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p., ¶ C; Defendants' 56.1 Response ¶ C).
Although the parties have not introduced any medical records, an email sent by Dr. Heidi Sanger to Plaintiff on June 15, 2010, describes the nature of Plaintiff's neck condition. According to that email—which was introduced as Exhibit 3 during Plaintiff's February 28, 2014, deposition and which is attached to Exhibit A to the Declaration of Eugene T. D'Ablemont in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "D'Ablemont Declaration")—an X-ray of Plaintiff's neck revealed two abnormalities. First, the X-ray revealed osteophytes
at all levels between C3 and C6.1 The email opined that these osteophytes were caused by arthritis, not the automobile accident. Second, the X-ray showed a narrowing of the intervertebral discs at the C3-C4 and C5-C6 levels, which the email attributed to the accident. Dr. Sanger predicted that it would take 6 to 8 weeks for the nerve damage associated with the disc narrowing to heal, but implied that Plaintiff would have to live with the arthritis.
Although Plaintiff's injury did not require in-patient care or surgery, and was treated only with anti-inflammatory medicine and physical therapy, Plaintiff remained out of work for about ten months. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 9; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1). On October 27, 2010, Phoenix sent a letter informing Plaintiff that the 12-week period during which his job was protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act had ended on September 10, 2010. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 10; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1). The letter informed Plaintiff that Phoenix was no longer legally obligated to hold his position open. (Id. ).
On Thursday, March 24, 2011, Dr. Sireen M Gopal, a physiatrist at New York Spine & Sport Rehabilitation Medicine, cleared Plaintiff to "return to work on full duty" on April 1, 2011. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 12; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1; Castagnozzi Deposition, Ex. 8).2 However, when Plaintiff reported for work on Monday, April 4, 2011, he was told that no sales representative positions were available. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 13; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 6, ¶ F; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 3, ¶ F). Instead, he was offered a position as a "general sales specialist," a substitute for sales representatives who were sick or on vacation. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 14-15; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 6, ¶ F; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 3, ¶ F). The general sales specialist position had the same duties and responsibilities as Plaintiff's former position as sales representative, but paid less because the general sales representative had no dedicated sales territory. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 15-16; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 6, ¶ G; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 3, ¶ G).
Plaintiff accepted the offer and worked as a general sales specialist for seven months. (Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 6, ¶ H; Defendants' 56.1 Response, pp. 3-4, ¶ H). On November 4, 2011, however, the general sales specialist position was eliminated as part of a restructuring of Phoenix's Sales Department. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 17-18; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1 & p. 6, ¶ H; Defendants' 56.1 Response, pp. 3-4, ¶ H). The restructuring also reduced the number of sales representatives from 46 to 33, but increased the number of "merchandisers" from 14 to 20. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 19; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1). While there were no merchandiser positions available in the sales group where Plaintiff had worked as a general sales representative, such a position was available in another sales group, headed by defendant Phil Curcio (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 20; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1).
On November 4, 2011, Plaintiff met with Curcio, a Sales Manager, who offered Plaintiff a position as a merchandiser starting on Monday, November 7, 2011. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 21; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1). The merchandiser position required more physical labor than the sales representative or general sales specialist positions. (Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 6, ¶ J; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 4, ¶ J). Although Plaintiff already knew the physical duties of the job. (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 24; Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 1), Curcio "explained to him that it was a much more physically demanding position" and that "was potentially maybe a drawback." (Curcio: 40).3 At his deposition, Curcio testified that he brought up this topic because he knew of Plaintiff's prior injury, was concerned that the injury might interfere with Plaintiff's physical ability to perform the job, and wanted to communicate that it would not be in Plaintiff's best interest to take the position if he, too, had concerns about his ability to perform. (Curcio: 41-42). According to Curcio, Plaintiff assured him that he was "physically up to ... the position" and could do the merchandiser job. (Curcio: 42).
Plaintiff did express concerns, however, about working weekends. (Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 6, ¶ N; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 6, ¶ N). By all accounts, Plaintiff told Curcio that he could not work weekends. (Curcio: 42; Castagnozzi: 163).4 There is some dispute as to whether Plaintiff explained to Curcio that his unavailability was due to his wife's work and his childcare obligations. (Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 6, ¶ N; Defendants' 56.1 Response, p. 6, ¶ N), but no one contends that Plaintiff's inability to work weekends had anything to do with his alleged disability.
The parties essentially agree that Curcio himself had no problem with Plaintiff not working weekends, but indicated that scheduling was determined by the district manager, defendant Ken Paterno, who would be Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. (Plaintiff's 56.1 Response, p. 7, ¶¶ O-P; Defendants' 56.1 Response, pp. 6-7,¶¶ O-P). Curcio recalled:
[W]hen he expressed his concern about working weekends, I said that was—your regular schedule is based purely on the needs of the group, so your district manager, if your district manager doesn't need you to work on the weekends, then there's no need for you to work the weekends. I said that's purely in the realm of the district manager's decision (Curcio: 43).
Plaintiff testified that Curcio said he "didn't have a problem with me not working weekends," but "told me to speak to Ken Paterno." (Castagnozzi: 130).
There is a dispute as to what Paterno said to Plai...
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