Catawissa Railroad Co. v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 28 March 1865
• Citation: 49 Pa. 186
• Parties: Catawissa Railroad Company <I>versus</I> Armstrong.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

49 Pa. 186

Catawissa Railroad Company versus Armstrong.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 28, 1865.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Lycoming county.

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George White, for plaintiffs in error.

J. & W. H. Armstrong, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered, March 28th 1865, by THOMPSON, J.

The principal grounds of complaint in this case are, the answer of the court to the third and fifth points of the defendants below.

The third point was, "that if Armstrong knew, or had the opportunity of knowing, that the train of defendants was at the Muncy Station, he was guilty of negligence in approaching the train in a hand-car, and thus occupying the track. The plaintiff cannot recover."

A negative of this point, I cannot doubt, might have been correct. Where was the negligence or impropriety in approaching it, if AT the station? The advance towards it would not necessarily put it in motion, or excite it into action, like a wild beast. The fact of being on the road with a hand-car was no trespass. It was a machine necessarily used in the business of the road, the use of which road the defendants had by contract, and if it did not obstruct trains, it was otherwise lawfully on the road. It was made to be used there with the limitation that it was not entitled to the road at any specified times as trains are. The point might with propriety have been negatived, but the court went further than a negative, and introduced what may have been very prejudicial to the defendants, without sufficient authority to justify it. They said: "If Armstrong knew, or had the opportunity of knowing, that the train of the defendants' cars was at Muncy Station, he was NOT guilty of negligence in approaching the train in a hand-car, and thus occupying the track of the road, unless he knew the train was in motion." Granting, as has been done, that the court might have declared that it was not negligence to approach the train at Muncy Station, in the hand-car, was the qualification, in case it was in motion, properly put? It was not negligence, say the court, unless he knew it was in motion! This was putting the case, I think, far too favourably for the plaintiff, and just as far too unfavourably to the defendant. Analyzed, it was that, unless actual knowledge was brought home to the deceased of the motion of the train, he might advance, at the speed of a man running, (which was the testimony in regard to the motion of the hand-car), at the moment of collision, and not be guilty of negligence. Unless he actually knew the train was moving, he was not put upon the duty of taking care. Whatever he did was nothing against him, unless it could be shown he knew there was a superior force in motion, which might crush him. I think this a fair analysis of the instruction. A jury might well infer from this, that they might dispose of the question of negligence without any test but the absence of proof that those who managed the hand-car knew the train was in motion towards them. It seems to me this, although perhaps not intended, thrust aside as unimportant, all inquiry into the fact of means of knowledge to be afforded by signals on part of the agents of the company. If this was a proper instruction, it looks as if it left the defendants only the chance of proving the deceased negligent by proving actual knowledge of danger, by knowledge of the advancing train. This was more than the law requires. It is the essence of all the authorities, that it is a duty incumbent on all persons on the track of a railroad, although rightfully there, but in subordination to the paramount right of passing trains, to exercise that care which prudence would suggest, measured by the standard of care which a prudent man would naturally adopt in such circumstances. There is no such thing as regarding a reasonable being released from care in such circumstances; and nothing but the affirmation of the proposition, that a man is not bound to use care unless he actually knows of a special peril, can ever release him! The hand-car, in the case before us, a very inferior vehicle in point of power and strength, was on the road in a dark night — it was advanced rapidly along the track with a view to pass the train at the station, and in the attempt, neither going on to the siding, nor, so far as the testimony shows, stopping to ascertain if the train had passed on to the siding, comes in contact with the backing cars, and death ensues; was it a proper instruction in such circumstances to say, as a matter of law, that there was NO negligence in this, unless the deceased and his companions knew the train was moving? We do not think it was. The deceased was bound to omit no reasonable precaution to avoid accident. He must have known, as all know who are acquainted with the working of railroads, that trains at stations move to and fro, very frequently, in adding to or diminishing their trains, or in discharging or loading freight. The words of the learned judge seem clearly to imply that the necessity of caution in the particular instance was only to result from a knowledge of the moving train. The point might have been negatived, as already said; but more properly the...