Del Castillo v. Bayley Seton Hosp.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1996
• Citation: 649 N.Y.S.2d 41,232 A.D.2d 602
• Parties: Alfredo Lopez DEL CASTILLO, Plaintiff, Alfredo Lopez Del Castillo, M.D., P.C., Respondent, v. BAYLEY SETON HOSPITAL, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 41

649 N.Y.S.2d 41

232 A.D.2d 602

Alfredo Lopez DEL CASTILLO, Plaintiff Alfredo Lopez Del Castillo, M.D., P.C., Respondent, v. BAYLEY SETON HOSPITAL, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Oct. 28, 1996.

Kelley Drye & Warren, New York City (Richard E. Donovan and Cathleen K. Condren, of counsel), for appellant.

Storch Amini & Munves, P.C., New York City (Bijan Amini and Lita Beth Torres, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and ROSENBLATT, PIZZUTO and HART, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant Bayley Seton Hospital appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Sangiorgio, J.), dated October 5, 1995, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

In 1984, the plaintiff Alfredo Lopez Del Castillo, M.D., P.C. (hereinafter the corporation), entered into a contract with the defendant Bayley Seton Hospital (hereinafter the hospital), to provide anesthesiology services as an independent contractor at the hospital for a period of five years. Paragraph THIRTIETH of the contract provided:

"The Hospital warrants and represents that it will give the Corporation a first opportunity to negotiate a renewal or modification of the within agreement, or a new agreement on or before March 1, 1989. The parties, their legal representatives and financial representatives will confer and negotiate in good faith as to a renewal, modification or new contract by and between the parties for the services to be rendered by the Corporation to the Hospital."

In 1986, the parties amended the agreement by extending the term until July 1990. On April 24, 1990, the hospital informed the corporation that it had decided not to renew the contract.

The corporation and Alfredo Lopez Del Castillo, individually, commenced an action, inter alia, for damages for breach of contract against the hospital alleging, among other things, that the hospital failed to give it a first opportunity to negotiate a renewal or modification of the contract pursuant to paragraph THIRTIETH. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and the hospital cross moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court, Richmond County, granted the plaintiffs' motion and denied the cross motion. This court modified, inter alia, by granting the branch of the cross motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted on behalf of Alfredo Lopez Del Castillo individually, dismissing the second and third causes of action entirely, and denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (see, Del Castillo v. Bayley Seton Hosp., 172 A.D.2d 796, 569 N.Y.S.2d 168). Thereafter, the hospital moved for summary judgment on the first cause of action contending, among other things, that the renewal provision of the contract was unenforceably vague. The Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.

The Supreme Court erred in concluding that the doctrine of the law of the case precluded granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment. It is well settled that the denial of a prior motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action does not preclude a subsequent motion for summary judgment (see, Pappas v....