Cathedral City Redevelopment v. Stickles

• Decision Date: 19 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. E036456.,E036456.
• Citation: 134 Cal.App.4th 1406,36 Cal.Rptr.3d 833
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CATHEDRAL CITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sam STICKLES, Individually and as Trustee, etc. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

36 Cal.Rptr.3d 833

134 Cal.App.4th 1406

CATHEDRAL CITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sam STICKLES, Individually and as Trustee, etc. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. E036456.

Court of Appeal of California, Fourth District, Division 2.

December 19, 2005.

The Law Office of Martin Lax and Martin Lax, Palm Desert, for Defendants and Appellants.

Oliver, Vose, Sandifer, Murphy & Lee and James Duff Murphy, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

KING, J.

INTRODUCTION

In this quick take eminent domain proceeding defendants and appellants¹ appeal from a judgment in favor of respondent, Cathedral City Redevelopment Agency (CCRA), condemning appellants' three residential rental properties for redevelopment purposes. We affirm the judgment.

In quick take eminent domain proceedings, the date of valuation of the property, for purposes of trial on the issue of the property owner's just compensation, is statutorily required to be no later than the date the plaintiff makes a deposit of probable compensation. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1263.110.)² Here, CCRA deposited $287,000 on December 16, 2002, and on January 20, 2004, deposited an additional $30,500, a total deposit of $317,500. The additional $30,500 was deposited pursuant to the parties' stipulation and the trial court's order, following a hearing on appellants' motion to increase the deposit. (§ 1255.030.) Appellants later filed a motion in limine to set the date of valuation on the date of trial. The trial court denied the motion, and set the date of valuation on December 20, 2002, the approximate date of the original deposit. (§ 1255.110.) At trial on the compensation issue, which commenced on April 28, 2004, a jury determined that the fair market value of the properties was $384,360 on December 20, 2002.

Appellants contend that the trial court committed reversible error in setting the date of valuation on December 20, 2002. They first argue that the date-of-deposit valuation rule of section 1263.110 did not apply because: (1) CCRA did not, by its own admission, deposit the "full" amount of appellants' probable compensation on or before December 20, 2002; (2) the $287,000 deposit was made in "bad faith" because it was based on a then 13-month-old, November 20, 2001, appraisal; and (3) CCRA failed to timely increase the deposit by the additional $30,500 within 30 days of the trial court's order requiring the additional deposit. (§§ 1263.110, subd. (b) & 1255.030, subd. (c).) Accordingly, appellants contend that their properties should have been valued on April 28, 2004, pursuant to the date-of-trial valuation rule of section 1263.130.

In the alternative, appellants contend that section 1263.110 was unconstitutionally applied to them because their properties substantially increased in value between the date of the original deposit and the commencement of trial on the compensation issue. Appellants rely on Saratoga Fire Protection Dist. v. Hackett (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 895, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 (Saratoga), which followed the settled rule that statutory requirements in eminent domain proceedings must be disregarded where necessary to ensure that the property owner receives just compensation at the time of the taking.³

Based on Saratoga, appellants argue that the trial court should have set the date of valuation on the date of trial or, alternatively, should have allowed them to present evidence to the jury of the fair market value of their properties at the time of trial and allowed the jury to decide whether they were entitled to the fair market value of their properties at the time of trial. More broadly, appellants maintain that their constitutional right to just compensation at the time of the taking required the trial court "`"to adopt working rules in order to do substantial justice in eminent domain proceedings."'" (Saratoga, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 906, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 696.)⁴

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the date of valuation on December 20, 2002, for purposes of the trial on the compensation issue, and that section 1263.110 was not unconstitutionally applied to appellants. First, substantial evidence supports the trial court's implicit determination that CCRA complied with the requirements of section 1263.110. Additionally, the initial deposit of $287,000 was not substantially less than the $317,500 amount that CCRA later admitted and the trial court implicitly determined was the fair market value of appellant's properties on December 20, 2002. Thus, setting the date of valuation on December 20, 2002, ensured that appellants received just compensation.

Appellants further contend that the trial testimony of CCRA's expert appraiser, Michael Champion, should have been excluded because he relied on an incorrect definition of fair market value. (§ 1263.320.) We reject this contention without considering its merits, because appellants have failed to designate any portion of Champion's trial testimony or any portion of the trial transcript, for that matter, as part of the record on this appeal. (Rancho Santa Fe Assn. v. Dolan-King (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 28, 46, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 614.)

DISCUSSION

A. The Quick-Take Statutory Scheme

Under the Eminent Domain Law (§ 1255.010 et seq.), the fair market value of the property on the "date of valuation" is the amount of compensation that must be awarded for the property. (§§ 1263.310 & 1263.320.)⁵ The statutes provide for three alternative dates of valuation: (1) the date of the commencement of the proceedings if trial on the compensation issue commences within one year of the date the proceedings commence (§ 1263.120);⁶ (2) the date a deposit of "probable compensation" is made (§ 1263.110, subd. (a));⁷ and (3) the date of commencement of trial on the compensation issue if trial does not commence within one year of the date the proceedings commence and the delay is not caused by the defendant (§ 1263.130).⁸

The date-of-deposit valuation rule of section 1263.110 applies only in "quick take" or "early possession" eminent domain proceedings. (See Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 794, 800-801, 214 Cal.Rptr. 904, 700 P.2d 794 (Gilmore).) In these proceedings, the plaintiff makes a deposit of the probable amount of compensation that the defendant will be awarded in the proceeding. (§ 1255.010 et seq.) In consideration for the deposit, the plaintiff is entitled to seek an order for prejudgment possession of the property pending a jury trial on the compensation issue. (§ 1255.410 et seq.) Regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks an order for early possession, the date of valuation is statutorily required to be no later than the date of the deposit. (§ 1263.110 et seq.; fn. 7, ante.)

Shortly after the deposit is made, the defendant may withdraw all or any portion of the deposit, subject to the claims of other persons having interests in the property (§ 1255.210 et seq.), and may invest the deposit in comparable real properties or other investments. If any portion of the deposit is withdrawn, the defendant waives its right to contest the plaintiff's right to take the property. (§ 1255.260.)

Regardless of whether the defendant withdraws all or any portion of the deposit, the defendant has a right to a jury trial on the amount of just compensation. (Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Harcros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1116, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 12; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19;⁹ People v. Ricciardi (1943) 23 Cal.2d 390, 402, 144 P.2d 799.) "All other questions of fact, or mixed fact and law, are to be tried ... without reference to a jury." (Id. at p. 402, 144 P.2d 799.) The questions to be tried before the court include, without limitation, whether the amount of the deposit equals the probable amount of the defendant's just compensation. (§ 1255.030.)

The quick-take statutory scheme includes procedures that are designed to ensure that the deposit equals the probable amount of compensation the defendant will be awarded at trial on the compensation issue. The deposit must be based on an appraisal, and the plaintiff must give notice of the deposit with a written statement or summary of the basis for the appraisal. (§§ 1255.010¹⁰ & 1255.020.) After the deposit is made, the plaintiff or any party having an interest in the property may move the trial court to "determine or redetermine whether the amount deposited is the probable amount of compensation that will be awarded in the proceeding." (§ 1255.030, subd. (a).) The motion must be supported "with detail sufficient to indicate clearly the basis for the motion," including the same type of information provided by the plaintiff in its written statement or summary supporting the deposit. (Ibid.; § 1255.060, subd. (b).)¹¹

If the trial court determines that the deposit is less than the probable amount of the defendant's compensation, the plaintiff must increase the deposit accordingly "within 30 days from the date of the court's order, or any longer time as the court may have allowed at the time of making the order." (§ 1255.030, subd. (c).) If the plaintiff does not increase the deposit within the time allowed, then "no deposit shall be deemed to have been made" for purposes of section 1263.110 and the date-of-deposit valuation rule will not apply. (§ 1263.110, subd. (b).)¹² In this event, the property will be valued on the date the proceedings commenced or on the date trial commences on the compensation issue, depending upon whether trial on the compensation issue commences within one year of the date the proceedings commenced and depending further upon whether the delay was caused by the defendant. (§§ 1263.120 & 1263.130.)

B. The Overriding Principle of Just Compensation

Notwithstanding the eminent domain statutes, it is settled that the defendant has a constitutional right to just compensation, which "`cannot be made to depend upon state statutory provisions.'...