Castle v. Appalachian Technical Coll.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–11546.,10–11546.
• Citation: 631 F.3d 1194
• Parties: Sara CASTLE, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.APPALACHIAN TECHNICAL COLLEGE, Jasper Georgia, In their individual and official capacities, et al., Defendants,Joan Thompson, Vice President, in their individual and official capacities, Dr. Trina Boteler, Executive Affairs Officer, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

631 F.3d 1194

264 Ed. Law Rep. 630

22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1716

Sara CASTLE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.APPALACHIAN TECHNICAL COLLEGE, Jasper Georgia, In their individual and official capacities, et al., Defendants,Joan Thompson, Vice President, in their individual and official capacities, Dr. Trina Boteler, Executive Affairs Officer, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–11546.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 27, 2011.

James A. Satcher, Jr., Rome, GA, for Plaintiff–Appellant.Devon Orland, Meghan Robson Davidson, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants–Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.Before BARKETT, MARTIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

We previously issued an opinion in this case. Castle v. Appalachian Technical Coll., 627 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir.2010). However, the panel, on its own motion, has decided to vacate that opinion and substitute this one in its place in order to clarify the meaning of one sentence. The only change is to insert the word, “even,” at the start of the following sentence, in Part II: “Even in the context of suspensions of no more than ten days, the Supreme Court held that ‘as a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school.’ ” The opinion is otherwise identical.

Sara Castle, a former nursing student, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that her suspension from the Licensed Practical Nursing Program (“the Nursing Program”) at Appalachian Technical College (“ATC”), violated her free speech and due process rights. Castle alleged that two ATC administrators, Joan Thompson, Vice President of Academic Affairs, and Dr. Trina Boteler, interim Vice President of Student Services, (1) suspended her in retaliation for reporting one of her instructors for falsifying attendance records, in violation of the First Amendment; and (2) suspended her without a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against her, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Thompson and Dr. Boteler on Castle's First Amendment retaliation claim based on qualified immunity but permitted the procedural due process claim to be tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in Castle's favor in the amount of $50,000 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages. However, the district court subsequently granted the administrators' motion for a judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), holding that while there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Castle's due process rights were violated, the administrators were shielded by qualified immunity. Castle now appeals both rulings. After careful review, we affirm, concluding that the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacity from liability for civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). As administrators at a state technical college, Thompson and Dr. Boteler were government officials, and the parties agree that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority. Thus, to determine whether they are protected by qualified immunity, we consider (1) whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Castle, shows that the administrators violated a federal right and, if so, (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).¹ Therefore, we first decide whether a violation of federal law occurred as to each claim and, if so, then determine whether the administrators would reasonably have known that their actions violated the plaintiff's federal rights.²

I. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) her speech was constitutionally protected; (2) she suffered adverse conduct that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there was a causal relationship between the adverse conduct and the protected speech. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2005). In order to establish a causal connection, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was subjectively motivated to take the adverse action because of the protected speech. Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir.2008). However, once the plaintiff shows that her protected conduct was a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that she would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected conduct, in which case the defendant cannot be held liable. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)).

The evidence before the district court at the summary judgment stage, viewed in the light most favorable to Castle, reflects the following events. In March 2007, one of Castle's instructors complained to school administrators that she often disrupted class, and Castle was given a disciplinary warning stating that she must improve her behavior or face the possibility of expulsion. Later, in approximately May 2007, Castle supported a petition seeking to change the Nursing Program's passing grade requirements. Castle does not dispute that she told one student that he would be “verbally attacked” by his peers if he did not sign the petition, but the parties dispute to what other extent Castle pressured students. No students complained about being pressured to sign the petition at this time.

On two occasions after Castle received the disciplinary warning, the administration received reports of her misconduct from her instructors. First, in June 2007, one of Castle's instructors informed an administrator that a student had told her that Castle had threatened him.³ This allegation was not investigated at the time. Second, on August 21, 2007, a different instructor reported that Castle was inappropriately loud and argumentative during a class discussion and that another student, Suanne Clayton, had reported that Castle had threatened her the previous semester, warning her to “be careful in the parking lot.” Castle denies making this threat.

On August 22, 2007, there was a heated argument between Castle, Clayton, and other students about a clinical course taught by Betty Sue Loflin. Castle and another student, Elizabeth Mata, left class to report what they believed were infractions by both Clayton and Loflin. Castle and Mata informed the Vice President of Academic Affairs, Thompson, that Loflin consistently released students early from this full day clinical course—sometimes after as little as one hour—and falsified their attendance records. They also complained that student Clayton had an excessive number of absences and received preferential treatment. Thompson initiated an investigation that confirmed the allegations against Loflin, and the instructor was fired two days later, on August 24, 2007.

As part of the investigation into Loflin's misconduct, Thompson also interviewed Clayton. Clayton admitted that she had been permitted to leave class early and had missed classes, but also told Thompson that she felt threatened by Castle and Mata and filed a formal grievance against them. In the grievance, Clayton alleged that Castle and Mata had both bullied and yelled at her, and that Castle had spread lies about her, called her names, and disrupted class by arguing with instructors. Thompson instructed Dr. Boteler to investigate Clayton's grievance against Castle and Mata.

Dr. Boteler immediately interviewed all of the students in the clinical course except for Castle, Mata, and Clayton. According to her notes, every student who was present corroborated Clayton's account of the August 22 argument and reported witnessing “inappropriate, aggressive, and/or threatening behavior” by Castle, and one student stated that Castle had once threatened him or her.⁴ None of the students reported any inappropriate conduct by Mata. However, one of the students interviewed testified that she reviewed Dr. Boteler's notes of each interview and concluded that none accurately reflected what she had said.

That same day, August 24, 2007, Dr. Boteler and Thompson met with Castle and told her that they had decided to dismiss her from the Nursing Program because she had violated the Student Code of Conduct and the terms of her disciplinary warning. The defendants also advised Castle of her right to appeal the decision. On August 27, 2007, Castle filed a written administrative appeal, which was referred to an independent committee for review. The committee elected to forgo a formal hearing and to decide the case based on the written appeal. On September 6, 2007, the committee upheld the dismissal as a suspension for the remainder of the year. Castle then filed this lawsuit alleging that Thompson and Dr. Boteler suspended her in retaliation for reporting the misconduct by Loflin.

The parties do not dispute that reporting Loflin was protected speech and that the suspension from the Nursing Program constituted adverse conduct. Thus, the questions remaining are whether Castle presented sufficient evidence that her protected speech was a motivating factor in the suspension and, if so, whether the administrators established that they would have suspended her in the absence of the protected speech. The district court found that there were disputed issues of material fact as to the administrators' subjective motivations and, for the purposes of this appeal, we accept that there is a factual dispute as to whether Castle's protected speech was a motivating factor in the...