Castelli v. Carcieri

• Decision Date: 17 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2008-196-Appeal.,2008-196-Appeal.
• Citation: 961 A.2d 277
• Parties: Ann M. CASTELLI et al v. Donald L. CARCIERI et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

961 A.2d 277

Ann M. CASTELLI et al v. Donald L. CARCIERI et al.

No. 2008-196-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 17, 2008.

Carly B. Iafrate, for Plaintiff.

Daniel W. Majcher, George H. Rinaldi, Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice WILLIAMS, for the Court.

This matter comes to us on the appeal of five sheriffs, Chief Deputy Sheriff James M. Grant, Chief Deputy Sheriff Daniel E. Silva, Chief Deputy Sheriff Jo-Ann J. Macari, Sheriff Joseph K. Ford,¹ and Sheriff Ann M. Castelli (collectively plaintiffs). The plaintiffs contend that their layoffs (or, in Castelli's case, her potential layoff) were improper. The trial justice ruled in favor of the defendants, Rhode Island Governor Donald L. Carcieri and director of the Department of Administration, Jerome F. Williams² (collectively defendants), concluding that the governor had the inherent authority to terminate the plaintiffs' employment and further that the state's economic distress constituted just cause under the controlling statute, G.L.1956 § 42-29-1. The plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel

The material facts are undisputed. Faced with a severe fiscal crisis and a significant budget deficit, Governor Carcieri instructed the heads of the executive departments to eliminate 1,000 jobs through "attrition, restructuring, subcontracting, and/or the layoff of state employees."³ To comply with the governor's directive, approximately 145 state employees were laid off by way of layoff notices sent on November 15, 2007. Approximately 400 additional state employees received notices informing them that their positions might be eliminated.

In accordance with the governor's order, the Division of Sheriffs, a division within the Department of Administration (DOA), reviewed all of its positions, seeking to eliminate any employees that the Division believed it could afford to remove. The positions of five sheriffs, Chief Deputy Sheriff Grant, Chief Deputy Sheriff Silva, Chief Deputy Sheriff Macari, Sheriff Ford, and Sheriff Castelli, specifically were reviewed. The plaintiffs' positions were unclassified positions, each carrying a statutory ten-year term; the director of the DOA, with the consent of then Governor Lincoln Almond, had appointed plaintiffs, pursuant to § 42-29-1, on December 2, 2001.

On November 15, 2007, Beverly E. Najarian, then director of the DOA, sent letters to Sheriffs Grant and Silva, informing them that they were being placed on layoff status from their positions as Chief Deputy Sheriff "due to the severe financial crisis" affecting the State of Rhode Island. Najarian informed Grant and Silva that the layoff would be effective starting November 30, 2007. These letters gave no indication that either Grant or Silva would be retained elsewhere in state service.

That same day, Najarian sent letters to Sheriffs Macari and Ford, which explained that because of a "shortage of funds" in the state budget, the state intended to eliminate their positions. These letters indicated that because Macari and Ford had achieved statutory tenure, the state would place them in a similar position. Approximately two months later, on January 8, 2008, Najarian sent a second letter to both Macari and Ford, explaining that the previous letter erroneously had indicated that the state would place them in a similar position. This new letter cited G.L.1956 § 36-4-59(a)(2)(iii) (the provision concerning tenure in state service), which provides that state employees "whose method of appointment and salary and term of office is specified by statute" did not qualify for tenure. Accordingly, Najarian informed Macari and Ford that they were not eligible to be retained in a similar position and that instead they were being placed on layoff status.

Castelli also received a letter from Najarian, on November 15, 2007, explaining that, because of a severe shortage of funds, Castelli might not retain her position. The letter did not affirmatively lay off Castelli or eliminate her position.

Both parties agree that the layoffs of Grant, Silva, Macari, and Ford are for an indefinite period; in addition, there is agreement that they will be placed on the reemployment list. The parties also agree that the positions held by Grant, Silva, Macari, and Ford would not be filled by other people. Although Castelli did not receive a layoff notice, but instead received a notice of a possible layoff, the parties agreed that if she were laid off, the layoff would be for an indefinite period, that she would be placed on the reemployment list, and that her position would not be filled by another person.

On November 28, 2007, shortly after they had received the letters of November 15, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court, naming Governor Carcieri and Najarian as defendants. The plaintiffs sought the following relief: (1) a writ of mandamus directing defendants to maintain plaintiffs in their respective positions until just cause for their removal was demonstrated; (2) a declaratory judgment declaring that only the General Assembly could eliminate their positions or change their terms of office; and (3) a temporary restraining order and mandatory injunctive relief directing defendants to maintain plaintiffs in their respective positions until completion of their term.

Because Grant and Silva were the only plaintiffs who had received a definite layoff date (November 30, 2007), they filed for a temporary restraining order in which they requested to maintain their positions pending a decision on the merits of their complaint. On November 30, 2007, defendants agreed to delay the layoffs, pending a decision on Grant and Silva's request for a temporary restraining order. On December 7, 2007, the request for a preliminary injunction was consolidated with the trial on the merits, and defendants again agreed to delay the layoffs pending resolution of the case.⁴

The plaintiffs argued that the governor did not have the power to take away their statutory positions, which they had acquired by appointment for a ten-year term, subject only to removal for just cause. They further contended that the financial reasons that were cited as the reason for the layoffs did not constitute the type of "just cause" that is referred to in § 42-29-1. Additionally, plaintiffs maintained that a lay off for an indefinite term amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of their property rights. The defendants responded that the governor has the inherent power to lay off sheriffs for economic reasons and, alternatively, that the layoff was proper under the terms of the statute because a budgetary crisis constituted just cause.

Upon hearing the arguments of both parties, the trial justice, in a written decision, agreed with defendants. She declared that the governor "has the inherent power, derived from the Rhode Island Constitution and state statutes, to lay off the Sheriffs for fiscal reasons, notwithstanding their appointment to ten year terms, from which they may be removed for cause, under § 42-29-1." The trial justice also provided alternate grounds for her ruling: the budget crisis constituted a statutorily authorized just cause for the layoffs and, as such, plaintiffs' due process rights were not violated. The trial justice also noted that the proposed layoffs were not tantamount to an elimination of plaintiffs' positions because plaintiffs may return to their positions if there is no longer a fiscal reason for them to remain on layoff status. The trial justice declined to address whether defendants had the power to abolish or eliminate plaintiffs' positions through reorganization or subcontracting because such action had not yet been taken.

The trial justice entered final judgment on all counts, and she made the following declarations: (1) the governor has the inherent power to layoff plaintiffs for fiscal reasons; (2) plaintiffs may be placed on layoff status; (3) the layoffs are for an indefinite period; and (4) the layoffs do not constitute abolishing of their offices nor are they tantamount to abolishing the positions. The plaintiffs timely appealed.

II Analysis

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial justice erred in deciding that the governor had the inherent authority to lay off plaintiffs in light of a financially distressed economy. The plaintiffs maintain that the trial justice should have respected the clear statutory language governing their terms of employment and allowed them to complete their ten-year statutory term. The plaintiffs further allege that a budgetary crisis does not constitute just cause for their layoffs and that the trial justice thus erred when she ruled to that effect.

A Standard of Review

When reviewing an appeal based on an alleged error of law, this Court employs a de novo review to determine whether the trial justice committed legal error. See Children's Friend & Service v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 893 A.2d 222, 229 (R.I.2006) ("As the question before us concerns an alleged error of law, our review is de novo."); Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 408 (R.I.2001) ("Questions of law, * * * including questions of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo by this Court."). "We conduct a de novo review * * * because `this Court is in the best position to decide the merits of a given question of law.'" Fleet National Bank v. Hunt, 944 A.2d 846, 851 (R.I.2008) (quoting Lett v. Providence Journal Co., 798 A.2d 355, 363 (R.I.2002)).

B G.L.1956 § 42-29-1

The plaintiffs contend that § 42-29-1, which governs the appointment and removal of all sheriffs, bestowed upon them a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment for the duration of a ten-year term of employment, subject to removal only for just cause. Section 42-29-1 provides:

"(a) The director of the department of...