Al Castrucci Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Patricia S. Keidel
| Decision Date | 29 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | 90-LW-3094,C-890290 |
| Parties | AL CASTRUCCI CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patricia S. KEIDEL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from Hamilton County Municipal Court.
Taft Stettinius & Hollister and Timothy C. Sullivan, Cincinnati for plaintiff-appellee.
Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Marc D. Mezibov, and Edmund J. McKenna, Cincinnati, for defendant-appellant.
DECISION.
This cause came on to be heard upon the appeal, the transcript of the docket, journal entries and original papers from the Hamilton County Municipal Court, the transcript of the proceedings, the assignments of error, the briefs and the arguments of counsel.
Plaintiff-appellee Al Castrucci Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ("the dealership") sued defendant-appellant Patricia Keidel for breach of contract and restitution when she left her employment with the dealership after one week, having attended a training program at its expense. The trial court entered judgment for the dealership based upon the jury's verdict. The issues on appeal are whether it was proper for the trial court to overrule Keidel's motions for summary judgment, for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Keidel also claims the verdict was based upon insufficient evidence and was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We find none of her assignments to be well taken and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Keidel was hired by the dealership as a Finance and Insurance Manager ("F & I Manager"), after having become acquainted with the dealership's owner and president, Al Castrucci. Keidel was previously employed as an interior designer and furniture salesperson, and had assisted Castrucci and his wife in decorating their home. Castrucci was apparently impressed with Keidel's abilities and decided to offer her a position as F & I Manager. During one of several preliminary interviews with Keidel in which the duties, compensation and other aspects of the position were discussed, Castrucci informed Keidel that she would be sent to Chicago, Illinois, for training and that he expected her to work for him for three years, saying "you owe me three years, to which [Keidel] replied, Al, I told you I would give it a try." T.p. 88.
At some point before she left for her two-week training seminar, Keidel received an employee handbook, given to most of the dealership employees, which stated in part:
This handbook is a general outline of the company's benefits, rules, and important personnel policies. It is designed as a guide to ensure consistent fair and uniform treatment of all employees. This handbook, however, cannot anticipate every situation or answer every question about employment. Therefore, the company reserves the right to modify, rescind, delete, or add to the provisions of this handbook from time to time at it's [sic ] sole and absolute discretion. Under no circumstances should an employee view this handbook as an employment contract. Any contract for employment will be a separate formal document.
In a provision establishing the categories of probationary and regular full-time and part-time employees, captioned "Employee Status,", the handbook further provided:
Since all employees are hired for an unspecified duration, these classifications do not guarantee employment for any specific length of time. Employment is at the mutual consent of the employee and the company. Accordingly, either the employee or the company can terminate the employment relationship at will.
The timing of Keidel's acceptance of the position and her receipt of an employee handbook was disputed at trial. Keidel claimed that although she was uncertain at one time, she then believed that she was given the handbook before her acceptance. The dealership claimed that, according to her previous testimony at her deposition, she received the handbook only after she accepted the position, and that it did not form part of her oral agreement with the dealership.
Castrucci maintained that Keidel was given the book only to outline the benefits given to Keidel, and that Keidel's oral agreement with the dealership remained as an independent agreement based on the consideration that it would take time for Keidel to mature into an effective and profitable employee for the dealership and the dealership's guarantee of her minimum salary of $30,000 per year for three years.
Keidel attended the two-week course in Chicago and returned to work for the dealership. After one week, Keidel quit because, among other things, she had problems working with an uncooperative co-worker and felt that the management at the dealership was not responsive to those problems. The dealership then brought suit against Keidel for the cost of the seminar and related expenses including airfare, lodging, meals and the weekly draw against commissions paid to her during training.
In its amended complaint, the dealership claimed that it reasonably relied on the oral contract when it paid Keidel's tuition and expenses, that Keidel's retention of the benefits of the training was unconscionable, and that Keidel was thereby estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense to the dealership's claim of a material breach of contract and damages. See Gathagan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 16, 490 N.E.2d 923. Alternatively, the dealership claimed that it conferred a benefit upon Keidel that Keidel accepted, that it was unjustly denied the value of the benefits it conferred upon Keidel, and that it was therefore entitled to restitution to prevent Keidel's unjust enrichment. See Legros v. Tarr (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 1, 540 N.E.2d 257; Hughes v. Oberholtzer (1954), 162 Ohio St. 330, 123 N.E.2d 393; Hummel v. Hummel (1938), 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923.
Keidel argued, among other defenses, that she was employed under a contract terminable at the will of either party, or an "at-will" contract, as shown by the provisions of the employee handbook. Keidel's motions, mentioned above, were denied by the trial court, and the case was tried before a jury that awarded the dealership $2,516.21 in damages.
In her first assignment of error, Keidel claims that the trial court erred when it overruled her motion for summary judgment. Keidel raises three issues under this assignment of error: (1) that the trial court should have granted summary judgment on the first count of the amended complaint because the dealership failed to show that Keidel made any promises upon which the dealership could rely, or that it actually relied on any such promise, as a predicate for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, (2) that the trial court should have granted Keidel summary judgment on the second count of the amended complaint because the dealership failed to show that Keidel received any benefit from the training, or because any benefit she did receive was merely incidental to the dealership's promotion of its own interests, and (3) that she should have been granted summary judgment on both counts because she was entitled to terminate her "at-will" employment at any time under the terms of the employee handbook. We disagree with all three contentions.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the trial and appellate courts use the same standard: that the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and if, when the evidence is so viewed, reasonable minds can come to differing conclusions, the motion should be overruled. Hounshell v. American States Insurance Co. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 424 N.E.2d 311. A reviewing court must follow the standards of Civ.R. 56(C), which provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law, and that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion being adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267.
A review of the materials before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment, including the transcripts of the depositions of Castrucci and Keidel, shows that, with the inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the most favorable light to the dealership, there existed a genuine issue of material fact on each of the three issues listed above. First, Keidel testified at her deposition that she responded to Castrucci's assertion that she owed him three years by saying " "Al, now I told you I'd give it a try.' " T.d. 15 at 62. Notwithstanding her assertion that Castrucci's deposition testimony does not show whether she made any response to his assertion that she owed him three years, by her own testimony she at least arguably agreed to the terms of the job offer by her response, " * * * I'd give it a try." Also, at least a genuine question of material fact with regard to whether the dealership actually relied on her promise may be reasonably inferred from the fact that the dealership paid for Keidel's training and expenses. The trial court did not err by refusing summary judgment on...
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