Castevens v. State

• Decision Date: 02 July 1906
• Parties: CASTEVENS v. STATE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

96 S.W. 150

CASTEVENS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

July 2, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Garland County; A. M. Duffie, Judge.

Scott Castevens was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

C. V. Teague, for appellant. Robt. L. Rogers, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HILL, C. J.

Appellant was tried and convicted on the charge of stealing a bicycle, the property of Cleveland Smith. The state's evidence tended to prove that a bicycle was stolen from Smith, that it was found in possession of appellant, that it had been mutilated by appellant to change its appearance, and that it was over the value of $10. A bicycle found in possession of appellant was brought into court, and witnesses identified it as Smith's by various marks and peculiarities distinguishing it, one of which was a wire nail inserted in a broken rivet in the chain. The evidence of the appellant tended to prove that he had bought the wheel in question before Cleveland Smith lost his, that it was not the Cleveland Smith wheel, and that it was of little value in its present condition, and if in good condition was worth less than $10. Two errors are alleged to have been committed:

First. The court gave this instruction: "You are instructed that, in arriving at the value of the bicycle, you are not to consider the value of the wheel in its present condition; but you must base your verdict upon its value at the time it was stolen." This instruction is criticised as assuming that there had been larceny of a bicycle, and that the one in court was the stolen one. Standing alone, it does carry such impression, but read in connection with the other instructions that impression is removed. The jury were fully instructed that they must not convict unless they were satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the wheel was stolen, and that appellant was the person who actually stole it. The jury were cautioned against attaching undue force to unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, and in other ways the rights of the appellant were carefully preserved, and the true issue sent to the jury. This instruction only went to the ascertainment of the grade of larceny in the event the appellant was found guilty. While this should have been more clearly shown, yet, taken in connection with the other instructions, it is sufficiently plain to save it from misleading a jury of average intelligence.

Second. Ben Rush, a witness for the state, had worked for Cleveland Smith's father, and had ridden...