Castro-Moran v. State
| Decision Date | 23 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | A20A0450 |
| Citation | 845 S.E.2d 708,356 Ga.App. 248 |
| Parties | CASTRO-MORAN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Natalie Katherine Glaser, Sheri Layne Smith, for Appellant.
John Scott Helton, Dalton, Herbert McIntosh Poston Jr., for Appellee.
Following a jury trial, Catarina Castro-Moran was found guilty of second degree murder and cruelty to children in the second degree, and the trial court imposed a 10-year prison sentence. Castro-Moran appeals from the denial of her motion for new trial, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting her statements to police into evidence at trial. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter, however the trial court did not err by admitting Castro-Moran's statements to police into evidence at trial. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,1 the record shows that Amanda "Marie" Santos occasionally took care of Yessica, who was Castro-Moran's 17-month-old daughter. While at a store with Yessica and Castro-Moran on December 26, 2015, Santos noticed that Yessica had a fever, and she told Castro-Moran to give Yessica Tylenol
. Two days later, Castro-Moran told Santos that Yessica was still sick. Santos recommended that Castro-Moran take Yessica to a pediatrician or to the health department. Around the same time, Castro-Moran's neighbor observed Yessica as she spoke with Castro-Moran, and she told Castro-Moran that Yessica "looked sick." Also around the same time, Castro-Moran's roommate, Gustavo Perez, noticed that Yessica was ill. Castro-Moran told him that Yessica had a fever, and he told her to take Yessica to the hospital.
Castro-Moran later took Yessica to the health department. A nurse practitioner evaluated Yessica based on Castro-Moran's complaint that Yessica had a fever, that she had blood in her nose, and that Yessica's last bowel movement had been "very hard." The nurse practitioner determined that Yessica was dehydrated and recommended that Yessica to be taken to the emergency room. Although Castro-Moran took Yessica to the emergency room, she ultimately refused treatment for Yessica because of financial concerns, and she left the hospital with Yessica.
In the days that followed, Yessica continued to have a fever and Santos told Castro-Moran to take Yessica to a doctor. On December 31, 2015, Castro-Moran knocked on Perez's bedroom door and said, "I think my baby died." Perez ran to Castro-Moran's bedroom, saw Yessica lying in the bed with her eyes open, and called 911. He also performed CPR on Yessica after noticing that she was not breathing and had no pulse. While attending to Yessica, he noticed that she had a blister near her mouth, that her skin was pale, and that her eyes looked "stiff" as though "they had not moved in a long time."
Officers from the Dalton Police Department responded to the home and observed that Yessica was not moving, that her lip was blue, and that her eyes were dilated. One of the officers also administered CPR to Yessica and noticed that her arms and legs were stiff, which led the officer to believe that Yessica had been "deceased for some time." EMS later arrived and took Yessica to a hospital, where hospital personnel declared Yessica deceased. An autopsy determined that the cause of Yessica's death was an infection, staphylococcus aureus sepsis, which was "complicated" by her lack of white blood cells. Congenital adrenal hyperplasia
, an abnormality in Yessica's steroid hormones, also contributed to her death.
Castro-Moran was indicted on one count of felony murder ( OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) ) and one count of cruelty to children in the first degree ( OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) ). The jury found Castro-Moran guilty of the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and cruelty to children in the second degree.2 The trial court merged the cruelty to children in the second degree conviction with the second degree murder conviction and sentenced Castro-Moran to ten years’ imprisonment. Castro-Moran filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
1. First, Castro-Moran argues that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on reckless conduct as a lesser offense of cruelty to children in the first degree, and erred by failing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder.
(a) As to Castro-Moran's claim regarding the trial court's refusal to charge on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of felony murder, we agree that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury in this regard.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Soto v. State , 303 Ga. 517, 520 (2), 813 S.E.2d 343 (2018).
Here, Castro-Moran submitted a written request that the jury be charged on involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of felony murder.3 "A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony." OCGA § 16-5-3 (a).
In this regard, a person may be found guilty of misdemeanor reckless conduct when he or she causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his [or her] act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
(Citation omitted.) Seabolt v. Norris , 298 Ga. 583, 585-586 (2), 783 S.E.2d 913 (2016).
Based on the trial record before us, we conclude that there was some evidence that Castro-Moran was guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, and thus the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury in this regard. A nurse practitioner at the health department who initially examined Yessica testified that she told Castro-Moran that, based on her observations, Yessica was dehydrated and that she "really needed to go to the emergency room."
Although Castro-Moran took Yessica to the emergency room, she refused treatment for Yessica because of financial concerns. Based on this evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Castro-Moran endangered Yessica by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her failure to seek medical treatment for Yessica would endanger her and lead to her death. See Evans v. State , 346 Ga. App. 739, 744-745 (1), 816 S.E.2d 843 (2018) (physical precedent only) ( that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding by the jury that the defendant's failure to provide proper medical care and treatment for the victim constituted reckless conduct, which was the underlying unlawful act of the involuntary manslaughter charge). Therefore, because there was some evidence to establish involuntary manslaughter predicated upon reckless conduct, the trial court should have charged the jury in this regard. See Seabolt , supra, 298 Ga. at 585-586 (2), 783 S.E.2d 913 ().
Nevertheless, the State argues that the trial court was not required to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter because the evidence adduced at trial showed that Castro-Moran was guilty of the "completed" offense of felony murder predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree. This argument, however, is unavailing. While we have held that, "if the evidence shows the completed offense, as charged, or no offense, the trial court is not required to charge the jury on the lesser included offense[,]" we have also been clear that "[w]here a case contains some evidence, no matter how slight, that shows that the defendant committed a lesser offense, then the court should charge the jury on that offense." (Citation omitted.) Brinson v. State , 245 Ga. App. 411, 413 (2), 537 S.E.2d 795 (2000). There was at least slight evidence at trial which showed that Castro-Moran was guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct, and the trial court therefore erred by refusing to charge the jury in this regard.
We must next consider whether this instructional error was harmless. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Henry v. State , 307 Ga. 140, 146 (2) (c), 834 S.E.2d 861 (2019).
We conclude that the failure to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter was not harmless. Although the trial court charged the jury on the State's request for the lesser included offense of second degree murder4 of which Castro-Moran was ultimately convicted, we cannot say based on the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bell v. State
...verdict for second degree cruelty to children is ‘unmerged’ from her conviction for second degree murder." Castro-Moran v. State , 356 Ga. App. 248, 252 (1) (b), 845 S.E.2d 708 (2020). We are therefore authorized to consider her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to th......
- Chaney v. State
-
Bell v. State
...consider her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the verdict on the charge of second degree cruelty to children. See id. ("[I]f a defendant raises an issue on appeal that, remand, would bar entry of a conviction on a verdict that was merged or vacated, it is appropri......
-
Landell v. State
...from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.11 This Court recently addressed a similar case, Castro-Moran v. State ,12 predicated on a failure to provide medical care, and we held that the trial court erred by denying a request to charge on involuntar......