Miller v. Barton Sch. Tp. of Gibson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 16 May 1939
• Docket Number: No. 27198.,27198.
• Parties: MILLER v. BARTON SCHOOL TP. OF GIBSON COUNTY.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

215 Ind. 510

20 N.E.2d 967

MILLER

v.BARTON SCHOOL TP. OF GIBSON COUNTY.

No. 27198.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 16, 1939.

Action by Roscoe C. Miller against Barton School Township of Gibson County, Ind., for an alleged breach of an indefinite contract to teach in the schools of the school township. Judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Gibson Circuit Court.

M. P. Lockwood and Warren W. Barnett, both of Princeton, for appellant.

Sandford Trippet, of Princeton, for appellee.

TREMAIN, Chief Justice.

The appellant filed this action against the appellee, alleging that he was a duly licensed teacher of the public schools of this state and was employed by the appellee township as a teacher continuously and successively for seven years, beginning in September, 1920, and ending in April, 1927; that thereafter he did not teach for the school township until September, 1931, when he was re-employed as a teacher in that township, which re-employment was followed by a second contract ending in April, 1933. He alleges in his complaint that by reason of said services he was ‘the possessor of an indefinite contract with the defendant to teach in the schools of the said school township, a copy of which indefinite contract is attached hereto and made a part hereof.’

The contract referred to and made a part of the complaint is the contract to teach in the schools of that township for the school year of 1932-33. He alleges that the township trustee refused to employ him at the termination of the year 1932-33, but breached his indefinite contract; that by reason thereof the appellant has been damaged in the sum of $25,000 and demands judgment for the amount.

The appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and assigns specifically that the complaint does not allege that appellant entered into a contract for further services beginning in September, 1927, and ending in April, 1928; that the ‘further service’ as a teacher did not follow consecutively the ‘five or more successive years;’ that the facts averred in the complaint do not make the appellant a permanent teacher within the statute and do not constitute an indefinite contract as defined by statute upon which appellant could maintain an action for damages. The court sustained the demurrer to the complaint; appellant refused to plead further and appealed from the court's ruling upon the demurrer.

Both parties cite and rely upon the first sentence of Section 1, Chapter 97, Acts 1927, page 259, to fortify their claims. It reads as follows: ‘That any person who has served or who shall serve under contract as a teacher in any school corporation in the State of Indiana for five or more successive years, and who shall hereafter enter into a teacher's contract for further service with such corporation, shall thereupon become a permanent teacher of such school corporation.’

Counsel discuss the meaning and use of the word ‘hereafter.’ The appellant asserts that the contract for further services may be executed at any time ‘hereafter’ or within a reasonable time. The appellee asserts that the contract for further services must follow consecutively the ‘five or more successive years.’

This appeal presents the sole question as to whether or not the appellant is a permanent teacher by reason of the fact that he has been employed for seven successive years beginning in 1920 and ending in 1927, before the effective date of the 1927 Teachers' Tenure Law, and did not teach for the same corporation until the lapse of a period of four years, when he again was employed for a period of...