Castillo v. State
| Decision Date | 29 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 1389-93,1389-93 |
| Citation | 913 S.W.2d 529 |
| Parties | Jose Ricardo CASTILLO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Robert Udashen, Dallas, for appellant.
Anne B. Wetherholt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas and Robert A. Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
A jury convicted appellant of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and assessed punishment at confinement for twelve years. On appeal appellant complained, inter alia, that the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause against venireman Noel Blaydes on the ground that he harbored a bias against some aspect of the law upon which the State was entitled to rely. Article 35.16(b)(3), V.A.C.C.P. The trial court had granted the State's challenge that Blaydes was unable to consider convicting an accused on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. Appellant contends that Blaydes' voir dire reveals nothing more than that his threshold for reasonable doubt is higher than the legal minimum to justify conviction, and that granting the State's challenge for cause was error under this Court's opinion in Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).
The court of appeals rejected appellant's contention, holding that propriety of the trial court's grant of the State's challenge for cause was governed, not by Garrett, but by our earlier opinion in Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Accordingly the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Castillo v. State, 867 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993). In his petition for discretionary review, appellant now contends that our opinion in Garrett effectively overruled Caldwell, and that the court of appeals therefore erred to dispose of his contention on appeal on the basis of the latter. We granted appellant's petition to address this contention. Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 200(c)(2) & (3).
During the prosecutor's questioning of the jury panel he asked whether anyone would need more than a single witness to a crime. Blaydes responded, Later during individual questioning, Blaydes reaffirmed his position:
"[Prosecutor]: You had indicated that you would have trouble deciding this case if we brought you testimony of only one police officer. Could you explain what is the genesis of that?
[Blaydes]: Well, I was a drug agent for a couple of years there, and I just ran into and encountered so many things with various law enforcement persons that I worked with, and I have known of more than one to get their story--to not get their stories straight and lie, frankly. I would be able to convict with two, but not with one. It's just no way. No way I could find guilty with just one officer. There would be a reasonable doubt. Be automatic.
[Prosecutor]: Automatic?
[Blaydes]: Automatic reasonable doubt.
The Court: I'm not sure that that is grounds for a challenge.
I would think that, Mr. Blaydes, the question that he asked was if you believed the witness?
[Blaydes]: I wouldn't automatically believe the witness.
The Court: But the way he asked the question was if you believed the witness?
[Blaydes]: 'If' is such a big word, I would not believe. If it was just one witness, I would not automatically.
The Court: You would prejudge?
[Blaydes]: Yes, I would prejudge one peace officer; not two or three, but one, yeah. I have a problem with that because drug cases are just so different, as far as I'm concerned, than other types of criminal cases.
[Blaydes]: I'll be honest with you, what I would do, I would pray and ask God whether the man was telling me the truth, the police officer, and if God told me, yes, and there was other evidence that it was crack that was taken into, you know, as evidence, yeah, yeah, I would find your man guilty.
[Blaydes]: With one witness right. See, I would be under pressure in there, but if I got the--got the answer when I prayed over it, if the one witness was telling the truth, I would find that man guilty.
[Blaydes]: That is why I was doing this. With--with all I know, if I was under pressure, wasn't given enough time to get an answer, very quick trial, then I would have to acquit because there would be a reasonable doubt there. You see, there is an--automatically reasonable doubt unless I have been given some sort of sign, because anyone could say anything.
Mr. Blaydes, let me assure you that you have the right to believe as you desire, as you have indicated. It's just that both sides have the right to have twelve jurors come in without some preconceived idea, and able to sit and listen to the evidence before they make up their mind as to whether or not to believe a witness, and here you have indicated to me that you would prejudge the facts; that there is only one peace officer, you can't believe them?
[Blaydes]: No, it doesn't necessarily mean he's telling the truth. That would be prejudging him, to just believe he's a police officer; he's automatically telling the truth.
The Court: What I'm saying, you have already prejudged the facts that you couldn't convict on the testimony of one peace officer, is that correct?
[Blaydes]: Not for this particular offense. For other offenses, yeah, but not for this particular offense.
The Court: So--
[Blaydes]: Kind of risky."
The trial court then granted the State's challenge for cause, without articulating a legal basis.
On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred to grant the State's challenge for cause against Blaydes, who had indicated nothing more than that he would "set his threshold of reasonable doubt higher than the minimum required to sustain a jury verdict[.]" Castillo v. State, supra, at 823. Conceding that this Court's opinion in Caldwell v. State, supra, had held that a venireman who refuses to consider rendering a guilty verdict on the testimony of only a single eyewitness is subject to a State's challenge for cause, appellant contended that we effectively overruled Caldwell in our subsequent opinion in Garrett v. State, supra. In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals drew a distinction between Garrett and Caldwell:
We do not read Garrett so broadly. Garrett concerns only the venireman's bias or prejudice against the law at the punishment phase of a capital trial. This case involves bias or prejudice against the law at the guilt-innocence phase. The considerations for and evidence adduced at these two phases are different.
At the punishment phase of a capital case, the law does not limit the State to presenting only the facts of the offense. To prove future dangerousness, the State can present evidence of the defendant's background and character, criminal record, psychiatric history, and any other evidence the court deems relevant. [citations omitted.]
However, at the guilt-innocence phase, the State can only present the existing evidence of the offense. If there is only one witness to the offense, the State has the right to have the case tried by jurors who will objectively consider the testimony of that one witness. See Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d at 797. If the only witness is a police officer, the State has the right to have the case tried by jurors who will objectively consider the police officer's testimony. Cf. Leach v. State, 770 S.W.2d 903, 907-08 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has always allowed the State to challenge for cause veniremen who express an inability to convict based solely on a class of legitimate evidence. * * * Garrett contains no indication that the Court of Criminal Appeals intended to overrule this line of case law. We conclude Garrett does not apply in this case.
In his petition for discretionary review appellant continues to insist that this Court effectively overruled Caldwell in Garrett. We granted his petition to address the question whether in principle Garrett and Caldwell can be meaningfully distinguished as the court of appeals believed they could. We hold they cannot.
In Caldwell the trial court granted a State's challenge for cause against venireman Hacker. Hacker had acknowledged that "under no circumstances would [he] be able to base a [guilty] verdict on the testimony of one witness." 818 S.W.2d at 797. Analogizing to cases in which we had approved challenges for cause against veniremen who could not convict on the basis of purely circumstantial evidence, this Court held that Hacker had indicated a bias against a phase of the law the State was entitled to rely on:
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...cause is an objection made to a juror for some legal reason that renders him unfit or incapable to serve on the jury. Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A veniremember can be challenged for cause if (among other reasons) he has a bias in favor of or against the defend......
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Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...cause is an objection made to a juror for some legal reason that renders him unfit or incapable to serve on the jury. Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A party may properly challenge a veniremember for cause when he reveals that he will not be able to follow the appl......
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Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...cause is an objection made to a juror for some legal reason that renders him unfit or incapable to serve on the jury. Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A veniremember can be challenged for cause if (among other reasons) he has a bias in favor of or against the defend......
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Jury Selection and Voir Dire
...cause is an objection made to a juror for some legal reason that renders him unfit or incapable to serve on the jury. Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A party may properly challenge a veniremember for cause when he reveals that he will not be able to follow the appl......