Castro v. Melchor
| Citation | 760 F.Supp.2d 970 |
| Decision Date | 15 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 07–00558 LEK. |
| Parties | Leah CASTRO, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Briandalynne Castro, deceased minor, Plaintiff,v.Leroy MELCHOR, in his individual capacity; Wanna Bhalang, in her individual capacity; Tomi Bradley, in her individual capacity; Amy Yasunaga, in her individual capacity; Roberta Marks, in her individual capacity; Kenneth Zienkiewicz, M.D., in his individual capacity; Kay Bauman, M.D., in her individual capacity; Keith Wakabayashi, in his individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Charles W. Crumpton, Suanna Vo Hansen, Crumpton & Hansen, Bruce F. Sherman, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff.Elizabeth A. Stone, Office of the Attorney General, Marie Manuele Gavigan, Department of the Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On August 5, 2010, Defendants Leroy Melchor, Wanna Bhalang, Tomi Bradley, Amy Yasunaga, Roberta Marks, Kenneth Zienkiewicz, M.D., Kay Bauman, M.D., and Keith Wakabayashi, all in their individual capacities (collectively “Defendants”), filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). Leah Castro, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Briandalynne Castro, deceased minor (“Plaintiff”), filed her memorandum in opposition on September 27, 2010, and Defendants filed their reply on October 4, 2010. This matter came on for hearing on October 18, 2010. Appearing on behalf of Defendants was Marie Gavigan, Esq., and appearing on behalf of Plaintiff were Suanna Hansen, Esq., and Bruce Sherman, Esq. Also present were Defendants Wakabayashi, Yasunaga, Marks, Melchor, and Bradley. After careful consideration of the Motion, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, Defendants' Motion is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons set forth below.1
Plaintiff originally filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 8, 2007. Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on October 27, 2008, and her Second Amended Complaint on April 30, 2009.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that, on or about June 30, 2007, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Oahu Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”). Following a verbal exchange with a guard, two guards physically forced Plaintiff to the ground from a standing position. While she was lying on the ground on her stomach, the guards restrained her by holding their body weights against her back and legs and placing her in handcuffs. Plaintiff was approximately seven months pregnant at the time. [Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 16.]
On July 2, 2007, Defendant Yasunaga saw Plaintiff for a prenatal exam. Defendant Yasunaga ordered laboratory tests and scheduled an appointment for Plaintiff at Kapiolani Medical Center for Women and Children (“Kapiolani”). There is no indication that Plaintiff was experiencing vaginal bleeding at this time. [State Defs.' Concise Stat. of Facts in Supp. of Motion ( ), Aff. of Amy Yasunaga (“Yasunaga Aff.”) at ¶¶ 3–6, Exh. Plaintiff was brought late to the appointment at Kapiolani and was therefore asked to reschedule. Plaintiff was not taken back to Kapiolani until sometime after her transfer from OCCC to the Women's Community Correctional Center (“WCCC”). [Pltf.'s Concise Statement of Facts in Supp. of Mem. in Opp. to Motion (“Pltf.'s CSOF”),2 Exh. 2, Excerpts of 4/23/09 Depo. of Leah Castro (“Castro Depo.”), at 52.] Plaintiff was transferred to WCCC on August 2, 2007. [Defs.' CSOF, Exh. G, Pltf.'s Answers to Defendants' First Request for Admissions to Pltf., Dated June 5, 2009 (“Pltf.'s Admissions”), No. 56.]
Sometime after the incident with the guards, Plaintiff experienced vaginal bleeding. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff timely and repeatedly reported this to OCCC guards and requested medical care. The guards related Plaintiff's complaints to OCCC medical staff, including Defendants Melchor, Bhalang, and Bradley, who are nurses in the OCCC medical unit. Plaintiff, however, was not provided with timely or adequate medical care. [Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 6–8, 17.] During this time, Plaintiff was in a lock-down cell for administrative segregation. According to Plaintiff, while she was in lock-down, she was not allowed to communicate with anyone besides the guards, and she did not have daily access to the sick call nurse. [Pltf.'s CSOF, Aff. of Leah Castro (“Castro Aff.”), at ¶ 2; Exh. 2, Castro Depo., at 45–46.]
The Second Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendants Bauman, Zienkiewicz, Marks, Wakabayashi, and Yasunaga were negligent in their duties and responsibilities, including the hiring, training, and supervision of Defendants Melchor Bhalang, and Bradley. Further, Defendants Bauman, Zienkiewicz, Marks, Wakabayashi, and Yasunaga were responsible for providing Plaintiff with, or ensuring that she receive, adequate prenatal and other medical care, but they failed to do so. [Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 18–19.] At all relevant times, Defendants Bauman and Zienkiewicz were physicians in the OCCC medical unit, Defendants Marks and Wakabayashi were nurse supervisors in the OCCC medical unit, and Defendant Yasunaga was a nurse practitioner in the OCCC medical unit. [ Id. at ¶¶ 9–13.]
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that, as a result of Defendants' actions and/or omissions, Plaintiff's fetus died in the womb. Plaintiff delivered a stillborn on August 10, 2007. At the time of delivery, the fetus' gestational age was thirty-two weeks. [ Id. at ¶ 20.]
The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following claims: a § 1983 claim for the violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); negligence; and punitive damages. Plaintiff's claims include allegations that Defendants Marks, Zienkiewicz, Bauman, and Wakabayashi: negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained Defendants Melchor, Bhalang, Bradley, and Yasunaga; negligently failed to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical and prenatal care; negligently failed to reprimand Defendants Melchor, Bhalang, Bradley, and Yasunaga regarding the denial of medical care to Plaintiff; and negligently managed OCCC's medical services and procedures, including the failure to adequately document Plaintiff's medical complaints. [ Id. at ¶ 42.] Plaintiff seeks: general, compensatory, and special damages; punitive damages; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or any other applicable laws; and any other just and equitable relief.
In the instant Motion, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because no liability exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to Plaintiff's medical needs claim, Defendants contend that there are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendants were deliberately indifferent either to Plaintiff's medical needs or to an existing policy, custom, pattern, or practice that resulted in the deprivation of her constitutional rights. Defendants argue that Plaintiff must establish that she was “(1) confined under conditions posing a risk of ‘objectively, sufficiently serious' harm and (2) that ... Defendants had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ in denying the proper medical care.” [Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 8 (quoting Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir.2003)).] Defendants emphasize that mere negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference. Instead, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants were aware that the medical care in question was necessary and they “disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” [ Id. (citing Lolli, 351 F.3d at 419).]
Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not confined under conditions which posed a risk of objectively, sufficiently serious harm because she had access to a nurse during “sick call”. Sick call is a daily procedure during which a nurse is stationed in the inmate module to speak with inmates who have non-emergency concerns. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff was in “lock-down” during the time in question and that the sick call nurse does not go to each lock-down cell, but Defendants assert that the women's lock-down cells are located in the same area where the nurses conduct the sick call. Thus, if an inmate in a women's lock-down cell has a medical need, she can either call the sick call nurse to her cell or have a guard ask the sick call nurse to see her. Defendants note that there are no complaints from Plaintiff in the sick call log for the month of July 2007. [Defs.' CSOF, Decl. of Keith Wakabayashi (“Wakabayashi Decl.”), at ¶ 10; Exh. J, sick call log.] Defendants also point out that, from July 12 to July 31, 2007, Plaintiff had daily access to the nurse who dispensed Plaintiff's medication to her, but there is no record in any medical charts that she presented any health complaints to that nurse. [Defs.' CSOF, Wakabayashi Decl. at ¶ 11.]
Defendants point out that Plaintiff concedes that Defendants Bauman, Marks, and Wakabayashi (collectively “Supervisor Defendants”) did not provide any direct medical care to her. [Defs.' CSOF, Exh. G, Pltf.'s Admissions, Nos. 51–53.]...
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