Castro v. Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island

• Decision Date: 05 April 2012
• Docket Number: C.A. PC 08-7573
• Parties: BRIAN CASTRO v. EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

BRIAN CASTRO v. EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND

C.A. No. PC 08-7573

Superior Court of Rhode Island

April 5, 2012

DECISION

RUBINE, J.

Appellant Brian Castro ("Castro") appeals from a decision of the Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island ("Board" or "ERSRI"). The Board's decision affirmed the Disability Subcommittee's ("Subcommittee") recommendation denying Castro's application for an accidental pension. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.

I Facts & Travel

Castro was employed as a deputy sheriff with the Rhode Island Sheriff's Department. Castro had served in that capacity for over twenty years. Castro originally applied for accidental disability retirement on April 8, 2005. (ERSRI Record, Ex. 33.) Castro listed a "neck fusion with a bad result" as the reason for his disability. Id

In support of Castro's application, Castro submitted to ERSRI an incident report dated August 30, 2002. The incident report stated that on August 30, 2002, while Castro was at work, Castro slipped on a wet floor in the bathroom at the State House. Id As a result, Castro sustained injuries to his neck and head. Castro later underwent surgery to alleviate these injuries.

In further support of his application, Castro submitted a report from Dr. Daniella Turacova. In her report, Dr. Turacova stated that Castro could no longer perform his duties as a sheriff. Id Additionally, Dr. Turacova estimated that Castro's fall in the bathroom was the proximate cause of his injuries. Id Castro was examined by Dr Kenneth Morrissey, and Dr. Morrissey also submitted a report to ERSRI. Dr. Morrissey stated that Castro had undergone surgery to have a cervical fusion done to alleviate a cervical disc injury. Dr. Morrissey determined that Castro was totally disabled and incapable of performing his job functions as a result of the bathroom fall. Id

Castro was examined by a third doctor, Dr. William Garrahan. Dr Garrahan submitted a report stating that Castro was suffering from weakness in his upper left extremity. Similarly, Dr Garrahan concluded that Castro was disabled and incapable of working as a sheriff because of the fall in the bathroom. Id Finally, Castro was examined by Dr. W. Lloyd Barnard. Dr. Barnard diagnosed Castro with cervical radiculopathy, which was a direct result from the fall. Dr. Barnard concluded that Castro was totally disabled and could not perform his duties as a sheriff Id

Thereafter, on November 17, 2007, the Subcommittee requested additional medical records relating to Castro's surgery and updated treatment records. Castro complied with the Subcommittee's request. The records revealed that Castro underwent surgery in December 2002, just four months after the bathroom fall. The records also revealed that prior to the fall, Castro complained of numbness in his left hand and had a herniated disc. A surgeon's report also stated that Castro had a "long history of neck pain."

The Subcommittee ultimately determined that Castro's fall in the bathroom was not a proximate cause of Castro's injuries. The Subcommittee determined that Castro's injuries were pre-existing conditions. Id The Subcommittee found it significant that Castro had been suffering the exact symptoms complained of in his application at least one year prior to his fall in the bathroom. Also, prior to his fall at work, Castro had gone for an MRI for numbness and tingling in his left hand. The MRI revealed that Castro was suffering from a herniated disc in his back. The Subcommittee determined that a report provided by Dr. Stern indicated that Castro was already considering "the very surgery that he now contends was made necessary by his fall at work." Id The Subcommittee recommended that Castro's application for an accidental disability retirement be denied. In December 7, 2007, the Subcommittee wrote a decision outlining the aforementioned facts, reasoning, and conclusions.

Shortly after receiving notice of the denial, Castro, through counsel, requested a reconsideration hearing. The reconsideration hearing was scheduled for February 8, 2008. (ERSRI Record, Ex. 25.) Sometime later, Castro's counsel requested the matter be continued from the February meeting to the Subcommittee's March meeting. Castro's reconsideration hearing was then continued at his request each successive month through August 2008.

In July 2008, the Assistant Director of Member Services of ERSRI wrote to Castro's counsel, warning him that failure to appear at the August hearing could result in a default being entered against Castro. (ERSRI Record, Ex. 29.) On August 7, 2008, the day before the hearing was scheduled, Castro's counsel sent a facsimile to the Assistant Director, stating that he would not attend the hearing the following day. (ERSRI Record, Ex. 30.) Castro's counsel did not seek further continuance of the matter; instead, he stated that he "must decline from moving forward on the appeal. . . . As the legal issues have not yet been resolved if I withdraw, until I reach a conclusion on the legal issues, the appeal simply cannot take place." Id

The following day, at the hearing, the Subcommittee determined that Castro's declining to "mov[e] forward on the appeal"-and not appearing at the reconsideration hearing he had requested and continued many times-constituted a default. See ERSRI Reg. § 9.7(b)(2). A member of the Subcommittee then made a motion to affirm the Subcommittee's prior decision. (ERSRI Record, Ex. 31.) Based on the original material submitted, the Subcommittee affirmed its prior recommendation denying Castro's application. The motion was ultimately approved by a majority vote of the Subcommittee. Id

On September 10, 2008, the Board adopted the Subcommittee's recommendation. (ERSRI Record, Ex. 33.) Castro was mailed notice of the Board's decision by certified mail on September 16, 2008. Id The certified letter was returned to the Board on October 4, 2008 after going unclaimed at the Post Office; however, Castro's counsel received notice of the decision. (ERSRI Record, Exs. 33, 36.) Castro filed this administrative appeal on November 28, 2008.

II Standard of Review

Pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court is granted appellate jurisdiction to review final orders as well as certain interlocutory orders of state administrative agencies not exempted from the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act. In undertaking that review, the Superior Court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Sec. 42-35-15(g); Barrington School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992). Section 42-35-15(g) of the APA states:

"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1)In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2)In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3)Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4)Affected by other error or law;

(5)Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Center for Behavioral Health, R.I., Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Wayne Distrib. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I. 1996) (citing Newport Shipyard Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 896 (R.I. 1994)). "[I]f 'competent evidence exists in the record, the Superior Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions.'" Autobody Ass'n of R.I. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Bus. Regulation, et al., 996 A.2d 91, 95 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Rhode Island Pub. Telecommunications Auth. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I. 1994)).

ERSRI uses a two-tier review process in which a hearing officer hears grievances and then issues a written decision that is submitted to the Retirement Board. The Board considers the decision, as well as any further briefs, and subsequently renders its own decision. ERSRI Reg. § 10.00(a). This two-tier system is similar to a funnel. Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 207 (R.I. 1993). At the first level of review, the hearing officer "sits as if at the mouth of the funnel" and analyzes the evidence, issues, and live testimony. Id At the second level of review, the "discharge end" of the funnel, the Board generally considers evidence that the hearing officer received first-hand. Id Our Supreme Court has held, therefore, that the "further away from the mouth of the funnel that an administrative official is . . . the more deference should be owed to the fact finder." Id. Determinations of credibility by the hearing officer, for example, should not be disturbed unless they are "clearly wrong." Id. at 206.

III Analysis Jurisdiction under § 42-35-15

ERSRI contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter because Castro filed his complaint in Superior Court more than thirty days from the mailing of...