Ilae v. Tenn

• Decision Date: 20 August 2013
• Parties: JOHN S. ILAE, Plaintiff, v. RODNEY TENN, LOUIS M. KEALOHA, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, JOHN DOES 1-25, DefendantS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

JOHN S. ILAE, Plaintiff, v. RODNEY TENN, LOUIS M. KEALOHA, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, JOHN DOES 1-25, DefendantS.

Civ. No. 12-00316 ACK-KSC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

Dated: August 20, 2013

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' RULE

12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 1, 2012, Plaintiff John S. Ilae ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Defendants Rodney Tenn, Louis M. Kealoha, and the City and County of Honolulu ("County") (collectively, "Defendants"). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's Complaint contains the following allegations: Count I - violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count II - Negligent Training/Supervision, Count III - Negligence, and Count IV - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id. On August 6, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 4. Upon Defendants' request, the Court stayed the Motion pending a summary judgment order issued by Judge Kobayashi that potentiallycould have affected Defendants' Motion.¹ ECF No. 18. On June 25, 2013, Defendants reactivated the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff filed his Opposition on July 5, 2013. ECF No. 23. Defendants filed their Reply on July 15, 2013. ECF No. 24. On July 29, 2013, this Court held a hearing regarding this matter. ECF No. 25.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

According to the standard for deciding a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court uses Plaintiff's Complaint to establish the factual background to decide this motion. See Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 2012).

On or about January 1, 2010, the Honolulu Police Department ("HPD") received allegations from certain individuals that Plaintiff assaulted three persons in Waimanalo, Hawaii earlier that morning. Compl. at 5, ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. Later that same day, the police allegedly verified the existence of the injuries suffered from one of the three complaining witnesses. Id. at 5, ¶ 15. On or about January 10, 2010, the assault casewas assigned to Defendant Tenn for further investigation. Id. at 5-6 ¶ 16. In March of 2010, the three complaining witnesses alleged that Plaintiff was the perpetrator of the assaults and identified Plaintiff from photo line ups. Id. at 6, ¶ 17. On or about April 1, 2010, the police confirmed the injuries suffered by one of the complaining witnesses after the witness previously told police that he had not sought medical treatment for his injuries. Id. at 6, ¶ 18.

On June 2, 2010, without first obtaining an arrest warrant, Defendant Tenn instructed police officers to arrest Plaintiff on three counts of assault in the second degree. Compl. at 6, ¶ 19, ECF No. 1.

The following events occurred on June 9, 2010. Around 7:30 a.m., the police arrested Plaintiff, transported him to the Kailua station, and notified Defendant Tenn of Plaintiff's arrest. Compl. at 6, ¶ 20, ECF No. 1. Around 8:45 a.m., the police administered an intoxilyzer test to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 21. Defendant Tenn arrived at the Kailua police station around 11:30 a.m. Id. at ¶ 22. The police continued to detain Plaintiff while Defendant Tenn waited for several other suspects to turn themselves in at the Kailua station. Id. at ¶ 23.

Around 1:40 p.m., Plaintiff was transferred to the Honolulu police station. Compl. at 7, ¶ 24. Defendant Tenn traveled from the Kailua station to the Honolulu station around2:20 p.m. Id. at ¶ 25. After Defendant Tenn and the arresting officer submitted the appropriate paperwork, the Honolulu District Court issued a probable cause determination for Plaintiff's warrantless arrest for assault in the second degree around 4:30 p.m. Id. at ¶ 26. Defendant Tenn advised Plaintiff of his constitutional rights around 10:30 p.m. and continued to detain Plaintiff through the rest of the evening after Plaintiff refused to make any statements. Id. at ¶ 27.

On June 10, 2010, no later than 7:45 a.m., Defendant Tenn was informed of the bail on the charges for which Plaintiff had been arrested. Compl. at 7, ¶ 28. Defendant Tenn continued Plaintiff's detention and charged him by felony information around 6:00 p.m. Id. at ¶ 29. Around 9:15 p.m., Plaintiff was released on bail nearly thirty-eight hours after his initial arrest. Id. at ¶ 30.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The Court may dismiss a complaint either because it lacks a cognizable legal theory or because it lacks sufficient factual allegations to support a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011).

For a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). However, "to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not defeat a motion to dismiss). Instead, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216.

"The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). However, in considering a motion to dismiss, "the court is not decidingwhether a claimant will ultimately prevail but rather whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted." Tedder v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 863 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1030 (D. Haw. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8).

The Court should grant leave to amend "even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other facts." OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012). Leave to amend "is properly denied, however, if amendment would be futile." Carrico v. City & County of S.F., 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether This Court Should Convert Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Into a Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 12(d)

Plaintiff attaches evidence to his Opposition in the form of a County memorandum regarding the County's alleged policy and practice of detaining an arrestee for up to 48 hours after a warrantless arrest ("48 Hour Rule"). Plntf.'s Opp. Ex. 2, ECF No. 23-2. As a general rule, "a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 668 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Davidson, Civ. No. 11-00498 LEK-RLP, 2012 WL 996890 at *9 (D. Haw. 2011). Under Rule 12(d), if"matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court," a motion to dismiss must be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. If the Court converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, then "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

While there are exceptions to the general rule, none of the exceptions apply to the instant case. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is not a document "whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions." See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). Exhibit 2 also does not fall within the judicial notice exception because the document presents facts that are "subject to reasonable dispute." See U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). In this case, Plaintiff attempts to use Exhibit 2 to establish the County's policy and practice of using the 48 Hour Rule. However, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and detained on June 9, 2010, but the Court observes that Exhibit 2 is dated January 20, 2011. See Plntf.'s Opp. Ex. 2, ECF No. 23-2. Thus, Exhibit 2 does not indicate that it represents the policy in effect in 2010 when Plaintiff was detained. Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion and declines toexamine Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 or convert Defendants' Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

II. Whether Plaintiff's First Cause of Action - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 States a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

In his First Cause of Action, Plaintiff makes numerous claims against various Defendants that his constitutional rights were violated. Although the Complaint is far from clear regarding the specific constitutional rights that have been violated, the Court will address the constitutional rights discussed in the Complaint and the parties' briefs.³

A. Whether Plaintiff Sufficiently Pleads a Violation of a Constitutional Right

1. The Alleged Delay Regarding Plaintiff's Probable Cause Determination

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a claim under the Fourth Amendment because a probable cause determination was made within 48 hours of Plaintiff's warrantless arrest. Def.'s MTD at 4-7, ECF No. 4-1.

The Fourth Amendment requires "a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to the extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Gerstein v. Pugh, ...