Castille v. Serv. Datsun, Inc.
Decision Date | 07 September 2017 |
Docket Number | NO. 01-16-00082-CV,01-16-00082-CV |
Parties | JAMES CASTILLE, BONNIE CASTILLE, WILLIAM T. MOORE, III, LINDA MOORE, ORAN HALL, AND CAROL HALL, Appellants v. SERVICE DATSUN, INC., Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 122nd District Court Galveston County, Texas
Appellants, James Castille, Bonnie Castille, William T. Moore, III, Linda Moore, Oran Hall, and Carol Hall, challenge the trial court's judgment, entered after a jury trial, in favor of appellee, Service Datsun, Inc. ("Service Datsun"), in appellants' declaratory-judgment action1 against Service Datsun. In four issues, appellants contend that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's negative finding against them and the trial court erred in granting Service Datsun affirmative declaratory relief, awarding it attorney's fees,2 and not properly instructing the jury on interpreting deed restrictions.3
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
In their petition, appellants alleged that they own certain real property in the Gulfview subdivision in Galveston County, Texas. When platted, "certain restrictions, conditions and covenants were declared to apply to all property situated within the subdivision." Two of the restrictions read as follows:
Appellants further alleged that Service Datsun owns certain property in the Gulfview subdivision. In violation of the above restrictions, it has installed and operates a recreational vehicle park ("RV park") on its property, renting "spaces" and certain recreational vehicles ("RVs") to other third-parties. The restrictions specifically "prohibit the placement of 'housetrailers' on lots within" the Gulfview subdivision, and Service Datsun's use of its property as an RV park "significantly inhibit[s] the use of Kahla Drive by other property owners" and has significantly impacted the values of their properties and their use and enjoyment of their properties.
Appellants sought a declaration that the Gulfview subdivision restrictions prohibit Service Datsun's "continued use of its property for the placement or rental of [RVs]" and such use "constitutes a violation of those restrictions." Appellants requested attorney's fees and a permanent injunction, requiring Service Datsun to "completely remove the offending [RVs] and/or RV [p]ark from its property" and "cease conducting activities [that are] prohibited by the Gulfview subdivision restrictions."
In its first amended answer, Service Datsun generally denied appellants' allegations and asserted certain affirmative defenses. It also counterclaimed for declaratory relief, requesting attorney's fees and seeking a declaration about "the validity, or legal effect, of the deed restrictions" and that "the continued operationof [its RV] park is not prohibited or restricted by" any of the Gulfview subdivision restrictions.
At trial, the trial court admitted into evidence of the Gulfview subdivision restrictions, which include the following:
The trial instructed the jury to answer the following question:
Because the jury answered "No" to Question No. 1, it did not answer the two remaining questions about Service Datsun's affirmative defenses.
Based on the jury's response to Question No. 1, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Service Datsun, concluding that it was "entitled to judgment declaring that its use of its property as an RV park in the Gulfview [s]ubdivision does not constitute a violation of the restrictive covenants of said subdivision." The court ordered that appellants "take nothing [in] their suit," declared that ServiceDatsun's "use of [its property in] the Gulfview [s]ubdivision, Crystal Beach, Galveston County, Texas, as an RV park does not violate the restrictive covenants pertaining to the subdivision." And it awarded Service Datsun attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000 for trial, $7,500 in the event of an appeal to the court of appeals, $3,500 in the event that a petition for review is filed with the Texas Supreme Court, and $7,500 if the petition is granted.4
In their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Service Datsun affirmative declaratory relief because the jury's negative answer to Question No. 1 "meant only that [appellants had] failed to carry their burden to prove a breach [by Service Datsun] of the Gulfview [subdivision] restrictions" and "could not support any affirmative declaratory relief" in favor of Service Datsun.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("DJA") generally permits a person who is interested under a deed or other contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute or contract, to obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 2015). The purpose of the DJA is "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legalrelations; and it is to be liberally construed and administered." Id. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 2015); see also Garcia v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv., Inc., No. 01-13-00359-CV, 2014 WL 3408701, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A declaratory-judgment action is a procedural vehicle that can be used to resolve a wide variety of legal disputes.").
We review declaratory judgments under the same standards as other judgments and decrees and look to the procedure used to resolve the issue at trial to determine the appropriate appellate standard of review. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.010 (Vernon 2015); City of Galveston v. Giles, 902 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). Our review of a trial court's entry of judgment on a jury verdict is a question of law that we review de novo. Arbor Windsor Court, Ltd. v. Weekley Homes, LP, 463 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); see also In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994) (); Resurgence Fin., L.L.C. v. Lawrence, No. 01-08-00341-CV, 2009 WL 3248285, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 8, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In a declaratory-judgment action, a party who asserts an affirmative claim for relief has the burden of proving its allegations. See Saba Zi Expl., LP v. Vaughn, 448 S.W.3d 123, 129 n.11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Russell v. City of Bryan, 919 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writdenied); see also Alanis v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 489 S.W.3d 485, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) ( ).
Here, appellants sought a declaration from the trial court that the Gulfview subdivision restrictions prohibit Service Datsun's "continued use of its property for the placement or rental of [RVs]" and such use "constitutes a violation of those restrictions." And Service Datsun sought a declaration about "the validity, or legal effect, of the deed restrictions" and that "the continued operation of [its RV] park is not prohibited or restricted by" any of the restrictions.
The trial court instructed the jury to...
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