Catalfo v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
| Decision Date | 19 December 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 55749,55749 |
| Citation | 213 N.W.2d 506 |
| Parties | Daniel CATALFO, Appellee, v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER CO. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Jones, Hoffmann & Davison, Des Moines, for appellants.
Hawkins, Hedberg & Ward, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
This is an appeal by defendants from trial court's judgment reversing the decision of a deputy industrial commissioner in a workmen's compensation review proceeding under Code § 86.34. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the industrial commissioner with instructions.
It is undisputed that claimant sustained injuries to his head, neck, back, and arm on December 15, 1966, when he caught his left arm in a conveyor while operating a sidewall mill in the Des Moines plant of defendant Firestone. He was hospitalized and examined by Dr. Marvin H. Dubansky, an orthopedic surgeon, who found claimant had suffered a comminuted fracture of the left humerus, fracture of the left ulna, laceration of the left forearm, radial nerve palsy, and blistering of the upper back.
Dr. Robert C. Jones, a neurosurgeon, was called to assist. He found marked atrophy of the deltoid superior and inferior spinatous muscle on the left and numbness of the fifth cervical dermatone, adding up to a complete radial nerve palsy, later determined to be at the site of the humerus fracture, and possible cervical nerve root avulsion, later confirmed by electromyogram.
Drs. Dubansky and Jones carried out surgical repair of the humerus and radial nerve injuries February 10, 1967. Additional surgery was done March 13, 1967, repairing the left ulna and the skin on claimant's back, and on August 22, 1967, involving the humerus. Claimant's injuries healed sufficiently so that he was authorized by Dr. Dubansky to return to work fulltime on April 15, 1968. The doctor believed he was weak but work activity would help. Dr. Dubansky last saw him July 15, 1968 and found he had a 20 percent permanent partial physical impairment of the left arm. Since he did not treat claimant for his neck injury, he did not attempt to rate any disability from it and deferred to Dr. Jones' opinion.
The fighting issue in this appeal relates to what effect should be given Dr. Jones' testimony. He last saw claimant February 11, 1969. At that time claimant's complaints were posterior neck pain, headaches, low back pain and slight numbness of the left upper leg, dizziness in bending over, and numbness and poor dexterity of the left arm. The doctor acknowledged he could better evaluate disability from the complaints if he observed claimant at work. He said the pain in the neck and headaches were related to the neck injury and the dizziness possibly so. He testified claimant might find difficult all tasks involving bending, stooping, squatting, working in tight places, craning of the neck and low back. He also testified, 'The problem with regard to the left arm has improved since the original injury, but I am led to understand that his incapacity with regard to the left arm is fairly well matched by his incapacity with regard to the neck pain and headaches.' He did not expect any significant future improvement.
Following are relevant parts of the deputy industrial commissioner's review-reopening decision:
'The principal question to be determined here is the nature and extent of the claimant's disability, if any, resulting from the incident of December 15, 1966.
'* * * The record indicates that the claimant sustained injuries on December 15, 1966, to his head, back and arm. It would appear, however, from reviewing the testimony of Dr. Dubansky and Dr. Jones, that the resultant disability attributable to this accident is confined to the arm. Although 'injury' has been defined as the producing cause, it is the 'disability' which determines the extent of compensation a claimant may be entitled to. (citation) The claimant's disability, to which both doctors referred, is apparently confined to his left arm. The claimant's recovery, therefore, will be restricted to the schedule contained in Section 86.34 (85.34), Code of Iowa. (citations) (italics added)
'* * *
'* * *
'THEREFORE, after considering all the credible evidence it is held and found as a finding of fact:
'That the claimant, Daniel Catalfo, sustained a personal injury on December 15, 1966, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company resulting in permanent partial disability to the extent of 20% Of the left arm.
'That the claimant's disability is confined to the left arm and the functional impairment thereof.'
Pursuant to Code § 86.26 claimant appealed directly to district court. Trial court read the deputy commissioner's decision as finding Dr. Jones' tetimony true but applying an incorrect rule of law and held claimant established as a matter of law his right to recover for permanent partial disability of the body as a whole under Code § 85.34, subd. 2(u). The court remanded the case to the industrial commissioner for determination of the extent of claimant's permanent disability.
Defendants appealed. They contend the deputy's finding that claimant's disability is limited to his left arm is supported by substantial evidence and thus conclusive. Claimant argues for the position taken by trial court.
In this posture the case is like Langford v. Kellar Excavating & Grading, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 667 (Iowa 1971), where we recognized the longstanding rule that under Code § 86.30 the industrial commissioner is the fact finder in workmen's compensation cases. '* * * (H)is findings are binding upon us if supported by substantial evidence; the facts determined by the industrial commissioner have the same effect as a jury verdict; and we may not interfere with such findings where there is a conflict in the evidence or when reasonable minds may disagree as to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, whether disputed or not.' Id. at 668. Nevertheless, we said 'this does not mean the fact finder may arbitrarily or totally reject the offered testimony, simply that he has the duty to weigh it and determine its credibility.' Id. at 669.
In that case, where the deputy found the medical testimony in support of the claim to be true and such testimony established the causal relationship at issue, we held the deputy erred in applying an incorrect standard of proximate cause to the established facts.
We agree with defendants we cannot say and trial court should not have said in this case, as we did in Langford, that medical testimony was accepted by the deputy as true and entitled claimant to his requested recovery as a matter of law. We simply do not know what the deputy meant when he made the statements in his decision, 'It would appear, however, from reviewing the testimony of Dr. Dubansky and Dr. Jones that the resultant disability attributable to this accident is confined to the arm' and, 'The claimant's disability, to which both doctors referred, is apparently confined to his left arm.' Did he overlook Dr. Jones' testimony as to disability from the neck pain and headaches? Did he find the doctor's testimony incredible? If so, was it because he did not testify truthfully or because claimant's complaints were spurious? Why did he reject, discount, or disregard it? If he found claimant's complaints were real and the doctor's testimony true, we believe the holding in Langford would require the result reached by trial court.
The above-quoted statements from the deputy's decision add nothing to his later finding that claimant's disability is limited to 'permanent partial disability to the extent of 20% Of the left arm.' He does not say what evidence he adopted or what reasoning he used in reaching his conclusion that disability is limited to the arm.
Administrative findings of fact must be sufficiently certain to enable a reviewing court to ascertain with reasonable certainty the factual basis...
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