Castle v. State
| Decision Date | 28 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 29445,29445 |
| Citation | 143 N.E.2d 570,237 Ind. 83 |
| Parties | Robert CASTLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
George T. Patton, South Bend, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., of Indiana, Owen S. Boling, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of assault under an affidavit charging the crime of rape. Appellant was fined $500 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment.
Appellant first contends on this appeal that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a discharge because of the running of the three term statute. 1
The facts bearing upon the matter show that the affidavit charging rape was filed on April 12, 1955, which was during the February term of court for 1955, and appellant was arrested on said date. On April 14, appellant pleaded not guilty and requested trial by jury. On said date he also posted bail bond and was released from custody. No action was taken in said cause during the succeeding May and September terms of court, and on November 22, in the November term, the cause was set for trial for December 21, 1955. The trial was not had, however, on said date, nor was the trial conducted, during the November term of court, but on the last day of the November term, to-wit: On February 3, 1956, the court found there was insufficient time during the November term to try said cause, citing among other reasons, the unavailability of a courtroom for the trial of jury cases, as the court below (Superior Court No. 1) was required to share the only courtroom suitable for jury trials with another court (Superior Court No. 2). The court's record in this respect is as follows (Tr. p. 9, lines 15-26):
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that every person accused of a criminal offense has a right to a speedy trial. 2 This constitutional provision is implemented by the Indiana statute, 3 in the case before us, which provides that:
'No person shall be held by recognizance to answer an indictment or affidavit, without a trial, for a period embracing more than three terms of court, not including the term at which a recognizance was first taken thereon, if taken in term time; but he shall be discharged unless a continuance be had upon his own motion, or the delay be caused by his act, or there be not sufficient time to try him at such third term; and, in the latter case, if he be not brought to trial at such third term he shall be discharged, except as provided in the next section.' 4
This statute, we have held, is to be so construed that all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused. See: Colglazier v. State, 1953, 231 Ind. 571, 110 N.E.2d 2; Shewmaker v. State, 1956, Ind.Sup., 138 N.E.2d 290.
For the accused to be entitled to a discharge under the statute, it is immaterial whose act caused the delay, unless the delay was caused by the accused. For example, in the Colglazier case, supra, it was specifically held the accused's right to a discharge could not be prejudiced by delay caused by the prosecuting attorney or the court, or anyone other than the accused.
It was the duty of the board of county commissioners in the case before us to provide a suitable and convenient place for the holding of the courts of the county, and this necessarily included a proper and sufficient courtroom with facilities for conducting trials by jury, including an adequate and sufficient jury room and the necessary conveniences. See: Board of Commissioners v. Stout, 1893, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683, 22 L.R.A. 398.
Upon the failure of the board of commissioners to provide sufficient facilities, the court itself, in order to ensure the efficient administration of justice, had not only the right but the correlative duty to see that the court was properly equipped in its accommodations and furnishings so as to be able to act effectively as a court. See: Woods v. State, 1954, 233 Ind. 320, 119 N.E.2d 558.
The dividing of the use of a courtroom and a jury room with another court of coequal jurisdiction, and the necessary postponement of jury trials because of the congestion occasioned by both courts using the same facilities simultaneously, is certainly not compatible with the orderly, prompt and...
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