Castro v. Los Angeles Bd. of Education

• Decision Date: 06 January 1976
• Citation: 54 Cal.App.3d 232,126 Cal.Rptr. 537
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Rene CASTRO and Cecelia Castro, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 46006.

Page 537

126 Cal.Rptr. 537

54 Cal.App.3d 232

Rene CASTRO and Cecelia Castro, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 46006.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Jan. 6, 1976.

Hidalgo & Aranda by Manuel Aranda, Jr., Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Veatch, Snow, Carlson, Dorsey & Quimby by Frederick C. Quimby, Jr., Los Angeles, and Herbert F. Blanck, Encino, for defendants and respondents.

STEPHENS, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint for wrongful death filed by parents of the decedent.

The original complaint alleged that the death of decedent, a high school student, occurred while he was participating with his R.O.T.C. unit in a field trip within California which was organized by and under the supervision and control of agents, representatives and employees of respondent Board of Education, and that his death occurred as a result of their negligence. Respondent's first demurrer to the complaint (which objected in substance to a misjoinder of parties) was sustained with leave to amend. The First Amended Complaint restated the cause of action, and the proper parties were joined. Respondent then demurred to the First Amended Complaint, alleging failure to state a cause of action in that Education Code section 1081.5 as amended specifically exempted respondent from any liability for injuries or damages, including death, sustained by a student during a field trip or excursion. Appellants again amended their complaint by deleting the words 'field trip' and substituting therefor the words 'summer camp, bivouac, or summer training.' Respondent's demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint alleged that section 1081.5 was still applicable. The court agreed, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581.3. $The question before us is whether subparagraph (d) of Education Code section 1081.5, providing respondent with immunity from liability, is applicable. The portion of the section in question states: 'All persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have waived all claims against the district or the State of California for injury, accident, illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion. All adults taking out-of-state field trips or excursions and all parents and guardians of pupils taking out-of-state field trips or excursions shall sign a statement waiving such claims.'

In order to answer this question, we necessarily commence our analysis with the general statutory provision imposing liability upon a governmental entity. Government Code section 815.2, subparagraph (a) provides: 'A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.' As stated in 4 Witkin, Summary of California Law (Torts, § 94, pp. 2396--7), 'This basic provision carries over the respondeat superior liability previously imposed on school districts, making it applicable to all public entitles. Hence, the decisions applying the Educational Code provision are still good law: 'The pattern of vicarious liability for employees' negligence is essentially identical under both statutes. We have found no evidence indicating an intention on the part of the Legislature to alter the duty to provide supervision of students while on school grounds, the standard of care required of those undertaking to provide supervision, or the amount of evidence necessary to support a finding of negligence. . . .' (Citing Dailey v. Los Angeles U.S. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747 (87 Cal.Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360) and Biggers v. Sacramento U.S. Dist. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 269, 274 (101 Cal.Rptr. 706).)' Continuing, Witkin states (at p. 2398, § 95): 'The distinct problem of the duty to supervise pupils Not on school property is covered in Educ.C. 13557.5, enacted in 1972. The district is not liable for pupils' conduct or safety unless (a) there has been an Undertaking to provide transportation to and from school or to sponsor a School activity off school premises, or (b) responsibility or liability has been 'otherwise specifically assumed.' The liability in the event of a specific undertaking is imposed 'only while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an employee of such district or board. " (Emphasis original.)

It is clear then that absent the applicability of the waiver provisions of section 1081.5, the district could be liable for the negligent acts of its employees.

We observe a continuity of design in the sections to which reference was just made. Section 815.2 (Gov't Code) recognizes that school districts are liable for the negligence of their employees. Section 13557.5 (Educ.Code) limits that liability to the schoolground area Unless the district 'has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.

In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district . . . shall be liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil only while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an employee of such district . . ..'

Section 1081.5 (Educ.Co...