Caston School Corp. v. Phillips, 25A05-9702-CV-74
| Decision Date | 13 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 25A05-9702-CV-74,25A05-9702-CV-74 |
| Citation | 689 N.E.2d 1294 |
| Parties | 123 Ed. Law Rep. 884 CASTON SCHOOL CORPORATION, Appellant-Defendant, v. Russell B. PHILLIPS, Jr., Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
The Caston School Corporation (Caston) appeals a declaratory judgment that Russell B. Phillips Jr.'s employment contract remained in effect for the 1996-1997 school year. Caston raises a single issue: whether a statutory provision that if a principal is not notified in a timely manner that his contract will not be renewed, his contract "shall be reinstated only for the ensuing school year" provides for continuing year-to-year renewals unless the principal is properly notified of nonrenewal.
We reverse.
Phillips served as an elementary school principal at Caston from August 1978 to June 1995. His most recent principal's contract was for the period July 1993 to June 1995. In the Spring of 1994, Caston began proceedings to dismiss Phillips for cause. The parties submitted the propriety of the dismissal to a panel of arbitrators, and the arbitrators found Caston had not shown cause to terminate Phillips' contract.
Following the arbitration, Caston commenced the statutory procedure which is to be followed when a principal's contract is not renewed. Caston notified Phillips of the conferences with the superintendent and the school board to which Phillips was entitled by law. Phillips had a conference with the superintendent. However, his conference with the school board was canceled after Phillips tried to tape record the proceedings. Phillips acquiesced in the board's request that he stop taping, but the board canceled the conference when Phillips refused to give the tape recording to the board.
After the conference was canceled, Phillips sued Caston alleging it had not followed the proper procedure in declining to renew his contract. The trial court agreed, 1 and ordered Phillips' contract reinstated for the 1995-96 school year. However, prior to that decision, Caston hired Phillips as an elementary school teacher for the 1995-96 school year. Caston did not pursue the contract non-renewal procedure during the 1995-96 school year because it had already done so during the prior year, and because it interpreted the controlling statute to extend Phillips' principal's contract for no more than the following school year.
In June of 1996, Phillips brought an action for a declaratory judgment that because Caston did not pursue the non-renewal procedure during the 1995-96 school year, Phillips' contract remained in effect for the 1996-97 school year. On November 4, 1996, the court entered a declaratory judgment to that effect.
The Indiana legislature has established, in the Teachers' Tenure Law, a procedure for the non-renewal of the employment contracts of public school principals. Indiana Code section 20-6.1-4-17.3 states:
(a) At least thirty (30) days before giving written notice of refusal to renew a contract under section 17.2 of this chapter, the governing body, or an employee at the direction of the governing body, shall inform the assistant superintendent, the principal, or the assistant principal by written preliminary notice that the governing body is considering a decision not to renew the contract and that, if the individual files a request with the school corporation for a private conference within five (5) days after receiving the preliminary notice, the individual is entitled to a private conference with the superintendent of the school corporation.
(b) If the individual files a request with the school corporation for an additional private conference within five (5) days after the initial private conference with the superintendent of the school corporation, the individual is entitled to an additional private conference with the governing body of the school corporation before being given written notice of refusal to renew the contract.
(c) The preliminary notice required under this section must include the reasons for considering a decision not to renew.
Indiana Code section 20-6.1-4-17.2 states in pertinent part:
(a) By February 1 of the year during which the contract of an assistant superintendent, a principal, or an assistant principal is due to expire, the governing body of the school corporation or an employee at the direction of the governing body shall give written notice of renewal or refusal to renew the individual's contract for the ensuing school year.
(b) If no notice is given by February 1 of the year during which the contract is due to expire, the contract then in force shall be reinstated only for the ensuing school year.
(emphasis supplied).
The trial court found that Phillips' principal's contract was due to expire at the end of the 1995-96 school year, and that no notice was given by February 1, 1996. Because no notice was given, the contract was automatically reinstated for a full year. The court went on to hold that Caston would have to "again comply with the statute if it wishes to terminate [Phillips'] contract." R. at 50. So, Phillips seems to be arguing that section 17.2(b) is a rolling, automatic renewal provision; that is, it provides for continuing one-year renewals for as long as Caston fails to comply with the notice and conference requirements of section 17.3. Caston characterizes the statute as a liquidated damages provision, which requires a school system which fails to comply with the notice and conference provisions to renew the principal's contract for one additional year, but no more.
When reviewing a trial court's determination of the construction of a statute, we are not bound by the trial court's interpretation, but rather must make an independent legal determination as to the meaning of the statute and its application to the facts of the case before us. Olejniczak v. Town of Kouts, 651 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied.
A statute should be read and construed with its companion provisions. We must give effect and meaning to every word, if possible, and no part should be held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Id. When construing a statute, we must give words and phrases their plain, ordinary and usual meaning, unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute itself. Id.
The purpose of the Teachers' Tenure Law is to advance the efficiency of school systems, and not to grant special privileges to teachers as a class or as individuals. Miller v. Barton School Tp. of Gibson County, 215 Ind. 510, 20 N.E.2d 967, 968 (1939). When interpreting statutes such as the Teachers' Tenure Law, in which the general public has an interest, we must adopt the construction best calculated to protect the public right as against the individual right. Id.; Joseph v. Lake Ridge School Corp., 580 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). The Teachers' Tenure Law vests school boards with a great deal of discretion in deciding whether to renew the contract of a particular school's principal, Joseph, 580 N.E.2d at 320.
We cannot adopt Phillips' construction of section 17.2(b) as permitting an indefinite number of one-year contract renewals for as long as a school system fails to give notice by February 1, because such construction is inconsistent with the purpose of the Teachers' Tenure Law, because...
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