Castano v. Leone

• Decision Date: 15 March 1932
• Parties: CASTANO v. LEONE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

278 Mass. 429

180 N.E. 312

CASTANO

v.LEONE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

March 15, 1932.

Appeal from Second District Court of Eastern Middlesex; Michael J. Connolly, Judge.

Action by Frances Castano, p. p. a., against Carmine Leone. Finding for defendant, and case reported. From an order of the appellate division dismissing the report, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.David Flower, of Boston, for appellant.

Richard J. Dunn, George W. Roberts, and James F. Lawton, all of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

This is an action of tort whereby compensation is sought by the plaintiff for personal injuries alleged to have been received through the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff's mother with three children, the eldest being the plaintiff, four and one-half years old, was invited by the defendant to ride in his automobile. After going a short distance one of the tires on his automobile became flat. The defendant returned immediately to the house of the plaintiff's mother and stopped his automobile on the right side of the street next to the sidewalk. The plaintiff's mother with her three children got out of the automobile through the right-hand door. The plaintiff's mother testified that she started up the walk toward her house with one of her children, five months old, in her arms, that the next child, three years old, was ‘coming up * * * Frances was running around.’ The defendant alighted from his automobile through the left-hand door and went to the front. He testified that he examined the flat tire, then returned, getting into his automobile through the left doorway. After entering, without looking in the direction of the left door, he closed it, not knowing where the child was; ‘he knew the children were playing around the car, but paid no attention to them because his mind was on the flat tire.’ The plaintiff's hand was caught in the hinge of the door and the top of the little finger on her left hand was injured.

At the close of the evidence the defendant made what are termed in the report ‘requests for Rulings.’ These were eight in number. The trial judge granted the sixth request which was in these words: ‘The defendant was not guilty of ordinary negligence in causing the injuries complained of.’ The form of this request imports that it was directed to a finding of fact. It was not phrased in appropriate words to express a request for a ruling of law. If that had been intended, the natural expression and the established practice would have been to ask for a ruling to the effect that the evidence would not warrant a finding of negligence in causing the injury to the plaintiff. The trial judge in a case like the present where there is no jury acts in a dual capacity. He must lay down correctly the pertinent rules of law for his own guidance; and having done that he must follow those rules in making the findings of material facts upon the evidence. Hetherington & Sons, Ltd., v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 18, 95 N. E. 961. Rule 28 (1922) of the District Courts as amended on June 20, 1929, shows a plain purpose to require such specification in requests for rulings of law as to disclose definite and unambiguous propositions of law as applied to the evidence. Holton v. American Pastry Products Corp., 274 Mass. 268, 174 N. E. 663. Although the trial judge could not have been compelled to make findings of fact in writing, requests to that end are not infrequent. Maglio v. Lane, 268 Mass. 135, 167 N. E. 228. Often it is desirable for information of parties and for presenting the real issues of law for review that findings of fact be made. In the case at bar it might have been...