Castillo v. State, 88-579
| Decision Date | 23 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-579,88-579 |
| Citation | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 42,536 So.2d 1134 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 42 Harol CASTILLO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Daniel F. Daly and Norman S. Cannella of Norman S. Cannella, P.A., Tampa, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a conviction for trafficking in cocaine. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a deputy sheriff's stop and search of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The state stipulated that our decision as to whether or not the motion was properly denied would be dispositive of this case. We agree with defendant's contention and reverse.
The manager of a motel advised the sheriff's office that the occupants of three motel rooms had been acting suspiciously. Defendant, one of the occupants, had paid cash daily for the three rooms which were registered in the names of two other persons as well as his own. Both of the other persons had local addresses. Apparently the manager, who had seen defendant come and go in a red Chrysler LeBaron, was not certain whether defendant had been staying in any of the rooms overnight. The occupants had stayed in the rooms during the day and had declined maid service. The desk clerk thought that the identification which defendant had provided purported to be a Texas driver's license but contained a misspelled city of residence. Deputies, after a computer check, determined that a Texas driver's license with the same number was registered to a woman. Possession of a fictitious driver's license is a third-degree felony. § 322.212, Fla.Stat. (1987). 1 A detective and a deputy set up surveillance of the Chrysler and the three motel rooms.
During the surveillance, a woman and two men, all at that time unidentified, emerged from one of the rooms and entered the Chrysler. The woman drove. The men were passengers. After the Chrysler left the motel, another deputy stopped the vehicle, asked the driver to produce her driver's license and registration, and asked the passengers, who were defendant and John Finney, to produce identification. The deputy saw that defendant's identification card was not a driver's license but was an identification card of the type available at flea markets. The deputy concluded that defendant had not committed a violation of the law by possessing a fictitious driver's license. 2 While the deputy told Finney that he had stopped the vehicle because it looked like one that had been reported stolen, there apparently was no basis to suspect that the car was stolen. The deputy had actually stopped it at the request of the detective and the other deputy based upon their information as to the supposedly fictitious driver's license. They had wanted him to stop the vehicle, obtain a consent to search it, and then search it. They had told him they were looking for narcotics but otherwise gave him no basis for a belief that narcotics would be found. His testimony was that he had only a "hunch" that narcotics were involved. The deputy asked the driver whether she would object to a search of the vehicle. The driver gave her consent orally and in writing.
After searching the trunk of the vehicle with defendant's participation, the deputy discovered inside the vehicle a closed zippered bag. Inside the bag he found money, two small zip lock baggies, and jewelry. He did not at that time see the amount of money or anything in the baggies. He then called for assistance. At that point defendant grabbed something from the vehicle and fled on foot. He was soon apprehended. The zippered bag was seized and was found to contain powdered and rock cocaine which are the principal subjects of the motion to suppress.
For reasons which we will explain, these circumstances did not provide a justification for the continued detention of the vehicle and defendant (or, for that matter, of the other occupants of the vehicle) after the deputy decided that there was no violation of law from defendant possessing a fictitious driver's license. Therefore, we conclude that the discovery and seizure of the zippered bag and its contents were not lawful.
The activities of the defendant and the other occupants of the three rooms at the motel did not provide justification for the continued detention of the vehicle and its occupants. The only possible basis for the stop of the vehicle was the information about defendant's possession of what the officers had concluded was a fictitious driver's license. Defendant argues that the stop was unlawful because when the vehicle was stopped and up to the time defendant was asked to produce identification, he had not been identified as an occupant of the vehicle. But we need not decide whether the stop was unlawful for that reason. Even to assume, arguendo, that the deputy had had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was a passenger, any justification for detention disappeared at the point when the deputy decided that defendant had not committed a crime through possessing a fictitious driver's license. The record does not show that at that point defendant was free to leave. Rather, the deputy then, after a period of time not clear from the record, sought and obtained from the driver her consent to the search of the car.
We cannot agree with the argument of the state that after the point at which the deputy decided that there was no violation of law from defendant possessing a fictitious driver's license, there was shown to have been no more than an uncoercive police encounter after which there was a not improper request for a consent to search. The state did not show that after that point there was no illegal detention. The state did not show that defendant or the driver was then free to leave. Indeed, the record indicates otherwise. Under the circumstances of this case it was the state's burden to show no continued illegal detention. The state did not carry its burden. See Edwards v. State, 532 So.2d 1311, 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ...
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