Castle v. Castle

• Decision Date: 19 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70--703,70--703
• Citation: 247 So.2d 455
• Parties: Darian Northrup CASTLE, Appellant, v. Frances CASTLE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 455

247 So.2d 455

Darian Northrup CASTLE, Appellant, v. Frances CASTLE, Appellee.

No. 70--703.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 19, 1971.

Edward W. Starr, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

J. Luther Drew, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

OWEN, Judge.

Interlocutory appeal to review an order granting custody of the parties' minor child to appellee, who was the plaintiff below in this suit for alimony unconnected with divorce.

The three-year-old child who is the subject of the custody order is not now and has not been at anytime during the pendency of this suit physically within the territorial limits of this state. Under the present state of the law, this fact deprived the court of jurisdiction to initially adjudicate the custody of the minor child. Dorman v. Friendly, 1941, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734; Rich v. Rich, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 777; Nieburger v. Nieburger, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 382; Mirras v. Mirras, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 887; Smith v. Davis, Fla.App.1962, 147 So.2d 177.

The custody order appealed is reversed.

REED, J., concurs.

WALDEN, J., dissents, with opinion.

WALDEN, Judge (dissenting):

The majority says, without reservation, restriction, or qualification, that the courts of this state cannot, as a matter of jurisdiction, adjudicate the custody of a minor child where such child is not physically present within the state during the pendency of the case. While this broad and unequivocal pronouncement provides a ready disposition of this appeal, it is my judgment respectfully advanced that such is neither the law nor should it be. This statement, if permitted to stand, will propogate a lonely, unnecessary and dangerously poor precedent in child custody cases.

The correct principle is that our courts have the power to award custody of children Domiciled within the state even though the children may be physically without the state during case pendency.

This was a suit for separate maintenance. The trial court awarded temporary custody of the three-year old daughter to the wife. The husband appeals on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to award such custody because the child was physically absent from the state at the time. The majority of this court accepts the husband's contention and orders a reversal of the award based on lack of jurisdiction.

It is to be noted--as a basis for comparison with the authorities relied upon by the majority--that the husband (father), wife (mother), and the three-year old daughter in question were all Domiciled in Florida at all times pertinent. They were Florida citizens--Florida people. The husband and wife were physically present before the court attended by counsel. The daughter was temporarily living in California because of the wife's illness and poor living conditions which were more particularly described in the appealed order, as follows:

'* * * The court, having heard all of the testimony, finds that the parties have a three year old daughter, that the parties were living in a small trailer, that the Defendant left the abode, and because of the unsanitary conditions, the lack of heat, and the illness of the Plaintiff, Plaintiff was forced to take the child and go to a friend's house. This proved also to be unsanitary and without adequate heat. The Plaintiff, being in a condition of near nervous breakdown, called upon the Defendant to take the child of the parties. This was in January of 1970 during cold weather. The Defendant sent the child to his sister in California where the child is at present. The court finds from the greater weight of the credible testimony that the Plaintiff acted in the best interest of the minor child in delivering said child to the Defendant under the circumstances; that Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the custody of said minor child; that the Defendant has harassed, neglected and injured the Plaintiff; that the best interest of the minor child will be served by being with her mother; and that said child should be returned to her mother forthwith.'

That the majority position is 'lonely' is attested by the fact that no other jurisdiction holds a like view. To the contrary, twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Canada and England--the only ones listed that have taken a stance--are unanimous in holding that even though children may be physically without the state, power exists in the court to make an award of custody of children domiciled within the state. See annotation, 'Jurisdiction of Court to award custody of child domiciled in state but physically outside it.' 9 A.L.R.2d 434 at page 442. The lead case there cited is Beckmann v. Beckmann, 1949, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566. There the court found that the children were domiciled within the state and adjudicated custody despite the fact that the children were temporarily absent. It further announced the general rule that ordinarily the residence of a minor child is the same as that of the father but where the parents separate and establish different domiciles the child is usually regarded as taking the domicile of the parent with whom it lives, in fact. For further substantiation and elaboration, see Restatement of Laws, Conflict of Laws, §§ 30, 32, 144 and 146; 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 303(b), 427--429; and 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 773. See also, Beekman v. Beekman, 1907, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So. 923; and Chisholm v. Chisholm, 1928, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694. For a particularly excellent and thorough discussion of this question see the opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor in the case of Sampsell v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 1948, 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739, beginning at page 746. Also this view was recognized in Florida in the case of Bourn v. Hinsey, 1937, 134 Fla. 404, 183 So. 614, when the Supreme Court held:

'The petitioner brought a suit in Mississippi against the father of the child, for separate maintenance and alimony. Both parties still reside in Mississippi. The court, having found the petitioner, as well as the father of the child, fit to have custody of her, Awarded the custody to the mother for nine months in the year and the father for three months in the year. The child was then in Florida.

'Two questions are presented to the court: First, is the Florida court required to give full faith and credit to the decree of the chancery court in Mississippi, regardless of any considerations involving the welfare of the child; and, secondly, whether the welfare of the child requires her custody to be awarded to the petitioner or the respondents.

'Upon authority of Beekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So. 923, It appears that the domicile of the father being in Mississippi, the child was incapable of making a choice of a domicile in Florida, independently of the father's domicile. Hence, the Mississippi court did have jurisdiction over the child, because it had jurisdiction over both parents, who were before the court. The proceedings of the court in Mississippi are admissible in evidence. The provisions of the final decree will be followed by the court here, unless changed conditions or the welfare of the child require a different adjudication. Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483.' (Emphasis supplied.)

While there was a difference of opinion back and forth within the court as to whether there were changed conditions or whether the welfare of the child required a change in custody, the above stated principle was unchallenged and represented the law of the case.

That the majority position is 'unnecessary' is reflected by a careful analysis of the cases relied upon by them. Those cases are Dorman v. Friendly, Fla.1941, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734; Smith v. Davis, Fla.App.1962, 147 So.2d 177; Mirras v. Mirras, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 887; Nieburger v. Nieburger, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 382; Rich v. Rich, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 777.

With one exception, all are factually distinguishable.

In the Dorman case ¹ the parties were earlier divorced and custody of the two minor children awarded to the wife. This was done at a time when the wife and children were domiciled in Florida and the husband domiciled in New York. There was no reservation of jurisdiction as concerns custody. Much later the wife and children properly moved to Virginia and established their domicile there. The husband later became a resident and domiciled in Utah. With this state of circumstances--neither the wife, husband nor children domiciled in Florida--the husband filed a post decretal petition in Florida asking, among other things, for custody of the children. The circuit court decided it had jurisdiction regardless of the fact that the parties and the children were not domiciled in Florida and this decision was presented to the Supreme Court by certiorari with the result that the trial court decision was quashed on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the glaring difference is that in Dorman none were domiciled in Florida, while in the instant case all are domiciled in Florida.

In the Smith case a like distinction was found with the...