Castillo v. Caprock Pipe & Supply, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 31,499.,31,499. |
| Citation | 2012 -NMCA- 085,285 P.3d 1072 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
| Parties | Sonya CASTILLO, Personal Representative over the Estate of Alfredo Castillo, individually, and as next friend of the minor children, Brian Lopez, Christian Castillo, and Julissa Castillo, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CAPROCK PIPE & SUPPLY, INC., Defendant–Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Max Houston Proctor, Hobbs, NM, Dick Blenden, Carlsbad, NM, for Appellants.
Miller Stratvert P.A., Erica R. Neff, Timothy R. Briggs, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
{1} The sole issue before us today is whether the injury and resulting death of a worker caused by a disease contracted from pigeons roosting in the warehouse where he worked falls within the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 52–1–1 to –70 (1987, as amended through 2007), or the Occupational Disease Disablement Law (Disablement Law), NMSA 1978, §§ 52–3–1 to –60 (1945, as amended through 2003). In this case, Alfredo Castillo contracted psittacosis from exposure to roosting pigeons while working as a warehouse laborer at Caprock Pipe & Supply, Inc. (Defendant). As a result of the disease, Castillo died. Castillo's estate, wife, and children (Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death action on Castillo's behalf against Defendant for damages.
{2} Caprock moved to dismiss the case on the ground that it was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act and the Disablement Law. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint fell within the exclusivity provisions of either law. For reasons explained below, we conclude that Castillo's injury and death do not fall within the exclusivity provisions of the Disablement Law, but are covered by the Act. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to dismiss because Plaintiffs' lawsuit is precluded by the Act.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{3} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears that [the] plaintiff cannot recover, or be entitled to relief, under any state of facts provable under the complaint.” Duran v. N.M. Monitored Treatment Program, 2000–NMCA–023, ¶ 19, 128 N.M. 659, 996 P.2d 922 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We assume all factual allegations included in the complaint are true, but “conclusions of law are not [considered] admitted.” Id. The applicability of the Disablement Law or the Act is a question of law that we review de novo. Banks v. IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co., 2003–NMSC–026, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 421, 77 P.3d 1014;Coates v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 1999–NMSC–013, ¶ 21, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999.
II. DISCUSSIONA. The Disablement Law Does Not Apply
{4} By creating both the Disablement Law and the Act, the Legislature intended “to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to the employers.” NMSA 1978, § 52–5–1 (1990).
[Both laws] fulfill[ ] [their] purpose through a bargain in which an injured worker gives up his or her right to sue the employer for damages in return for an expedient settlement covering medical expenses and wage benefits, while the employer gives up its defenses in return for immunity from a tort claim.
Morales v. Reynolds, 2004–NMCA–098, ¶ 6, 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612. The right to compensation is exclusive under the Disablement Law only when “the disablement or death is proximately caused by an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, and is not intentionally self-inflicted.” NMSA 1978, § 52–3–8(C) (1953). At issue here is whether there is sufficient causation to categorize Castillo's disease as occupational.
NMSA 1978, Section 52–3–32 (1989) states what is required to establish causation:
The occupational diseases defined in [NMSA 1978, Section 52–3–33 (1973) ] shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if there is a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence.
(Emphasis added.)
{5} The Disablement Law clearly requires the disease to be closely related to the nature of the employment. To be covered by the Disablement Law, Marable v. Singer Bus. Machs., 92 N.M. 261, 262, 586 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Ct.App.1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There must be some “recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of [the worker's] job.” Martinez v. Univ. of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 457, 601 P.2d 425, 427 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To come within the definition, an occupational disease must be a disease which is a natural incident of a particular occupation, and must attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of that attending employment in general.” Herrera v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 89 N.M. 245, 247, 550 P.2d 144, 146 (Ct.App.1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It must be one which is commonly regarded as natural to, inhering in, an incident and concomitant of, the work in question.” Marable, 92 N.M. at 262, 586 P.2d at 1091 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{6} In the present case, with relation to this issue of causation, Defendant solely argues that Castillo “was exposed to pigeons in the work environment due to his particular occupation ... as a warehouse laborer in an open-air warehouse.” There is no evidence in the record, nor does Defendant cite any, that pigeons or psittacosis were incidental to the character of the oilfield supply business, or such businesses that employ people within warehouses. Nor is it otherwise obvious to the Court, from factually analogous case law or common knowledge which links particular injuries with particular occupations, that there is a known natural incident of psittacosis which relates to employment within the oilfield or warehouse-laborer occupational field. Thus, we cannot conclude that psittacosis was a natural incident of Defendant's employment in the warehouse. Therefore, the Disablement Law does not apply to this set of facts. We next determine whether Castillo's death would be covered exclusively by the Act.
B. The Act Is Plaintiffs' Exclusive Remedy
{7} For the Act to apply and preclude a cause of action by the employee, three requirements must be met:
A. [A]t the time of the accident, the employer has complied with the provisions thereof regarding insurance;
B. [A]t the time of the accident, the employee is performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment; and
C. [T]he injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and is not intentionally self-inflicted.
NMSA 1978, § 52–1–9 (1973). Plaintiffs do not dispute the accidental nature of Castillo's death. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the third prong cannot be met, in that Castillo's death was not an accident “arising out of and in the course of [his] employment” and, thus, falls outside of the Act. “The term ‘arise out of’ relates to the cause of the injury, while the phrase ‘in the course of’ refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred.” Wilson v. Richardson Ford Sales, Inc., 97 N.M. 226, 229, 638 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1981). We address each factor, starting with “in the course of employment.” Id.
{8} Plaintiffs argue that “in the course ... of employment” requirement has not been met because, although the injury took place during the period of employment and at the place of employment, the circumstances of Castillo's injury were not related to his employment. See Chavez v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 2001–NMCA–039, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 524, 27 P.3d 1011 . Plaintiffs state that “[t]he ‘condition’ at Defendant's premises, i.e., roosting pigeons, was in no way linked to ... Castillo's employment, other than [by] location.” Plaintiffs appear to argue that roosting pigeons were unrelated to Castillo's job and, therefore, the injury did not occur under the circumstances of employment.
{9} Plaintiffs misinterpret the meaning of “circumstances” with regard to how our case law has defined the “in the course of employment” requirement. “The phrase, in the course of employment, relates to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.” Flores v. McKay Oil Corp., 2008–NMCA–123, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 782, 192 P.3d 777 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But, we take this to mean that “an injury occurs in the course of employment when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of employment or doing something incidental to it.” Grimes v. Wal–Mart Stores Inc., 2007–NMCA–028, ¶ 7, 141 N.M. 249, 154 P.3d 64 (alteration,...
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