Castner v. Pocahontas Collieries Co.

• Decision Date: 31 July 1902
• Citation: 117 F. 184
• Parties: CASTNER et al. v. POCAHONTAS COLLIERIES CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

117 F. 184

CASTNER et al. v. POCAHONTAS COLLIERIES CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Virginia.

July 31, 1902

V. L Sexton, for petitioners

McDOWELL District Judge.

On July 16, 1902, on a verified bill of complaint, I signed an order enjoining numerous named defendants,-- striking coal miners,-- and all others associated or connected with them for interfering with the working of the mines of the Pocahontas Collieries Company, either by menaces, threats, or any character of intimidation used to prevent employes of said company from going to or from said mines, or from engaging in mining at said mines. It appears from a petition for writ of habeas corpus this day laid before me in behalf of Miles Hambrick and two others (none of the petitioners being named in the injunction order) that on July 23, 1902 on the affidavit of one A. J. King, warrants for the arrest of petitioners were issued by a United States commissioner for this district; the charge made in the affidavit being that the petitioners had by intimidation sought to prevent certain employes of the above-named company for working, in violation of the above order. The petitioners were arrested and given a preliminary hearing before the commissioner, and, being unable to give the bond required for their appearance before court, have been committed to jail pending the next regular term of court.

The point chiefly relied on by counsel for petitioners is the alleged want of authority in the commissioner to hold the examining trial and to commit the petitioners.

Section 1014, Rev. St. U.S., reads, so far as material, as follows:

'For any crime of offense against the United States, the offender may, by any * * * commissioner of a circuit court to take bail * * * agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state * * * be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offence.'

By Act May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. 184) United States commissioners are given the same powers and duties as had previously been given to circuit court commissioners. That a contempt is an offense against the United States is not open to question.

In Fanshawe v. Tracy, 4 Biss. 490, Fed. Cas. No. 4,643, Judge Drummond said:

'A party who has conducted himself in such a way as to justify the court in punishing him for contempt or for disobedience of its order has committed an offense against the United States.'

In Fischer v. Hayes (C.C.) 6 Fed. 68, Judge Blatchford said:

'It is well settled that contempt of court is a specific criminal offense.'

Citing New Orleans v. New York Mail Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387, 392, 22 L.Ed. 354.

In Re Ellerbe (C.C.) 13 F. 530, 4 McCrary, 449, Judge McCrary said:

'A refusal to obey the process of a court of the United States * * * is plainly an offense against the federal government. A proceeding in contempt, in a federal court, is a criminal case, to be prosecuted in the name of the United States.'

In U.S. v. Jacobi, 1 Flip. 108, Fed. Cas. No. 15,460, the question is quite fully discussed; the court saying:

'I hold that section 17 (section 725, Rev. St.) makes contempt of court a crime against the United States. Now that it is, within section 33 (section 1014, Rev. St.), a crime for which the party may be arrested and imprisoned or bailed, I do not doubt.'

See, also, In re Acker (C.C.) 66 F. 290.

As further tending to show that contempt of court is an offense against the United States, it may be noted that since a very early day the president has been held to have the power to pardon for contempt under article 2, Sec. 2, Const., giving him the right to pardon for offenses against the United States. In re Mullee, Fed. Cas. No. 9,911, and opinions of attorneys general there cited.

Another ground relied upon in the petition is that the affidavit upon which the warrants were issued was not made by a party to the suit.

In Secor v. Singleton (C.C.) 35 F. 378, it is said:

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