Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 30 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-2722,87-2722
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 125 Ill.Dec. 596 Raul CASTANEDA, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, and Corroon & Black of Illinois, Respondents.

Page 1005

530 N.E.2d 1005

175 Ill.App.3d 1085, 125 Ill.Dec. 596

Raul CASTANEDA, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, and Corroon & Black of

Illinois, Respondents.

No. 87-2722.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fifth Division.

Sept. 30, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1988.

Susan P. Malone, Chicago, for petitioner.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen. (Diane Curry-Grapsas, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondent, Illinois Human Rights Com'n.

Gerald D. Skoning, Carl E. Johnson, Seyfarther, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, for respondent, Corroon & Black.

ON DIRECT REVIEW OF ORDER AND DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS HUMAN

RIGHTS COMMISSION.

Justice SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to section 8-111 of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch 68, par. 8-111), and Article III of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 3-101 et seq.), petitioner, Raul Castaneda, appeals from an order and decision of a panel of the Illinois Human Rights Commission dismissing with prejudice his complaint of discrimination against respondent, Corroon & Black of Illinois. Petitioner contends that a default judgment should have been entered against respondent for violating various discovery orders and that the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Upon our review of the record, we have determined that this appeal must be dismissed because of petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of the appeal.

The procedural history of this cause may be briefly summarized--petitioner, a native of Mexico, was employed as a senior vice-president with respondent, an insurance broker, until he was terminated on or about December 30, 1982. On February 14, 1983, he filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights which, on December 14, 1983, filed a complaint against respondent, alleging violations of petitioner's civil rights.

Following an extensive evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge found that respondent had not discriminated against petitioner on account of his national origin and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Petitioner filed exceptions to the recommended order and decision with the Illinois Human Rights Commission. On July 30, 1987, a three-member panel of the Commission entered an order and decision adopting the recommendations of the administrative law judge and dismissing with prejudice petitioner's complaint. From that decision, petitioner appealed directly to this court without first seeking rehearing by the entire Commission.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that "a party aggrieved by administrative action ordinarily cannot seek review in the courts without first pursuing all administrative remedies available to him." (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill.2d 350, 358, 326 N.E.2d 737.) This doctrine has been developed to allow the full development of the facts before the agency; to allow the agency an opportunity to utilize its expertise; and to permit the aggrieved party to succeed before the agency, rendering judicial review unnecessary. 60 Ill.2d 350, 358, 326 N.E.2d 737.

Section 8-107(F)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 68, par. 8-107(F)(1)), states in pertinent part that "[w]ithin 30 days after service of the Commission's order, a party may file an application for rehearing before the full Commission." No such application was filed in the case at bar. Although there is contrary authority (see Jackson Park Yacht Club v. Department of Revenue (1981), 93 Ill.App.3d 542, 548-49, 49 Ill.Dec. 212, 417 N.E.2d 1039; Danison v. Paley (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1036-37, 355 N.E.2d 230), the weight of authority and, in our judgment, the better authority holds that "[i]f there is an agency rule or statute which provides for a rehearing, then an agency decision is not appealable until the aggrieved party requests rehearing and his petition is denied." (Consolidation Coal Company v. Department of Labor (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 541, 544, 92 Ill.Dec. 859, 485 N.E.2d 1102. Accord: Hoffman v. Department of Registration & Education (1980), 87 Ill.App.3d 920, 924, 43 Ill.Dec. 291, 410 N.E.2d 291; Oliver v. Civil Service Commission (1967), 80 Ill.App.2d 329, 333, 224 N.E.2d 671. See also Reiter v. Neilis (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 774, 778, 81 Ill.Dec. 110, 466 N.E.2d 696; and Condell Hospital v. Health Facilities Planning Board (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 907, 929-30, 113 Ill.Dec. 765, 515 N.E.2d 750.) Petitioner, however, did not seek rehearing before the entire Commission and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Our supreme court has recognized certain exceptions to the rule that all administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to judicial review. The stated exceptions to this rule are where an ordinance or statute is attacked as unconstitutional in its entirety; where multiple remedies exist before the same administrative agency and at least one has been exhausted; where irreparable harm will result from further pursuit of administrative remedies; where it would be patently useless...