Casterline v. Stuerman, 39897
| Decision Date | 28 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 39897,39897 |
| Citation | 588 S.W.2d 86 |
| Parties | Shirley Sue CASTERLINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Lawrence G. STUERMAN, Charlotte Wetzel Wood, Dorothy Windmiller Payne, Vickie Elaine Bruch, D. Rule Campbell, Carol Petrie Campbell, Carol Calvin, Helen Fisher, Dr. Eugene Bricker, William Naxera, Sr., Adele Kooreman, Shirley Butters, George Nienhueser, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Henry Gerhardt, St. Charles, for plaintiff-appellant.
James G. Rittenbaum, Louisiana, Carr L. Woods, Bowling Green, Edward A. Glenn, Louisiana, Paul E. Williams, Bowling Green, Gerre S. Langton, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. We review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the trial court entered summary judgment, Peer v. MFA Milling Co., 578 S.W.2d 291, 292(1) (Mo.App.1979), and reverse and remand.
The first amended petition alleged that plaintiff had been employed as the Director of Nurses of the Pike County Memorial Hospital since May 1974, and had been appointed as the Assistant Administrator of Smith-Barr Manor Nursing Home, which was to be opened and operated by the Pike County Memorial Hospital; that her contract of employment with the hospital administration was oral; and that she was dismissed from her employment on or about January 23, 1976, as a result of the concerted activities of the thirteen defendants. Other pertinent allegations are set out in the margin. 1 The petition concluded with a prayer for $50,000 actual and $150,000 punitive damages.
After filing a variety of motions to make more definite and certain, to strike, and to dismiss, all defendants eventually filed motions for summary judgment supported by an affidavit of Pike County Clerk James R. Baker to the effect that the Pike County Memorial Hospital is wholly owned and operated by Pike County. The affidavit was not controverted by plaintiff; and, as indicated, the motions for summary judgment were granted. The trial court gave no reasons for its actions other than finding "no genuine issue as to any material fact." However, we discern from the transcript and the briefs that defendants' principal position below as well as in this court is that, because plaintiff's contract of employment with the hospital was not in writing, she may not maintain this action. Their primary authority for this argument is § 432.070, RSMo 1969, which reads:
"No county, city, town, village, school township, school district or other municipal corporation shall make any contract, unless the same shall be within the scope of its powers or be expressly authorized by law, nor unless such contract be made upon a consideration wholly to be performed or executed subsequent to the making of the contract; and such contract, including the consideration, shall be in writing and dated when made, and shall be subscribed by the parties thereto, or their agents authorized by law and duly appointed and authorized in writing."
From the foregoing, defendants argue that counties may contract only in writing; plaintiff did not have a written contract; therefore, plaintiff did not have a contract the breach of which they could induce. We are not persuaded by this reasoning for the petition also alleges that defendants wrongfully interfered with plaintiff's "relationship and expectations" with her employer.
Assuming that the Pike County Hospital, as an instrumentality of the county, is subject to the strictures of § 432.070, supra, cf. Fulton National Bank v. Callaway Memorial Hospital, 465 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Mo.1971), we hold that the defendants, sued in their private, individual capacities can take no benefit from it. The purpose of the statute is to protect the county. Miller v. City of St. Joseph, 485 S.W.2d 688, 692(3) (Mo.App.1972); State ex rel. Walton v. Miller, 297 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Mo.App.1956). It was not designed to insulate individuals from liability for their tortious acts.
It is undisputed that, as between plaintiff and the hospital, there existed an employment relationship of indefinite duration which had existed for a fairly substantial period of time prior to her dismissal. Whether this relationship is or is not termed a "contract" cannot logically affect plaintiff's right to protect it or seek redress for unjustified interference with it. In an often cited case involving interference with business and contractual relationships, our Supreme Court said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rail Switching Servs., Inc. v. Marquis-Missouri Terminal, LLC
...a claim for wrongful interference with business expectancy even in the face of an unenforceable contract."); Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979) (expressing that a party potentially may have a protected expectancy or relationship that the law will endeavor to prot......
-
Hester v. Barnett
...or future, with which the defendant has knowingly interfered, without justification, to the damage of the pleaders. Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo.App.1979). The proof, of course, must show an intent and primary purpose in the actor to interfere and to cause the result the in......
-
Hanrahan v. Nashua Corp., 53608
...CARL R. GAERTNER, P.J., and GRIMM, J., concur. 1 Cf., Eib v. Federal Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432 (Mo.App.1982); Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86 (Mo.App.1979). In Eib, the Western District held that a claim for tortious interference against corporate officers in their individual capac......
-
MJS Resources, Inc. v. Circle G. Coal Co., 78-1268 C(2).
...is irrelevant, however, to plaintiff's claims that S&S tortiously interfered with plaintiff's contractual and business relations with Circle G.1 Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. App.1979). An unenforceable contract is not a necessary element of such a cause of action; all that is ......