Castle v. United States, 15520.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1956
• Docket Number: No. 15520.,15520.
• Citation: 238 F.2d 131
• Parties: Herbert Daniel CASTLE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

238 F.2d 131 (1956)

Herbert Daniel CASTLE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 15520.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

November 16, 1956.

Joe A. Walters, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

Harold C. Evarts, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Paul, Minn. (George E. MacKinnon, U. S. Atty., St. Paul, Minn., was with him on the brief), for appellee.

Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and WOODROUGH and VOGEL, Circuit Judges.

VOGEL, Circuit Judge.

Herbert Daniel Castle, appellant herein, was proceeded against by indictment in which he was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, in that he conspired with one Charles Edgar Reed, Jr., not charged herein, and other persons unknown, to transport stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312, and to receive, conceal, store, barter, sell and dispose of stolen motor vehicles moving as and which were a part of and which constituted interstate commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, in violation of 18 U.S. C.A. § 2313. The conspiracy allegedly consisted of a plan whereby the appellant and Reed would acquire wrecked automobiles through purchase and then transfer the motor numbers and serial numbers from the wrecked automobiles to stolen ones. After the transfer of numbers from the wrecks to the stolen cars, the stolen cars were to be transported in interstate commerce and sold. Motor vehicle registration documents pertaining to the wrecks were to be substituted for those of the stolen vehicles.

The indictment charged eight overt acts allegedly performed by the appellant and by Reed to effectuate the objects of the conspiracy.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury, following which the court imposed a sentence of two years' confinement. The appeal to this court raises three claims of error in that: (1) The conviction is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary to the evidence and to the law; (2) the indictment is fatally defective because the foreman of the grand jury had an adverse interest, was partial, prejudiced, and therefore the court is without jurisdiction; (3) exhibits and testimony were received which were not properly admissible and which were so prejudicial as to deny appellant a fair trial.

In considering the first point raised by the appellant, we must take that view of the evidence which is most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict. As we said in Phelps v. United States, 8 Cir., 1947, 160 F.2d 858, 868:

"It is not for us, on an appeal from a conviction, to weigh the conflicting facts, circumstances and inferences of the trial proceedings, but only to consider whether the evidence in its most favorable aspect to the Government is legally capable of allowing a jury to become persuaded of guilt."

The following is an outline of the activities of Reed and appellant upon which the government relies to sustain conviction. The appellant and Reed were long-time friends, with years of business and social relationship between them. In January, 1954, they decided to go into the business of selling used cars, apparently on a partnership basis. The operation began under the trade-name of Monarch Motors. Premises to be used as a used-car lot were leased at 132 East Lake Street, Minneapolis, with Castle signing the lease, apparently because his credit rating was sufficient whereas Reed's was not. The understanding was that after the operation got underway a corporation would probably be formed. As an indication of appellant's personal interest in, knowledge of and responsibility for the operations of Monarch Motors, the evidence shows that he supplied the funds to begin operations and personally applied for a license in his own name to operate a used-car lot. He opened a bank account in the name of Monarch Motors, initially having the address for the account as that of his private residence. Later it was changed to 132 East Lake Street. In May, 1954, the appellant executed a power of attorney authorizing Reed to withdraw or deposit funds in the bank account, and to draw and endorse checks in the name of Monarch Motors. The appellant became a notary public and after March, 1954, notarized all transfers and related documents in connection with the operation of the business of Monarch Motors.

For the most part, the inventory of Monarch Motors consisted of older cars, 1950 models and older. There were a few 1951 and 1952 models and one 1953 model. In August, 1954, Reed purchased a wrecked 1954 Chevrolet for Monarch Motors. This car was towed to a private garage where it remained until February or March, 1955, when the appellant had it towed to his home. The appellant stated then that he had received the car in an "insurance deal". At that time appellant stated that he had "bought two or three of them or got two of them and he intended to fix up one of them". Shortly after buying the 1954 wrecked Chevrolet, Reed brought the title card to the partnership place of business so that title could be transferred to Monarch Motors. The appellant notarized the transfer and was aware of the purchase and where the car was stored. Later in August, 1954, another wrecked 1954 Chevrolet was purchased by a person representing himself to be one Charles O'Neil. O'Neil was later identified as Reed. This wrecked car was also placed in a private garage. The title card was brought to the partnership place of business and Castle notarized the transfer from "Charles O'Neil" to Monarch Motors.

On September 1, 1954, two tickets were sold by Capitol Airlines, Inc., for a flight from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The manifest indicated that the tickets were issued to a passenger or passengers under the name "Castle". That same evening in Milwaukee a 1954 Chevrolet was stolen from its owner. A general description of the stolen car conforms with one which the appellant and Reed were later seen using in checking on one of the wrecked cars located in a private garage in Minneapolis. Later the car stolen in Milwaukee was sold by Reed in Iowa, where an inspection disclosed that the numbers appearing on the car at that time were those belonging to one of the wrecked cars purchased by Monarch Motors. The foregoing is typical of several transactions involving wrecked cars whose numbers subsequently appeared upon stolen cars sold by Reed through Monarch Motors after their having been transported in interstate commerce. A detailed recitation of the evidence concerning each transaction is unnecessary here.

Two stolen cars bearing identifications of wrecked cars purchased by Monarch Motors were sold by Reed through the Denver Auto Auction in Colorado. Reed there identified himself as a representative of Monarch Motors. Later, upon receiving information indicating that the cars might have been stolen, the proprietor of Denver Auto Auction attempted to call Reed on long distance telephone. Being unsuccessful in attempting to locate Reed, he asked for the manager of Monarch Motors and talked with the appellant. He informed appellant that the call was about stolen automobiles. Appellant said he didn't know anything about Reed, that Reed wasn't connected with Monarch Motors and never had authority to represent them, and that he didn't know Reed's whereabouts. A few days later appellant received a second call from the Denver Auto Auction, wherein he was told that the Denver Auto Auction wanted the money for the cars that were stolen and that they were stopping payment on one check that had not as yet cleared. Appellant replied that the cars were not stolen, that they "* * * better not turn down the checks on them and he wanted the money for them". Two days thereafter Reed called the Denver Auto Auction. Upon being informed that the Denver Auto Auction people had reported to the F.B.I. and they thought he should do so too, he replied that the cars were not stolen but he didn't want to go to the F.B.I. "* * * because the story about the cars is so fantastic that no one would believe it". Reed suggested the payment of a couple of hundred dollars to "* * * get somebody to lay off the case".

As an indication of Castle's knowledge of Reed's unlawful activities, Castle subsequently notarized an affidavit by Reed as sales manager of Monarch Motors to the effect that in working on one 1954 Buick sedan, which was sold through the Denver Auto Auction, the number plate on the motor of the automobile was damaged in such a manner as to make its numbers illegible and that he, Reed, restored the original and true number of said plate of the motor. Appellant admits that before he notarized the affidavit he discussed the matter with Reed but that Reed informed him that it only involved a discrepancy in the title and the affidavit was to clear it up. He denied having any knowledge as to what the discrepancy was. Having been apprised by the Denver Auto Auction that they believed Reed sold them stolen cars, the appellant's subsequent actions in first denying that Reed had anything to do with Monarch Motors and then notarizing Reed's affidavit is strangely inconsistent with his claimed lack of knowledge of Reed's unlawful activities. This is particularly true in light of the evidence to the effect that none of the wrecked cars was, contrary to the proposed plan of operation by appellant and Reed, repaired and thereafter sold. Inasmuch as titles to the wrecked cars purchased by Monarch Motors had been appropriated for use on the stolen automobiles, it would have been impossible to give good title to any of the wrecked cars had they actually...